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ABSTRACT 
 
Disciplined Intuition: Subjective Aspects of Judgment and 
Decision Making in Child Protective Services. (May 2003) 
Robert  S. Daniel, B.A., The University of Texas at Austin;  
M.A.H.S., St. Edward’s University 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Carolyn Clark 
 
 This qualitative study was aimed at developing an understanding of how persons 
involved in the investigation or deliberation of child abuse and neglect cases think 
and feel about the process of weighing evidence and drawing conclusions from it. 
Twenty investigators, supervisors, and administrators employed by the Child 
Protective Services agency in Texas were asked to describe cases they had 
investigated or reviewed that had been particularly difficult because of conflicting or 
ambiguous evidence. They were also asked opinion questions about the agency’s 
actuarial risk assessment instrument and the concept of preponderance of evidence. 
Finally, participants were asked to respond to two short case vignettes describing 
allegations of sexual abuse. Constant comparative and narrative analysis of interview 
data revealed that the process of case deliberation in CPS makes use of both intuitive 
and analytic decision-making styles, and there is a general movement from intuition 
to analysis as a case ascends the decision-making hierarchy. This movement entails a 
shift from narrative forms of thought and an outcome-oriented ethic to analytic forms 
of thought and a rule-based ethic. Though intuitive decision making is at least partly 
guided from personal experience and personal values, and does produce error 
because of that, it is nonetheless a form of rationality as capable of being guided by 
scrupulousness and fidelity to truth as analysis is. The personal value and outcome-
oriented ethic that intuition brings to the decision making process not only cannot be 
eliminated, it is necessary to the program’s achievement of its mission. It is 
recommended that the training of new investigators should, first, acknowledge the 
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large role that intuitive thinking plays in CPS decision making and, second, develop 
ways to help decision makers discipline intuition, in the words of one participant, 
and to create conditions that foster its optimal functioning.  
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 A woman named Carmen, who supervises a Child Protective Services (CPS) 
investigative unit in Austin, Texas, begins a story: 
 
We had a two-year-old, nonverbal child who was being split evenly, so…and 
that’s… that’s one point that made it very difficult in this case. Half…half the week 
with mom, half the week with dad. Dad has a… um… a wife with other kids? Mom 
has a boyfriend and one other child. And he was coming back from visits with his 
father with blisters or burns. And… um… we just… we had no idea.  So mom kept 
calling in these referrals: “Every time I get my child back, he has a burn or a blister.” 
 
 Carmen goes on to explain that the blisters or burns were on the boy’s hands and 
feet, also his lower trunk, including his buttocks and scrotum. “We took pictures, “ 
Carmen says, “and the pictures are horrific. They look like this child was held over a 
steam-pot, and it just steamed the skin off of this child.”   
 The doctor who examined the boy in the Emergency Room couldn’t tell whether the 
lesions were the result of burning or of an unusual skin disease, so the investigator 
working the case took the child to a dermatologist. The dermatologist said the boy did 
indeed have a skin disease and had not been burned. Just to make sure, Carmen asked 
the investigator to get a second opinion. The second dermatologist disagreed with the 
first, saying that very hot water or steam had caused the blisters. “When?” the 
investigator asked, hoping to determine from that whether the mother or the father, or 
either of their new spouses, was responsible. But the doctor could not make a good 
estimate about the time. 
 The investigator watched the child with both families, and he seemed to her to have a  
 
This dissertation follows the style and format of Narrative Inquiry. 
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trusting, happy relationship with everyone, including the three older children who lived 
with the father and the stepmother, and the babysitter his mother left him with 
sometimes. Carmen and the investigator discussed the case with the regional 
administrators and attorneys. While it was still under investigation, the child was going 
back and forth as usual between the mother and father. One day the father took the child 
to the Emergency Room covered with bruises, having been “beaten black and blue,” says 
Carmen, “black and blue.” The father’s story was that the boy had shown up at his house 
that morning, having come from the mother’s, with at least some of the bruises, and had 
then later fell down at a picnic. The other children in the father’s house told the 
investigator, “One day we heard mom upstairs yelling, and then we heard a big old 
thump, and then we heard the baby crying.” It wasn’t clear, though, whether this was the 
same day the boy was taken to the hospital. Suspicion also fell on the mother’s new 
spouse, because throughout the investigation he had behaved belligerently to the 
investigator and shown a bad temper.  
 While the investigator was sorting out the possibilities, the hospital performed a long 
bone X-ray of the boy and found that he’d suffered a number of fractures at different 
times in the past. “Somebody’s been beating this child all his life,” Carmen says. The 
doctor said to the investigator, “’I don’t see a place where this child hasn’t been hit or 
broken.’” Since the medical evidence could not establish when these beatings occurred, 
where they had occurred could not be determined either. The judge who heard the case 
therefore ordered that not only would the victim be taken away from both families and 
placed in foster care, the mother’s infant daughter would be removed, too. The judge did 
not order the older children in the father’s home to be taken because, being of school 
age, they were seen daily by responsible adults outside the home. When long bone X-
rays showed the infant to be free of injury, the judge ordered her to be returned home as 
well. The boy remained in custody at the time Carmen told me the story. His skin was 
being closely monitored so if any new blistering appeared he could be taken quickly to 
the dermatologist for diagnosis. 
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 Carmen’s investigator was, of course, devastated when she learned that the child had 
been beaten at least one more time as a result of her not taking him away sooner. 
Carmen says she did her best to console the investigator: “No. Everything you did was 
approved by me. Everything you didn’t do was approved by me.  We’ve staffed this case 
a million times. So it’s not your fault.” Carmen adds that she and the investigator were 
told repeatedly by Carmen’s boss, the Program Director, that they had done everything 
they should have. “But it’s hard,” Carmen says. “You sit there as a supervisor saying, 
‘What else could I have done? Why did I let this child endure this much more pain?’”  
She calls this case the most “horrific” she’s ever dealt with, partly because, in the end, 
after all they had done, “We don’t know. We don’t know.” 
 Hardly anyone comments on decision making in CPS without pointing out the 
importance of getting it right.  Carmen’s story clearly shows the cost of investigation and 
assessment failure. Because the degree of risk the boy faced was initially 
underestimated, because of the unusually ambiguous evidence, he had to endure further 
abuse. The infant girl was perhaps separated from her parents unnecessarily. Both kinds 
of error, the false positives and false negatives, are potentially disastrous to children, to 
families, and to their communities.   
 Carmen’s story, however, is not primarily about the consequences of error. It is 
about the struggle against error, the great difficulty of achieving truth and justice in a 
case where the evidence is incomplete, conflicting, or vague. It’s also about the 
emotional price of maintaining that struggle, especially when it falls short of its goals. 
This study, like a great many before it, is interested in what promotes or hampers 
accuracy in CPS decision making. Somewhat more unusually, it is also interested in the 
subjective aspects of that decision making. How do investigators, and those above them 
in the hierarchy, think and feel about the process of collecting evidence, weighing it, and 
reaching conclusions? Do personal values and experiences influence decision making? If 
so, how? Is such influence always for the worse, as many have assumed? Are there some 
values and experiences that can actually improve accuracy? 
 These are questions that have long been of interest to me as an investigator, an 
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evaluator of investigative reports, a trainer of investigators, and now as a researcher. 
When I began my graduate studies I had been working for number of years at a series of 
jobs related to the investigation of abuse and neglect in facilities for persons with mental 
illness and mental retardation. That particular field of investigation, when I first took it 
up, was still new, and no formal training for it had yet been developed. So all of us 
around the state of Texas hired into those first investigator positions proceeded more or 
less intuitively, taking statements from the people involved, collecting other evidence 
that seemed to likely to shed light on the matter, and then writing our reports more or 
less as we had written papers in college – presenting a thesis and supporting it with facts, 
expert opinion, and close inference.  We brought to our work the habits of research, 
judgment, and argumentation we’d acquired through our general, liberal educations. We 
seemed to have gained a fundamental understanding of concepts like relevance, 
coherence, probative weight, and quality of argument.  No doubt we would have been 
better off with specialized training, but for the most part, our feel for inquiry stood us in 
good stead.   
     When, later in my career, I became a receiver of investigative reports, rather than a 
producer of them, I discovered that what had come somewhat naturally to me and others 
never came at all to some, even after specialized training and years of experience. A 
surprisingly large number of investigators made what seemed to me obviously fallacious 
inferences from the evidence collected. Or they failed to understand what a case was 
really about, focusing on extraneous matters and ignoring the central issue. Or they left 
important questions unanswered, apparently not realizing why they mattered. These 
were not failures of procedure. They showed an absence of that feel for inquiry, that 
reflective judgment, or critical reasoning ability, without which facts never become 
evidence, and evidence cannot point to the truth. 
 I began to wonder what could be done in training or in supervision to foster, or 
perhaps simulate, a feel for inquiry in those who did not have it already when they came 
to our agency. This became a matter of some personal urgency when I became a trainer 
of new investigators. I thought, or hoped, that perhaps the right sort of exhortation, the 
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right examples, or the right exercises could at least make uneasy the sleep of reason and 
alert investigators to the most horrible possibilities of error. In a broader way, I began to 
wonder, too, what the feel for inquiry is exactly, what it is, in practical terms, to make 
sense of a mass of evidence, to be satisfied that one has arrived at the truth. I hoped to 
explore that issue as I began my Ph.D. program in Educational Human Resources 
Development. I wanted to understand the process of making investigative judgments and 
to learn what I could do as a trainer to make those judgments better. 
 A work that greatly influenced my early thinking about these issues was Inside the 
Juror, a collection of essays on juror judgment and decision making edited by Hastie 
(1997). The essays represented a variety of approaches to the understanding and 
modeling of the jury decision-making process.  Most assumed the process to be a logical 
or semi-logical one whereby an initial belief state A would be impacted in some fashion 
by evidence E and give rise to new belief state B. This was interesting, despite the fact 
that none of the authors tried to assign values to any of the variables, even in a 
hypothetical who-stole-the-tarts type case, nor did they describe how this might be done. 
Also missing was any sort of explanation as to just what psychological mechanism 
caused or could cause changes in belief. So even though the practical application of 
these models was far from clear, I was intrigued by the possibilities. Could I, perhaps 
with a series of specially constructed case problems with known outcomes, find a way to 
measure the accuracy of trainees’ judgments? And then could I act upon their judging 
process in different ways to find the explanations or exercises that would increase 
accuracy the most? After reading more deeply into the literature of judgment and 
decision making and taking my first research courses, I believed I was aimed at a 
standard HRD study, in which I would measure a group’s level of performance, provide 
training of a certain type, then measure the performance again.  When, though, I began 
to cast around for the means to accomplish this, I recapitulated a transformation I think 
many qualitative researchers had made before me.   
 I wrote a paper for a class that was my first attempt to explore in an organized way 
the questions with which I had begun my graduate study. Much of the research in the 
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judgment and decision making field proceeds from the assumption that the choices 
human beings make in practical situations are, or ought to be, rational. That is, they 
result, more or less purely, from a fundamental desire to get as much as possible of what 
one wants and avoid losing as much as one can of what one has. A decision follows 
therefore from a calculation of cost, risk, and expected benefit, one that should, when 
conducted properly, conform to the laws of the probability calculus. Researchers have 
found over and over again, however, that people fail to be rational in the judgments they 
make. They choose in violation of probability, even after its principles have been 
patiently explained. Even the intuitive judgments of experts, psychological diagnosis and 
prediction, for example, are almost always less accurate than decision models even when 
they model previous choices made by the same person.  
 Among the articles I read for that paper was one by Camerer and Johnson (1997), 
which also found the intuitive judgment by experts to be inaccurate and inconsistent. In 
passing the authors referred to a 1959 study by Goldberg, which found in general a 65% 
accuracy rate among neurologists trying to diagnose organic brain damage, but also 
found one doctor, reported to work slowly, who was right 83% of the time. This 
impressed me. It impressed me a great deal more, in fact, than the rule to which it 
appeared to be an exception. I realized I was much less interested in exploring further 
the construction and application of decision models than I was in finding out about that 
guy. I wanted to talk to him, see what thoughts and feelings he brought to his judgment 
tasks that made him superior.   
 Also, I became aware of the connection some researchers had made between 
judgment and ethics. Schön (1987), Langer (1989; 1997), and King and Kitchener 
(1994) all identified a certain kind of intellectual virtue, very much like Aristotle’s 
phronesis, as the hallmark of excellence in judgment and in the solving of ill-structured, 
complex problems. These writers saw practical wisdom as neither knowledge nor skill, 
but as a principled way of applying knowledge and skill, a commitment to truth that 
faces inward as much as outward, a modesty before evidence that could not be captured 
in a protocol. These theories seemed to support the notion of the feel for inquiry and its 
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ethical underpinnings I had arrived at intuitively, as an investigator, a reader of 
investigative reports, and a trainer. 
 In the spring of 2000 I took my first course in qualitative research and came to see 
that valuable insight into the lives and activities of human beings could be gained by 
simply asking them questions, recording their answers, and analyzing the results, that 
there were, in fact, subtleties of thought and feeling that would reveal themselves no 
other way. In addition, by actually doing qualitative research, I found that it suited my 
abilities and interests in a way that quantitative research was never likely to do. Because 
of my experience as an investigator and some counseling training I had when I was 
getting my master’s degree, I understood interviewing. So with a sense of both relief and 
trepidation I committed myself to the qualitative course. 
 I decided, for two reasons, to make Child Protective Services (CPS) the focus of my 
research, even though my area of specialization, as an investigator and trainer, had 
always been Adult Protective Services (APS). First, the literature having to do with 
decision making in CPS is much more plentiful. Second, unless I went to another state I 
couldn’t hope to find many APS participants for the study with whom I wasn’t 
acquainted. I thought investigators in my own agency might censor or tailor their 
responses on the chance that, despite assurances to the contrary, what they said would 
not be held confidential. 
 I did not have formal hypotheses when I began my research, though I did have 
expectations, developed both from my work experiences and my preliminary research. I 
expected to find that the role a person played in an organization influenced his or her 
decision making. For instance, it had long seemed to me that the amount of evidence 
seen as necessary to justify a validation of an allegation of abuse and neglect tended to 
increase as one moved up the agency hierarchy. Investigators would be more inclined 
than supervisors to validate in a case where the evidence was mixed or contradictory. 
Supervisors would be more inclined to validate than Program Administrators, and so on 
up the ladder. Whether this had more to do with differences in age, personality, bias, or 
philosophy among persons at different levels or simply with closeness to or distance 
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from the investigation, I didn’t know, but was curious to find out. I also expected to find 
the case decision making of the participants showing the influence of personal factors – 
experiences, beliefs, acculturation – that were extraneous to the case evidence. In some 
of the staff members I would interview, especially those considered exemplary by 
others, I expected to see those virtues of discipline, scrupulousness, diligence, and 
fidelity that made up the feel for inquiry. In others I expected to see narrowness, 
predisposition, carelessness, and habit paving the way to judgment error. I hoped to gain 
insight into the nature of the differences between the two groups. 
 Though my findings have by no means settled the question of why people in higher-
paying jobs weigh evidence differently from those who get less, or why some 
investigators have the feel for inquiry and others do not, I have gained a clearer 
understanding the nature of those differences, and succeeded, I think, in showing how 
they manifest themselves in the ways different persons perceive case facts, organize 
them into coherent narratives, and draw conclusions form them. Specifically, I have 
found the following: 
• The process of case deliberation in CPS makes use of both intuitive and analytic 
decision-making styles. 
• There is a general movement from intuition to analysis as a case ascends the 
decision-making hierarchy and as it progresses from intake to closure. This 
movement entails a shift from narrative forms of thought, outcome-oriented 
ethics, and a grounding in personal identity to analytic forms of thought, rule-
based ethics, and grounding in group identity. 
• Intuitive decision making is at least partly guided from personal experience and 
personal values, and does produce error because of that. It is nonetheless a form 
of rationality as capable of being guided by scrupulousness and fidelity to truth 
as analysis is. 
• The personal value and outcome-oriented ethic that intuition brings into the 
decision making process not only cannot be eliminated, it is necessary to the 
program’s achievement of justice. Intuition corrects for the excesses and 
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insensitivities of system, just as system corrects for intuition’s bias and 
narrowness of focus. Doing right by the children, families, and communities CPS 
serves comes about through a balance of  personal and organizational influences 
on decision making, of systematic and intuitive decision making. Such balance 
comes about through a conflict between the two that is never completely resolved 
and is continually experienced as a problem both by the organization and 
individual decision makers. 
 As Carmen, her investigators, and others in CPS make the judgments and decisions 
their daily routines put before them, they apply their identities, in all their various 
aspects, to situations that, through experience, they recognize to be of a certain type. 
They make decisions as members of an organization and as conscientious performers of 
specific roles within the organization, but also as persons with many other affiliations – 
based on culture, gender, class, ethnicity, ideology, personal history – that predate their 
organizational membership, continue to encompass it, and impose obligations on them 
they do not put aside as they do their work. It is the principled effort to resolve conflict 
among their various obligations that makes decision making in CPS morally as well as 
emotionally demanding; the sense they bring that one has failed in one’s fundamental 
obligation is a big part of what makes cases like the one in Carmen’s story “horrific.”  It 
is also that effort, however, that is constitutive of fairness in process and justice in 
outcome, not only for the individual decision makers, but for the agency as a whole, as it 
seeks to honor its sometimes conflicting obligations to children, their families, and their 
communities. 
 My research has strongly reinforced my belief that the feel for inquiry, conditioned 
as it may be by training, experience, and local rules, is essentially ethical in nature. 
Though this dissertation would most accurately be categorized as descriptive narrative 
research, which, according to Polkinghorne (1988), is “description of the narrative 
accounts individuals or groups use to make sequences of events in their lives or 
organizations meaningful” (pp. 161-162), I am tempted to characterize it as a work of 
descriptive philosophy. It seems to me now that what I have mainly done is show people 
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manifesting their ideas of the good as they understand situations and making judgments 
about them. These participants, whatever intuitive or analytic tools they use, apply the 
whole of their conflicted, but univocal selves to the decision-making task, and through it 
enact the full range of their beliefs. 
 
Overview of Laws, Policies, and Procedures Governing the  
Investigation and Deliberation of CPS Allegations 
 
 In Texas, CPS is the largest branch of an umbrella agency, the Texas Protective and 
Regulatory Services Department (TDPRS), which also comprises Adult Protective 
Services and Child Care Licensing.  It has about 5000 employees (Texas Department of 
Protective and Regulatory Services, 2001b). 
 Every CPS investigation begins with an allegation of abuse or neglect to a child.  
Texas law requires that any person who knows of or suspects abuse must report it, and a 
single 1-800 reporting number can be called from anywhere in the state.  The number is 
widely publicized.  In recent years, knowledge of the duty to report suspected abuse or 
neglect has become part of general training for teachers, providers of daycare, law 
enforcement officials, pediatricians, and others whose work routinely brings them into 
contact with children.  The training also routinely includes recognizing the physical, 
emotional, and behavioral signs of abuse and neglect.  In 2001 CPS in Texas received 
over 170,000 allegations (Texas Department of Protective and Regulatory Services, 
2001a). 
 The intake worker enters basic information about the allegation into the Child and 
Adult Protective System (CAPS) database.  The information includes the names of the 
reporter, the victim or victims, the alleged perpetrators, and others, known in the system 
as collaterals, whom the reporter believes may have knowledge about the incident.  The 
worker also writes a brief narrative summarizing the reporter’s information.  Before 
accepting a report and forwarding it to the appropriate unit in the field, the worker must 
be satisfied that the intake information indicates that a child has been abused or 
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neglected, as defined by the Texas Family Code.  These definitions are based upon 
definitions in the federal Child Abuse Protection and Treatment Act, first passed in 1974 
(Smith, 2002). 
  According to the Texas Family Code, abuse of a child is defined, in part, as: 
• mental or emotional injury to a child that results in an observable and material 
impairment in the child’s growth, development, or psychological functioning; 
• causing or permitting the child to be in a situation in which the child sustains a 
mental or emotional injury that results in an observable and material impairment 
in the child’s growth, development, or psychological functioning; 
• physical injury that results in substantial harm to the child, or the genuine threat 
of substantial harm from physical injury to the child, including an injury that is at 
variance with the history or explanation given and excluding an accident or 
reasonable discipline by a parent, guardian, or managing or possessory 
conservator that does not expose the child to a substantial risk of harm; 
• failure to make a reasonable effort to prevent an action by another person that 
results in physical injury that results in substantial harm to the child; 
• sexual conduct harmful to a child’s mental, emotional, or physical welfare; 
• failure to make a reasonable effort to prevent sexual conduct harmful to a child; 
• compelling or encouraging a child to engage in sexual activity 
• causing, permitting, encouraging, engaging in, or allowing the photographing, 
filming, or depicting of the child if the person knew or should have known that 
the resulting photograph, film, or depiction of the child is obscene (as defined by 
the Texas Penal Code) or pornographic; 
• the current use by a person of a controlled substance in a manner to the extent 
that the use results in physical, mental, or emotional injury to a child; or 
• causing, expressly permitting, or encouraging a child to use a controlled 
substance as defined in the Health and Safety Code. 
Neglect of a child includes: 
• the leaving of a child in a situation where the child would be exposed to a 
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substantial risk of physical or mental harm, without arranging for necessary care 
for the child, and a demonstration of an intent not to return by a parent, guardian, 
or managing or possessory conservator of the child; 
• the following acts or omissions by any person: 
o placing the child in or failing to remove the child from a situation that a 
reasonable person would realize requires judgment or actions beyond the 
child’s level of maturity, physical condition, or mental abilities and that 
results in bodily injury or a substantial risk of immediate harm to the 
child; 
o the failure to seek, obtain, or follow through with medical care for the 
child, with the failure resulting in or presenting a substantial risk of death, 
disfigurement, or bodily injury or with the failure resulting in an 
observable and material impairment to the growth, development, or 
functioning of the child; 
o the failure to provide the child with food, clothing, or shelter necessary to 
sustain the life or health of the child, excluding failure caused primarily 
by financial inability unless relief services had been offered and refused; 
o placing a child in or failing to remove the child from a situation in which 
the child would be exposed to a substantial risk of sexual conduct harmful 
to the child; or 
o the failure by the person responsible for a child’s care, custody, or 
welfare to permit the child to return to the child’s home without arranging 
for the necessary care for the child after the child has been absent from 
the home for any reason, including having been in residential placement 
or having run away. 
 It is important to note that CPS accepts for investigation allegations that abuse or 
neglect is likely to occur in the future, not just those having to do with events in the past.  
In something of a sea change that has affected Child Protective agencies throughout the 
United States, CPS has begun to focus upon risk in its investigations as much or more 
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than if focuses upon incidents (Schene, 1996).   
 In addition to fitting one or more of the Family Code definitions of abuse or neglect, 
a CPS allegation must also have as its alleged perpetrator (AP) someone who has a 
continuing relationship with the child and continuing access to him or her. Alleged 
perpetrators can be a parents, guardians, managing or possessory conservators, foster 
parents, members of the child’s family or household, teachers or other school personnel, 
or employees or volunteers at a child-care facility that provides services for the child or 
at a public or private residential institution or facility where the child resides. Abuse or 
neglect alleged to have been committed by a stranger would not be investigated by CPS, 
but by law enforcement. Also, intake workers must screen out allegations that, by 
statute, would fall outside CPS’ jurisdiction. Allegations involving children in daycare 
centers would be investigated by Child Care Licensing, another branch of TDPRS.  
Children receiving services from the state’s Mental Health and Mental Retardation 
(MHMR) system, alleged to have been abused by MHMR staff, fall under the protection 
of a specialized investigative unit within Adult Protective Services. 
 Once an intake is forwarded, a supervisor reviews it to make a preliminary 
determination, using the same criteria as were used at the intake stage, whether it is 
suitable for investigation. Over 140,000 of the 170,000 intakes received in 2001 passed 
through these intake and supervisor filters to be assigned for investigation (Texas 
Department of Protective and Regulatory Services, 2001a).   
 CPS prioritizes its intakes based on how it assesses the degree of risk to a child.  If 
there appears, either to the intake worker or to the field supervisor, to be immediate risk 
of death or serious harm to a child, a Priority I is assigned to the allegation, which 
requires that an investigation be initiated within 24 hours. Where there does not seem to 
be such a risk, the case is given a Priority II, which requires that an investigation be 
initiated within 10 days. Initiation means trying to interview each alleged victim, or, if 
the victim can’t be found right away, at least one of the victim’s parents or a collateral 
who has first hand information about the abuse or neglect. 
The goals of CPS investigation are specified as: 
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y determining, with law enforcement help, whether abuse or neglect has occurred; 
y assessing family functioning to see whether any child is at risk of abuse or 
neglect, and, if so, identifying strengths and resources that could reduce the risk; 
and  
y intervening immediately to protect any child who is in danger.   
 The basic steps of a CPS investigation set out in policy as: 
y interviewing and examining each alleged child victim, as well as any other; 
children who live in the home; 
y interviewing each of the alleged victim’s parents; 
y interviewing the alleged perpetrator of the alleged abuse or neglect; 
y contacting “collateral sources,” or other persons who may have knowledge of 
the alleged abuse or neglect; and 
y conducting a criminal background check on the alleged perpetrator 
 Other evidence investigators routinely collect include photographs of injuries or 
incident scenes, statements from medical and other professionals, videotapes of a child 
victim’s statement, and the child’s school records. 
 Not all of these measures need be taken in every case. Policy permits closing a case 
after preliminary investigation shows that the situation does not meet statutory 
definitions of abuse or neglect, or, after interviews with the child victim and at least one 
parent, it is clear that no abuse or neglect has occurred or is likely to occur.   
 As CPS policy repeats many times, the primary purpose of a CPS investigation is the 
protection of the child, not the arrest and prosecution of child abusers. CPS investigators 
are expressly enjoined from gathering evidence or conducting any interview with the 
sole purpose of criminal investigation. Law enforcement is required to investigate jointly 
with CPS. Intake workers are required to relay all allegations of child abuse or neglect to 
whatever law enforcement agency has jurisdiction for criminal investigation over the 
area in which the alleged incident took place, even if the allegation does not fall under 
CPS jurisdiction. In addition, the local CPS unit must contact law enforcement before 
initiating an investigation of serious physical abuse or sexual abuse. The goal of these 
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requirements is to make clear, both for CPS and for law enforcement, that the CPS 
investigation is not a substitute a criminal investigation or even an aid to it. Law and 
policy say that CPS and law enforcement must investigate jointly. CPS investigators thus 
never have to give Miranda warnings to alleged perpetrators unless they are already 
under arrest. They are to defer to law enforcement investigators whenever the 
investigating officer requests it. 
 The investigation may reach several conclusions. When a preponderance of the 
evidence indicates that abuse or neglect occurred, the finding is “reason-to-believe,” 
commonly abbreviated by staff as RTB. In 2001, 25.2% of all investigations received 
this designation (Texas Department of Protective and Regulatory Services, 2001a). 
When it is reasonable to conclude that no abuse or neglect has occurred, the finding is 
“ruled out.” “Unable to determine” is the finding when neither RTB nor “ruled out” are 
appropriate.   
 In addition to determining whether abuse or neglect have occurred in the past, and 
who was responsible, the investigator must also estimate the likelihood of abuse or 
neglect occurring in the future. Risk assessment, according to policy, is a continuous 
process requiring caseworkers to assess and reassess the degree of risk to the child. Risk 
may exist in any of several areas, including the child’s vulnerability (usually a function 
of age, physical condition, availability of protection), the home environment, the quality 
of care the child receives, the caregiver’s ability to give good care, the presence of 
violence in the home, and the caregiver’s response to CPS. If the investigator finds that 
there are risk factors in the family, or that the family is able to deal with its risk factors 
in a way that keeps the child safe, the case is closed. If, however, the investigator 
determines that risk factors exist and the family cannot or will not address them, the 
designation “Risk Indicated” is applied. CPS then develops a service plan, elements of 
which may include the involvement of other family or community members, referral of 
the family to voluntary community services, the imposition of services by the court, the 
abusive parent leaving the home, either voluntarily or by court order, the nonabusive 
parent leaving the home with the child victim, or both parents voluntarily placing the 
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child out of the home. If none of these measures are feasible or if the parents refuse to 
cooperate, the investigator must seek supervisory approval to take the child away. 
 When an investigation has been completed, a finding of RTB has been reached, and 
a particular person has been designated as a perpetrator, he or she may request an 
Administrative Review of Investigation Findings (ARIF). An ARIF involves an informal 
hearing, convened by the regional director of TDPRS, or, more commonly, a designee, 
usually a CPS Program Director (PD). The convener reviews the original CPS report, 
gathers further information as necessary, and issues a written decision that upholds, 
overturns, or alters the original finding.   
 Should an ARIF go against a designated perpetrator, he or she may then appeal to the 
TDPRS ombudsman office. The ombudsman reviews the case record, the ARIF 
proceedings, and any other evidence deemed relevant. If the ombudsman agrees with the 
ARIF convener’s decision, that ends the review process within TDPRS. If the 
ombudsman office disagrees, it sends an overturn recommendation to the Director of 
CPS. The Director may then overturn, but, if she and the ombudsman office disagree, 
she forwards the case to the TDPRS general counsel, who advises the TDPRS Executive 
Director on a final determination.   
 Table 1 shows the major decision points in a CPS case, what initiates them, what 
questions they must answer, who makes them, and their results. 
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TABLE 1 
Decision Points in a CPS Case 
Initiating 
condition or 
event 
Decision Question Decision maker If yes If no 
Call to Statewide 
Intake 
Does the 
allegation, if true, 
meet statutory 
definition of abuse 
or neglect? 
Intake worker 
Allegation 
forwarded to the 
field 
Allegation rejected 
or referred to 
another agency 
Receipt of an 
intake from 
Statewide Intake 
Does the 
allegation, if true, 
meet statutory 
definition of abuse 
or neglect? 
Supervisor Case assigned for investigation 
Allegation rejected 
or referred to 
another agency 
Case assigned for 
investigation 
How should the 
investigation be 
conducted? Who 
should be 
interviewed? 
How? Where? 
How many times? 
What other 
evidence should be 
collected? 
 
Investigator, with 
supervisor 
consultation as 
necessary 
 
─ 
 
─ 
Completion of 
investigation 
Did the child 
suffer abuse or 
neglect as alleged? 
Investigator, with 
supervisor 
consultation as 
necessary 
Finding “reason-
to-believe” 
Finding of “ruled 
out” or “unable to 
determine” 
Completion of 
investigation 
Is the child at risk 
of future abuse or 
neglect? 
Investigator, with 
supervisor 
consultation as 
necessary 
Designation of 
risk, services 
offered 
Case closed 
Family declines 
services 
Should a court 
order be sought to 
compel the family 
to accept services? 
Supervisor, in 
consultation with 
superiors and 
agency attorneys 
Court action 
sought Case closed 
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TABLE 1 continued 
 
Initiating 
condition or 
event 
Decision Question Decision maker If yes If no 
Assessment that 
child is at risk 
Should the child 
be removed from 
the home? 
Supervisor, with 
input from the 
investigator 
Child, with court 
approval, goes into 
placement with a 
relative or foster 
parent 
Child left in the 
home 
Designated 
perpetrator appeals 
a “reason-to-
believe” finding; 
an Administrative 
Review of 
Investigative 
Findings (ARIF) is 
held 
Did the 
investigation reach 
the right 
conclusion? 
CPS Program 
Director Finding confirmed Finding reversed 
Appeal of ARIF 
findings 
Did the ARIF 
reach the right 
conclusion? 
Ombudsman 
office, in 
consultation with 
CPS Director or 
designee 
Finding 
confirmed; appeal 
process ends 
Finding reversed 
 
 
     CPS policy prescribes a methodology for making each of these decisions. The aim is 
not to ensure positive outcome in every instance, which, of course, it cannot do, but to 
ensure rationality and defensibility process. No set of rules can anticipate all possible 
contingencies, especially in complex decision environments like that of CPS 
investigation. The effort, or pretense, to do so can only lead to absurdity (Howard, 
1994). Policy, to be at all rational, must leave gaps for the exercise of a different 
rationality, that of the individual decision maker on the scene, even if it never 
acknowledges that such gaps exist and pretends, at least implicitly, to be absolute. 
Though CPS policy requires investigators to interview the alleged perpetrator, it sets no 
goals for that interview and does not specify what questions to ask. Although it says the 
investigator must determine, with the help of law enforcement, whether abuse or neglect 
has occurred, it lays out no protocol for making that determination. This dissertation 
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focuses on the rationality that fills the gaps in policy, the investigative judgment and 
decision making in CPS that is unstructured, subjective, and case-specific. I find, in the 
descriptions 20 persons engaged in CPS decision making give of the way they go about 
collecting evidence and drawing conclusions, the working of a rationality that is 
informed by personal ethics and experience, yet proceeds by collaboration with others 
and is oriented toward an idea of objective truth. Being largely intuitive, it recognizes its 
own fallibility, yet is reluctant to subordinate itself to more systematic forms of 
rationality. Despite the bias and narrowness to which it is prone, the intuitive judgment 
of its agents in the field embodies, more than does policy, the mission CPS has to protect 
children.   
 A better understanding of the subjective aspects of judgment and decision making in 
CPS investigations, to which I hope this study contributes, will lead to training, policy, 
and management designs that will recognize not only the ineliminability, but the value of 
intuitive and personally ethical decision making. Such designs would create working 
environments that fostered the optimal functioning of subjective rationality, minimizing 
its errors and maximizing its benefits. 
 The dissertation’s structure is in the five-chapter tradition, with the findings rendered 
in four chapters instead of one. Chapter II reviews several general theories of judgment 
and decision making and reviews previous research on CPS decision making. Chapter III 
describes my methods for collecting and analyzing interview data. In Chapter IV I 
examine participants’ intuitive and systematic approaches to decision making. In the first 
part of the chapter I show how investigators both rely upon narrative to help them 
assemble evidence into a case structure and also resist its satisfactions when it does not 
meet internalized standards of truth. In the second part I explore the ambiguous feelings 
participants have about the analytic decision-making aid they are required to use for 
assessing risk. These feelings are seen as related to sometimes ambiguous attitudes about 
the power they exercise and represent as agents of the state. Chapter V explores the 
working definitions that participants have of the concept of the preponderance of the 
evidence, the legal standard of proof CPS must use in reaching its judgments. In Chapter 
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VI the reactions of the participants to two case scenarios by Jackson and Nuttall (1996) 
are analyzed. I find evidence that the participants quickly, but provisionally, assign case 
facts to a particular story genre as a way of getting a handle on them. Chapter VII 
analyzes in some detail the interview of one participant, Frieda, whose uneasy 
combination of systematic and intuitive thinking is seen as representative of the way the 
agency as a whole uses both approaches to achieve justice in its decision making. 
Chapter VII summarizes the findings and considers some of their philosophical and 
practical implications. An Epilogue reports the reactions of some of the participants to 
the way I made use of their interviews in this dissertation. 
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CHAPTER II 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 In this chapter I introduce the theory of judgment and decision making that I think 
best explains my findings, Hammond’s cognitive continuum. I then review the literature 
on case decision making in CPS and describe the efforts to create linear models using the 
decision-making factors identified in those studies. After outlining major theories of 
intuitive judgment, I explore the research demonstrating its biases and shortcomings. 
Other research showing the general adequacy of intuition, especially in ill-structured, 
time-pressured decision environments, is then reviewed. Finally, I link Aristotle’s 
concept of practical wisdom to the judgment and decision-making research and suggest 
that intuition is most successful when exercised out of strong personal ethic. 
 
Hammond’s Cognitive Continuum 
 
 General theories of judgment and decision making have become plentiful over the 
last 50 years. Cooksey (1996) has identified 14 major theories. A majority of these are 
the classical, optimizing theories that have been developed by economists, 
mathematicians, and psychologists with the aim of creating models that could predict, 
aid, or even replace human judgment. Such models seek to determine the formal 
relationships among the various elements of judgment – the initial state of affairs, the 
goals of the decision maker, the strength and direction of the evidence, the expected 
outcome of various decision options – all of which are then assigned values and weights. 
Rational decision makers calculate the attractiveness of options as the product of 
likelihood and expected utility (Jeffrey, 1983), or they make other calculations in 
accordance with the probability calculus, such as the Bayesian1 (Hastie, 1993). Other 
                         
1 Bayes’ theorem describes the logical relationship between prior and posterior states of belief.  
The probability of hypothesis H being true given evidence E is equal to the probability of E being 
truegiven H, times the prior probability of H, divided by the prior probability of E: P(H|E) = 
P(E|H)P(H)/P(E). 
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major judgment and decision-making theories recognize that the conditions of the 
optimizing models are frequently not met in real-world situations. Decision makers’ 
ability to make rational choice is “bounded” (Simon, 1997) by limited knowledge of the 
environment, by time constraints, by a cognitive incapacity to calculate probabilities, 
especially where there are large numbers of variables, and by uncertainty regarding 
outcomes. Furthermore, decision making is not an activity performed in cognitive 
isolation. It takes place in and is conditioned by particular social situations.  
 Hammond’s decision theory (Hammond, 1996), which I will use as the framework 
for my analysis of the data in this study, though it fully endorses analytic, systematic 
decision making for appropriate tasks, does not accept that it should be the yardstick 
against which to measure judgmental competence generally. Problems are unsuitable for 
the exercise of analysis when models are unavailable or when there is a poor fit between 
the data and the model. And sometimes we have very good reasons to “wish to sacrifice 
the precision, the justifiability, the scientific, and technological arguments derived from 
analytical cognition for the advantages of robust, rapid, and easily produced intuitive 
judgments” (Hammond, 1996, p. 160). Hammond also disputes the common assumption 
that intuition and analysis are mutually exclusive, either/or methods of judgment. The 
great majority of judgments have an element of both, displaying, in Hammond’s 
terminology, quasirationailty, or common sense. Intuition and analysis, he argues, 
should be seen as the poles of a cognitive continuum. A given judgment exists as a point 
on the continuum, being closer to one pole or the other depending on a number of 
factors, the most important of which is the nature of the task that called for the judgment 
to be made. Good judgment results when there is high congruence between the mode of 
judgment and the task structure (See Figure 1). Hammond and his colleagues showed 
that as highway engineers solved a series of job-related problems, each with different 
task characteristics, the combination of cognitive techniques they used on a particular 
problem corresponded to that problem’s particular mix of task features (Hammond, 
Hamm, Grassia, and Pearson, 1997). 
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High cognitive control and conscious   
awareness 
Slow data processing 
Confidence low in answer, high in 
method 
Errors few, but large 
Low cognitive control and conscious 
awareness 
Rapid data processing 
Confidence high in answer, low in method 
Errors normally distributed 
 
 Intuition 
 
 
Figure 1 
Hammond’s Cognitive Continuum Analysis 
Large number of cues (>5) 
Cues measured perceptually 
High redundancy among cues 
Simultaneous display of cues 
No valid model exists or no criterion to
choose among competing models 
Poor data-model fit Small number of cues 
Cues measured objectively and
reliably 
Low redundancy among cues 
Sequential display of cues 
Valid models exist 
Good data-model fit Cognitive Continuum
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 Because human beings employ what Hammond calls dynamic cognition, there can be 
movement along the continuum. Time is an important factor. The longer it takes to reach 
a judgment, the more analytical tools become appropriate and available. Clarity, 
measurability, redundancy, and sequentiality of cues are also important. I will claim in 
Chapter IV that, at least partly because of these factors, the decision making in a 
particular case displays a general movement from intuition to analysis as it moves up the 
agency hierarchy. Also, individual decision makers can oscillate back and forth between 
intuitive and analytic cognition. If a more analytical approach fails to yield good results, 
the decision maker can adopt a more intuitive approach, and vice versa. We will see in 
Chapter VII how Frieda, a participant who, as Risk Director, reviews child death cases, 
makes use of both intuition and analysis in her work. 
 Hammond claims that his is the first theory of judgment and decision making to 
explicitly reject a dichotomous relationship between intuition and analysis. It embraces 
Kosko’s “fuzzy principle” (1993, p. 18) that everything is a matter of degree. Most 
judgments are neither wholly intuitive nor wholly analytic. They are intuitive and 
analytic to some degree. Acceptance of this principle, Hammond argues, allows us to 
recognize and study the ways people combine intuition and analysis in their everyday, 
real-world judgments. 
 The task structure of child abuse investigation seems to many to lend itself to 
analytic, or systematic, decision making. The same variables are present to greater or 
lesser degree in every case. Investigation can provide detailed knowledge of the 
situation. Decision makers have time to deliberate. These factors, coupled with a sense 
of the error to which intuitive decision making is subject, have caused many in the 
profession to make efforts to move CPS decision making toward the analytic end of the 
continuum, hoping that systematization will make its outcomes as accurate as possible  
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and, even where there is inaccuracy, at least make its processes transparent and rational. 
Hammond defines analytic thinking as “a step-by-step, conscious, logically defensible 
process” (Hammond, 1996, p. 60), and this is just what policy makers would like CPS 
decision making to be. 
  
The Search for Determinative Factors in CPS Decision Making 
 
 Much of the research on CPS decision making has had the aim of determining what 
factors the victims, perpetrators, and circumstances of previous instances of child abuse 
and neglect had in common. Knowledge of these factors can help CPS agencies 
determine whether the factors actually being used to make casework decisions are the 
ones they have intended should be used. Such knowledge can also help determine how to 
direct – through training, supervision, or protocol – the attention of investigators in 
future cases. Researchers look for factors either in the records of completed 
investigations or in the descriptions provided by the investigators themselves of what 
they did and thought during their investigations. Some researchers use both data sources. 
The tables on the following pages describe the findings in a number of such studies. 
They are separate tables for each of four decision types: validation (Table 2), designation 
of risk (Tables 3 and 4), removal of the child from the home (Table 5), provision of 
services (Table 6), and recommendation of court action (Table 7). 
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TABLE 2 
Studies on CPS Validation Decisions 
Study Data Source Factors Identified Comments/Other findings 
English, Marshall, 
Brummel, and 
Coghlan (1998) 
Analysis of intake 
and post-
investigative data 
in the records of 
all  referrals 
(12,978) made to 
Washington 
State’s CPS 
agency over the 
course of a year 
1. Child’s age (allegations 
involving children over 5 
significantly more likely to be 
substantiated) 
2. Type of allegation (medical 
neglect cases more likely to be 
substantiated than other types of 
allegation, sexual abuse and 
physical neglect less likely 
3. Ethnicity (allegations involving 
Native Americans more likely to 
be substantiated) 
4. Presence of risk factors (esp. 
dangerous acts on the part of the 
parents, family stress, and 
frequency of abuse/neglect 
allegations) 
5. Referral from law enforcement, 
over and above cumulative 
effect of risk factors 
 
Hetherton and 
Beardsall (1997) 
Responses of 55 
U.K. social 
workers and 55 
UK police officers 
to four sexual 
abuse vignettes, a 
sex role inventory, 
and a 
questionnaire 
regarding 
women’s 
sexualized 
behavior toward 
children 
Gender bias in favor of women. 
Validation considered more 
appropriate when alleged 
perpetrators was a man.  
Male participants 
recommended prosecution 
more frequently for male 
perpetrators; women 
recommended prosecution 
more frequently for female 
perpetrators. 
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TABLE 2 continued 
Study Data Source Factors Identified Comments/Other findings 
Schwab, Baumann, 
and Gober (1997) 
Analysis of case 
documentation for 
2905 child abuse 
and neglect cases 
in the Houston, 
Texas area in 1993 
Physical abuse: 
1. Bruises/welts/extension cord 
marks 
2. Child told parent about sexual 
abuse 
3. Caretaker doesn’t or can’t 
control child 
4. Facial head injury 
5. Gives child drugs or 
alcohol/drug addicted baby 
6. Inappropriate discipline 
7. Children left with other 
caretaker who is unable to 
monitor them 
8. AP admission with or without an 
excuse 
9. AP asked to leave by family 
10. Lack of parenting skills 
11. Family takes allegation less 
seriously than CPS 
12. Family has differing accounts of 
incident or no knowledge of it 
Neglect: 
1. Facial or head injury 
2. Caretaker arrested and no care 
provided 
3. Caretaker doesn’t or can’t 
monitor children 
4. Caretaker in bed 
5. Shower or bath with child 
6. Caretaker can’t control kids 
7. In appropriate discipline 
8. Preschool kids left alone 
9. AP admission 
10. Lack of parenting skills 
11. Unrealistic expectations of child 
12. Family has differing accounts of 
incident or no knowledge of it 
 
Drake (1995) Analysis of 
validated abuse 
cases in 8 high 
poverty and 7 low 
poverty areas  
 
Concentrated neighborhood poverty 
a high risk for substantiated 
maltreatment  
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TABLE 2 continued 
Study Data Source Factors Identified Comments/Other findings 
Smith, Sullivan, and 
Cohen (1995) 
Analysis of 504 
Illinois sexual 
abuse and physical 
abuse/risk of harm 
investigation 
reports 
1.  Physical abuse – low degree of 
assessed risk most important 
(negative indicator), also witness 
testimony, physical evidence, 
perpetrator input 
2.  Sexual abuse – victim input most 
important, also physical 
evidence, witness testimony, 
substance abuse  
3.  Risk of harm – extent of police 
involvement most important, 
also witness testimony 
 
Haskett, Wayland, 
Hutcheson, Tavana 
(1995) 
Semi-structured 
interviews with 20 
Florida and North 
Carolina CPS 
workers regarding 
criteria used in 
deliberating their 
10 most recent 
sexual abuse 
allegations; also 
analysis of 175 
case reports 
produced by those 
workers 
1. Quality of child’s disclosure 
(most important factor) 
2. Child’s affect and behavior 
3. Presence of a custody dispute 
(much lower validation rates for 
cases with this factor present) 
4. Age of child (allegations in older 
children more likely to be 
substantiated) 
5. Race of child (allegations 
involving African-American 
children more likely to be 
validated than those involving 
white children) 
6. Type of abuse 
 
Prior history of substantiated or 
unsubstantiated abuse allegations 
not related to validation in present 
case. 
“Case workers were 
significantly more certain of 
their decisions in cases judged 
to be valid than in cases judged 
to be invalid.” (p. 34) 
 
“Unfortunately, in nine cases, 
workers reported that they did 
not substantiate the allegations 
in part because the child’s 
behavior (e.g. good mental 
health status) was incompatible 
with that of an abused child.” 
(p. 41) 
 
“There were times when case 
workers struggled to express a 
particular feeling or intuition 
that contributed to their 
decision. We should attempt to 
understand this intuition better, 
as it may be equally as 
important as other factors.” (p. 
44) 
Zuravin, Orme, and 
Hegar (1995) 
 1. Family being African-American 
2. Child being older 
3. Report of severer allegation  
 
Winefield and 
Bradley (1992) 
Analysis of 3,228 
Australian cases 
1. Source of report (higher for 
victims, police, social workers, 
and teachers; lower for nurses 
and related nonprofessionals 
2. Age of child (higher for older 
children) 
3. Child having been the subject of 
a previous report 
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Study Data Source Factors Identified Comments/Other findings 
Giovanni (1991) Opinion survey of 
117 California, 
Idaho, and 
Virginia CPS 
workers regarding 
unsubstantiated 
reports 
1. Volume and quality of evidence 
2. Motive and reliability of original 
report 
In response to the question, 
“How do you feel when you 
investigate a case that is not 
validated?” most respondents 
expressed some degree of 
discomfort: frustration at 
having been unable to verify an 
intuition that “something is 
going on,” uncertainty about 
having done a good enough 
investigation, embarrassment at 
having intruded into families’ 
lives. 
 
“The majority [of respondents] 
would opt for taking the risk of 
the false positive over the risk 
of the false negative. While 
concerned with the rights of 
families where there is a 
conflict, the protection of 
children comes first even if on 
occasion it must be at the cost 
of unnecessary intrusion.” (p. 
61) 
Craft and Bettin 
(1991) 
Interviews with 41 
social work 
graduate students 
regarding their  
determination of 
risk in 4 fictional 
case scenarios 
1. Nature of injury 
2. Consistency of parent 
explanation 
3. Parental reaction 
4. Respect toward child 
5. Physical/mental abilities of 
parent 
“Subjects consistently failed to 
request information regarding 
the condition of the home and 
the availability of community 
resources.” (p. 114) 
 
“For medium risk cases where 
case information is of both a 
positive and negative nature, 
investigators need more 
information before a decision 
can comfortably be reached, 
suggesting that there may be 
some “threshold” of positive or 
negative attributes that must be 
exceeded before a decision can 
be comfortably reached.” (p. 
120)  
 
“When information uncovered 
in an investigation proves 
inconsistent, individual value 
orientations are likely to enter 
the decision-making process 
and influence decision 
recommendations.” (p. 121) 
TABLE 2 continued 
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Study Data Source Factors Identified Comments/Other findings 
Schuerman, Stagner, 
Johnson, and Mullen  
(1989) 
Interviews with 36 
Cook County, IL 
supervisors and 
workers on their 
decision 
procedures and 
their own cases 
1. Presence of physical evidence 
2. Whether the caretaker admits 
responsibility 
3. Whether the child accuses the 
caretaker 
4. Credibility of the child 
5. Confirmation of abuse by 
collaterals or by the investigator 
“Investigators are generally 
consistent in the factors they 
consider in making decisions 
and in the process of reaching 
conclusions.” (p. 11) 
 
“Investigators do not see the 
choice as one of taking 
protective custody of the child 
versus leaving the child at 
home and providing in-home 
services. They see the decision 
simply as whether or not the 
immediate safety of the child 
requires protective custody.” 
(p. 11) 
Eckenrode, Powers, 
Doris, Munsch, and 
Boiger (1988) 
Representative 
sample of New 
York child 
maltreatment 
reports 
1. All allegations – report from a 
professional 
2. Physical abuse – child being 
black or Hispanic 
3. Sexual abuse – child being older 
and female, larger households, 
number of allegations and length 
of investigation 
4. Neglect – child being younger, 
black, or Hispanic, presence of a 
prior report, origination in New 
York City 
Overall validation rates: 48% 
for physical abuse, 39% for 
sexual abuse, 28% for neglect 
 
Anonymous neglect reports had 
a low validation rate compared 
to non-anonymous reports. 
Anonymous abuse reports were 
validated at the same rate as 
non-anonymous reports. 
Alter (1985) Validation 
decisions of 73 
CPS workers in 
four Midwestern 
states regarding 16 
neglect case 
scenarios 
constructed to 
display different 
combinations of 
factors developed 
in worker 
interviews 
Pre-selected factors: 
Physical: 
1. Degree of physical harm 
observed 
2. Age of the child 
3. Frequency of alleged 
parental behavior 
Abstract: 
1. Willful behavior of the 
parent (yes or no) 
2. Parent-child relationship 
(positive or negative) 
3. Parental social deviance 
(high or low) 
4. Parental desire to change 
behavior (yes or no) 
 
Yes for #4 and negative for #5 was 
the strongest determinant of 
validation. A majority of workers 
validated on either of these factors 
alone. The four abstract factors 
accounted for 23.7% of variance in 
validation decisions. 
“Working together over time, 
workers develop common 
assumptions about how to 
define this boundary [between 
normal and deviant parenting 
behavior]. Because these 
assumptions remain almost 
wholly implicit, and because 
they fear public controversy in 
making them explicit, workers 
develop a high level of mutual, 
tacit understanding based on 
idiosyncratic language and 
symbols” (p. 109). 
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Wolock (1982) 289 New Jersey 
case records and a 
questionnaire 
administered to 
184 New Jersey 
caseworkers and 
assistant 
supervisors, 
eliciting reaction 
to a set of 
scenarios based on 
real cases 
Family’s socioeconomic status “A psychological process takes 
place in which the typical or 
average cases in the total 
caseload of a district office 
come to serve as standard or 
‘referent’ for judging the 
severity of cases… Similar 
situations will be treated 
differently by offices in the 
socioeconomically 
disadvantaged areas than by 
offices in the more 
socioeconomically advantaged 
areas.” (p. 13) 
Jason, Anderack, 
Marks, and Tyler 
(1982) 
Analysis of 7502 
Georgia CPS cases 
1. Not having natural parents in the 
home 
2. Low socioeconomic status 
Other factors identified in 
previous studies – child’s age, 
family’s urban residence, early 
motherhood – may have 
resulted from greater social 
attention paid to persons in 
those categories 
Rosen (1981) Validation 
decisions of 162 
New Jersey and 
Philadelphia CPS 
workers regarding 
8 physical abuse 
case scenarios 
constructed to 
display different 
combinations of 
factors developed 
through literature 
review 
Pre-selected factors: 
1. Injury to the child 
2. History of injury to the child 
3. Emotional disturbances in the 
parent  
4. Environmental stress 
5. Unusual behavior of the child 
---------- 
6. Vague explanation for the injury 
 
All factors but the last were 
significant by themselves in 
participants’ decision making. They 
are shown in descending order by 
decision making weight. Two way 
interaction effects: 1 and 2, 4 and 6. 
Three-way: 1, 5 and 6. Four-way: 2, 
3, 4, and 6. Five-way: all but 6 
 
Groeneveld and 
Giovanni (1977) 
Analysis of 2400 
cases gathered by 
the National 
Clearinghouse on 
Child Neglect and 
Abuse 
1. Source of report (higher for 
professionals, especially law 
enforcement, lower for private 
individuals 
2. Greater law enforcement 
involvement in the case 
3. Age of the child (higher for 
older children) 
4. Size of family (higher for larger 
families) 
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Study Data Source Factors Identified Comments/Other findings 
Little and Rixon 
(1998) 
Analysis of 20 
physical abuse, 
emotional abuse, 
and neglect cases 
to determine 
degree of 
presence of 8 
criteria developed 
by a team of 
social workers 
For high risk: 
1. Very negative caregiver ability  
2. Negative caregiver ability plus 
very negative, negative, or 
ambivalent caregiver attitude 
 
English, Brummel, 
Coghlan, Novicky, 
and Marshall (1998) 
Interviews with 
the investigators 
of 200 
Washington State 
CPS referrals 
where the child 
was determined 
after investigation 
to be at high or 
medium risk  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Substance abuse, for all types 
1. Caregiver cooperation 
2. Collateral contacts 
3. Caregiver’s recognition of the 
problem 
4. Family history 
5. Availability of resources 
“The primary factor 
influencing CPS worker 
decision-making is how much 
time they have to spend on an 
investigation and the 
resources available if they 
decide to intervene.” (p. 89) 
 
“Almost one in five CPS 
workers reported the primary 
role of the CPS worker is 
investigation, not 
assessment.” (p. 90) 
 
“Unless a CPS worker feels 
they can ‘prove’ the case, 
with either physical evidence, 
a collateral witness, 
confession, or strong child 
disclosure, they are unlikely 
to intervene unless the family 
is willing to cooperate or the 
risk is so high they are willing 
to take the case to court.” (p. 
90) 
 
“Agency culture seems to be 
particularly important as a 
factor in CPS worker 
decision-making. These CPS 
workers reported feeling a 
lack of support from the 
“administration,” above the 
line supervisor level, for their 
decisions… They also believe 
that political concerns result 
in the constant addition of 
new rules and regulations 
with which compliance is 
impossible.” (p. 91) 
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English, Marshall, 
Brummel, and 
Coghlan (1998) 
Analysis of intake 
and post-
investigative data 
in the records of 
all  referrals 
(12,978) made to 
Washington 
State’s CPS 
agency over the 
course of a year 
Core group of factors relevant across 
decisions and types of abuse: 
1. Age of child (under 5 more 
likely to be assessed at higher risk) 
2. Severity by type of abuse 
3. Frequency of allegations 
4. Victimization of others 
5. Dangerous acts 
6. Hazards in the home 
7. Parenting skills 
8. Nurturance/attachment/bonding 
9. Recognition of problem 
10. Protection of child 
11. Substance abuse 
12. History of abuse as a child 
13. Past or present domestic 
violence 
14. Stress 
15. Social support 
16. Cooperation with agency 
17. Access 
 
Two clusters of factors were identified 
-- one related to child vulnerability and 
another to the caregiver (11, 13, 12, 
and employment status). 
 
Other factors important in the overall 
level of risk: parental response to 
disclosure, level of 
attachment/bonding, and social support 
for caregiver. 
 
Factors that discriminate between high 
and low overall risk: Parenting skills, 
recognition of the problem, cooperation 
with the agency, protection of the 
child, frequency of the abuse/neglect, 
child’s fear of the caretaker, caretaker 
stress, extent of emotional harm 
exhibited by the child 
“Although there are 
differences in risk factors 
associated with different types 
of abuse/neglect/, the 
similarities between risk 
factors and abuse types are 
greater than the differences.” 
(p. xviii) 
 
“For many cases there is 
inadequate documentation of 
risk, and assessments of 
critical risk factors are not 
documented or are 
documented as ‘insufficient 
information to assess,’” (p. 
xvii) especially caregiver 
history of abuse as a child, of 
domestic violence, and of 
substance abuse, which are 
significant factors in 
recurrence of child abuse and 
neglect.  
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DePanfils and 
Scannapeico (1994) 
Review of criteria 
used in 10 models 
designed to assess 
the safety of 
children at risk of 
maltreatment 
Parent factor:  
Ability of the parents/caregivers to 
control their behavior 
Family/environment factors: 
1. Life-threatening living 
conditions 
2. Intense family conflict/stress or 
crisis that endangers the child’s 
safety 
3. Support systems 
Maltreatment factors: 
No consensus 
Intervention-related factor: 
Parents’ level of cooperation 
 
Shapira and 
Benbenishty (1993) 
28 Israeli social 
workers’ risk 
assessment of 
fictional case 
scenarios 
1. Signs of abuse and neglect (none, 
moderate, severe) 
2. Child’s physical/intellectual 
development (normal, inadequate, 
marked retardation 
3. Mother’s relationship with the child 
(positive, indifferent, negative, 
abusive) 
4. Child’s social and emotional 
development (normal, inadequate, 
marked retardation) 
“Practitioners are similar in 
their underlying strategies, 
but appear different because 
of inconsistencies in the way 
each uses information.” (p. 
18) 
Waterhouse and 
Carnie (1992) 
Analysis of 51 
English sexual 
abuse cases; 
interviews with 
their investigators 
1. Attitude of the non-abusing parent 
toward the alleged perpetrator 
(most important factor) 
2. Access of alleged perpetrator to the 
child 
3. Type of abuse (intercourse more 
significant than touching) 
4. Age of child (younger children 
considered more at risk) 
5. Alleged perpetrator’s acceptance of 
responsibility 
6. Parents’ willingness to cooperate 
with the investigation 
7. Quality of child’s disclosure 
a. Specificity 
b. Circumstantial factors giving rise 
to opportunity 
c. Consistency over repeated 
tellings 
d. Corresponding changes in 
behavior 
8. Psychological symptoms in the 
child 
9. Physical signs of abuse 
10. Child’s attitude toward remaining at 
home 
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Schuerman, Stagner, 
Johnson, and Mullen 
(1989) 
 
Interviews with 
36 Cook County, 
IL supervisors and 
workers on their 
decision 
procedures and 
their own cases 
 
1. Whether there is physical evidence 
of abuse or neglect 
2. Whether the primary caretaker was 
responsible for the abuse 
3. Age of the child 
4. Severity of the abuse or neglect 
5. Functioning of the caretaker 
6. Potential for recurrence 
 
 
 
Meddin (1985) 
 
Interviews with 
two sets (81 and 
134) of 
Midwestern CPS 
workers, using 
fictional case 
scenarios 
 
1. Age of the child 
2. Functioning of the child 
3. Cooperation of the caretaker 
4. Functioning of the caretaker 
5. Intent of the perpetrator 
6. Current access of the perpetrator to 
the child 
7. Severity of the current incident 
8. Existence of pervious incidents 
 
 
 
 
 English (1997) synthesized the findings of previous studies and produced a list of 22 
risk factors relevant to various CPS judgments. See Table 4.
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TABLE 4 
Risk Factors Identified by English from a Literature Review 
1.  Chronicity of child abuse or neglect 12.  Supervision 
2.  Parenting skills 13.  Physical injury/harm 
3.  Cooperation with agency 14.  Substance abuse 
4.  Recognition of problem 15.  History of child abuse or neglect as a 
child 
5.  Protection of child 16.  History of domestic violence 
6.  Stress on caretaker 17.  Caretaker impairments 
7.  Fear of caretaker 18.  Social support 
8.  Emotional harm/abuse 19.  Economic resources  
9.  Dangerous acts 20.  Access/responsibility child 
10.  Basic needs 21.  Victimization of others 
11.  Sexual abuse/exploitation 22.  Hazards in the home 
For judgments of overall risk, factors 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, and 11 were 
determinative. For judgments as to whether abuse or neglect had occurred, factors 1, 2, 
4, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, and 13 were determinative. For placement decisions factors 5, 9, 
14, and 15 were determinative. For judgments whether to open or close a case, factors 1, 
3, 4, 15, 17, and 18 were determinative. 
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Studies on Decisions Regarding Removal of the Child From the Home 
Study Data Source Factors Identified Comments/Other findings 
Rossi, Schuerman, 
and Budde (1999) 
Decisions of 12 experts 
and 103 Michigan, 
Texas, and New York 
CPS workers on 18 
summaries of real cases 
categorized by the 
researchers as “serious” 
1. Prior complaints 
2. Perpetrator having threatened 
the child 
3. Homelessness 
4. Dangerous environments 
5. Lack of family support for the 
caregiver 
6. Criminal record 
7. Low receptiveness to change 
“There are some case 
characteristics to which the 
workers (compared to 
experts) apparently pay much 
less attention in their 
decisions, namely, 
receptivity to change, 
dangerous environment, and 
family negative to the 
caretaker.” (p. 594) 
 
“The overall structure of the 
decision making concerning 
cases was much more 
indeterminate than optimally 
desired. Decision making 
about serious abuse and 
neglect cases is inconsistent 
and lacking in structure.” (p. 
595) 
English, Marshall, 
Brummel, and 
Coghlan (1998) 
Analysis of intake and 
post-investigative data 
in the records of all  
referrals (12,978) made 
to Washington State’s 
CPS agency over the 
course of a year 
1. Provision of basic needs 
2. Adequacy of medical care 
3. Substance abuse 
4. Recognition of the problem 
5. Mental/physical/emotional 
impairment of the caretaker 
6. Parenting skills 
7. Frequency of abuse/neglect 
allegations 
8. Protection of the child by the 
non-abusive caretaker 
 
Wrightman (1995) Interviews about 
placement decisions 
with 9 Illinois 
caseworkers who 
specialized in 
investigations of 
cocaine-exposed 
infants 
1. Infant symptomatology, 
comprising medical and 
behavioral symptoms 
2. Caregiver-infant interactions, 
including touching, eye contact, 
and preparation for the infant's 
return home (i.e., baby bed, 
clothing) 
3. History of abuse or neglect 
4. Criminal/mental health history 
5. Substance abuse patterns 
6. Caregiver's parenting 
knowledge and skills 
7. Strength of family support 
systems 
8. Stability of home and 
environment; and 
9. Agency linkage 
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Study Data Source Factors Identified Comments/Other findings 
Shapira and 
Benbenishty (1993) 
28 Israeli social 
workers’ risk 
assessment of fictional 
case scenarios 
1. Mother’s relationship with the 
child (positive, indifferent, 
negative, abusive) 
2. Signs of abuse and neglect 
(none, moderate, severe) 
3. Parental cooperation during 
previous intervention 
 
 
Lindsey (1991) Demographics from a 
stratified sample of 
9,597 U.S. cases 
involving children who 
had been removed and 
placed in foster care 
Low family income, often 
secondary to single parenthood 
 
Pellegrin and 
Wagner (1990) 
Removal decisions in 
43 cases of validated 
sexual abuse 
In order of importance: 
1. Mother’s compliance with the 
investigation 
2. Mother's belief that the abuse 
occurred 
3. Severity of abuse 
4. Mother’s employment status 
5. Frequency of abuse 
 
42% of all victims were 
removed 
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Dalgleish and Drew 
(1989) 
Analysis of 152 
Australian abuse cases 
to determine presence 
of factors identified 
through CPS worker 
interviews  
Factors used: 
1. Severity of abuse 
2. Aspects of parenting 
(inability to meet child’s needs, 
provide a nurturing 
environment, have reasonable 
expectations of the child) 
3. Assessment of parents 
(disturbed, violent, abused as a 
child, alcohol/drug addiction, 
inability to form trusting 
relationships) 
4. Aspects of marital 
relationship (stress over 
conflict, inability to 
communicate, violence) 
5. Assessment of child 
(unusual behavior or 
characteristics, developmental 
delays, age-appropriate 
behavior) 
6. Aspects of family social 
system (isolation, financial or 
housing problems, stress) 
7. Family lack of cooperation 
(inability to recognize risk to 
child, unwillingness to work to 
protect child, lack of motivation 
for change) 
 
Factors 1, 2, 4, and 7 contributed 
most to removal decisions. For 
perceived risk the factors 
accounted for 65.9% of variance, 
with factors 1, 2, and 7 being most 
predictive. 
“The use of explicit 
indicators for risk assessment 
can eliminate much 
idiosyncratic decision 
making.” (p. 500) 
Schuerman, 
Stagner, Johnson, 
and Mullen (1989) 
Interviews with 36 
Cook County, IL 
supervisors and 
workers on their 
decision procedures 
and their own cases 
1. Child’s age 
2. Severity of the injury 
3. Primary caretaker’s level of 
functioning 
4. Potential for recurrence 
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Wells (1988) Literature review 1. Caregiver factors: immoral or 
illegal behavior, the mother 
being the abuser, substance 
abuse, admission of abuse, 
lack of impulse control, 
having inappropriate 
expectations of the child, 
unemployment, poverty 
2. Child victim factors:  
hospitalization, temporary 
removal, involvement of 
more than one child, infancy, 
arrested development 
3. Allegation factors: sexual 
abuse, emotional neglect, 
broken bones, visible sores, 
failure to thrive, delay in 
getting medical care, verbal 
hostility, having been 
reported by a professional 
4.     Investigation factors: being 
longer 
 
Katz, Hampton, 
Newberger, and 
Bowles (1986) 
Removal decisions of 
185 Boston cases of 
children seen at a 
hospital 
1. Mother’s involvement in the 
abuse 
2. Child being under 6  
3. Family having more than one 
stressor (such as pregnancy, 
unemployment, marital 
separation)  
4. Child having non-serious 
injuries 
5. History of previous child abuse 
Socioeconomic class not a 
predictor. 
 
Segal and Schwartz 
(1985) 
Placement decisions in 
files of 424 children 
admitted to emergency 
treatment over a 6 year 
period 
Four factors taken together were 
discriminant:  
1. Place the child was 
admitted from 
2. Time spent in the home 
3. Age 
4. Race 
Weakest predictor was whether the 
child had been abused 
 
Meddin (1984) Questionnaires, 81 
Midwestern CPS 
workers and 
supervisors regarding 
criteria for placement 
decisions and what 
placement decision 
they would make in a 
set of fictional case 
scenarios 
1. Risk to the child 
2. Severity of the incident 
3. Functioning and cooperation of 
the prime caretaker 
4. Age of the child 
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Finkelhor (1983) Analysis of 6096 
Midwestern sexual 
abuse cases 
87% of child victims were girls; 
families were at the lower end of 
socioeconomic scale; 78% of 
perpetrators were parents, 
stepparents, or guardians; higher 
rate of removal in sexual abuse 
cases than in physical abuse cases 
(17% vs. 12%); removal more 
likely if child is older 
 
Runyan, Gould, 
Trost, and Loda 
(1982) 
Analysis of 8610 North 
Carolina CPS cases 
1. Perception by parents that 
severe punishment is acceptable 
2. Substance abuse 
3. Severe injuries requiring 
hospitalization 
4. Abandonment of young 
children 
5. More severe types of abuse 
Not significant were the ages of the 
children or the parents, more than 1 
maltreated child being in the 
family,  race, income, education 
 
Meezan (1978) Questionnaire 
data and removal 
decisions by 164 New 
York City CPS workers 
from either traditional 
units or units primarily 
concerned with 
providing preventive 
services  
Workers in preventive services 
units were less inclined remove 
children. They were more likely to 
believe that preventive services 
were useful and that foster care 
damaged children. 
 
Bradford (1976) Importance 
rankings by 48 
Maryland CPS workers 
of 25 critical incidents 
affecting removal 
decision making; 
incidents were those 
mentioned most often 
among over 300 
incidents identified by 
15 supervisors 
1. Parental potential for abuse 
2. Vulnerability of child for abuse 
3. Visual evidence of abuse or of 
a disturbed child 
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Studies Regarding Provision of Services Decisions  
 
Study Data Source Factors Identified Comments/Other findings 
Freeman, Levine, 
and Doueck (1996) 
Analysis of 293 
New York abuse 
cases 
Younger age predicts more services, 
more visits and phone calls by 
caseworkers; no difference in 
substantiation rates by age 
Age as a risk factor not 
ignored. 
DiLeonardi (1980) Analysis of case 
data from 12 
Chicago child 
abuse and neglect 
demonstration 
projects 
Presence and severity of injury, 
victimization of other children in the 
family, age of the child, admission of 
abuse by the parent, degree of child 
victim development, child’s fear of 
parent, worker’s perception of child-
parent interaction, adequacy of parent 
in fulfilling parent role, alcohol or drug 
abuse, parent’s expectations of child’s 
behavior, presence of marital problems, 
parental self-control, parent’s 
expression of hostility toward child, 
parents’ receipt of welfare 
“The assertion of one’s 
authority as a protective 
service worker is easier with 
client accustomed to 
complying with public agency 
requirements.” (p. 363) 
Gordon and 
Gibbons (1998) 
Analysis of cases 
of all types of 
allegations, from 
eight English 
Child Protection 
Committees and 
social services 
departments 
1. Poverty 
2. Ten indicators of 
“vulnerability”:  
a. A more serious referral incident 
b. A referred child under 5 
c. An alleged perpetrator being in 
the same household as the child 
d. Previous recorded investigations 
for abuse or neglect 
e. Evidence of parent abusing drugs 
or alcohol 
f. Parent figure with a criminal 
record 
g. Parent figure having mental 
illness 
h. Domestic violence between adult 
partners 
i. Family being headed by a lone 
parent 
j. Reconstituted family 
 
Vulnerability factors (esp. d, f, g, and 
h) more predictive of validation than 
poverty. 
“We did not find evidence to 
support fears that decision-
making in child protection is 
so unreliable that local 
aspects of the system, rather 
than children’s needs, 
determine their placement on 
protection registers.” (p. 434) 
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Studies Regarding Recommendation of Court Action Decisions 
 
Study Data Source Factors Identified Comments/Other findings 
Craft and Clarkson 
(1985) 
Decision of 73 
CPS workers  and 
73 attorneys, all 
Iowan, regarding 
16 physical abuse 
case scenarios 
constructed to 
display different 
combinations 
factors developed 
in previous study 
Factors used: 
1. Seriousness of injury 
2. Previous injury 
3. Consistency of the parents’ 
explanation of the injury 
4. Parental reaction to the 
investigation 
 
Significantly more attorneys 
recommended court action than 
social workers. 
 
Factors 1 and 2 most predictive of 
recommended court action for both 
groups. 
 
“Protective workers often claim 
they do no recommend court 
intervention in specific cases 
even though they personally 
believe abuse has occurred. The 
reasons given are that there is 
insufficient evidence to 
substantiate the case, or that the 
prosecuting attorney will not 
support their position. The 
results of this study indicate 
this is a false assumption.” (p. 
172) 
Craft, Epley, and 
Clarkson (1980) 
Decision of 38 
CPS workers in a 
Midwestern state 
regarding 16 
physical abuse 
case scenarios 
constructed to 
display different 
combinations 
factors developed 
in worker 
interviews  
Factors used: 
1. Seriousness of injury 
2. Previous injury 
3. Consistency of the parents’ 
explanation of the injury 
4. Parental reaction to the 
investigation 
 
Strong interaction effects among the 
factors. The more that were present, 
the more likely the recommendation 
of court action. 
“General tendency among child 
protective service workers not 
to recommend court action, 
particularly when there is a 
mixture of negative and 
positive characteristics 
describing the case” (p. 41-42) 
 
“Decisions may depend to a 
substantial extent on the biases 
of the individual worker and 
not on the characteristics of the 
cases being examined.” (p. 42) 
  
  
 In a review of 42 factor studies published before 1992, Jones (1993) pointed out that 
the majority of them are limited by having small, unrepresentative samples, no 
comparison groups, the use of agency staff to record data, and reliance upon incomplete 
and possibly unreliable archival data.  Even so, the high degree of overlapping findings 
in such studies indicates “considerable agreement among workers about the 
circumstances and indicators used at each stage of the decision making process” (Jones, 
1993 pp. 245-6). Taken together, these studies portray CPS decision making as focusing 
mainly upon factors that are probative, relevant, and appropriate. Nonetheless, some 
non-evidentiary elements, like ethnicity and socioeconomic status, make themselves felt 
in the outcomes, and reliability is less than optimal even when different investigators 
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look at the same factors. Different investigators assign different weights to evidentiary 
factors, possibly, in some instances, as a result of racial, class, or other kinds of bias, and 
they take into consideration factors that have nothing to do with the evidence. 
 
Decision-Making Models in CPS 
 
 The identification of relevant evidentiary factors and knowledge of the variance they 
each account for in cases that have been rightly decided raises the possibility that a 
decision making model could be created. Such a model would focus upon those 
identified relevant factors, only upon them, and would assign the right weights to each 
one, so that any one factor would have an impact on the outcome relative to its 
established importance. Investigators trained in the use of the model could then take it 
into the field and enter scores for each of the factors. When all the scores were entered, 
the model would multiply them by the weights, sum the products to produce an overall 
score, an objective measure to counteract the bias and inattention of the investigator.  
 Such models are generally not considered appropriate for making validation 
decisions. Theoretically, at least, the events of the past are fully available to 
investigation, and a calculation that an allegation is statistically likely or unlikely to be 
true would seem unnecessary, not to say potentially unjust. The future, however, is not, 
in principle, available to investigation, and a probabilistic assessment of the likelihood of 
future occurrence of abuse or neglect would seem not only appropriate, but a necessary 
condition for accuracy and fairness in decision making about removal, placement, and 
the seeking of court orders to impose services or revoke parental rights. 
 Efforts to create models for the assessment of risk began in the early 1980s 
(Baumann, 1997). Some models, called consensus-based, used factors developed by 
panels of experts or from the kind of studies outlined above. Others, called actuarial 
models, developed factors through statistical analysis of demographic case factors.  
These efforts have coincided with a philosophical shift in many CPS agencies from an 
incident-based approach to investigation, as taken by law enforcement, to a risk-based 
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approach (Cicchinelli and Keller, 1990, quoted in DePanfils and Scannapeico, 1994). 
The reservations that many experts have about the design and use of these models are 
touched upon in Chapter IV. Research has shown, however, that predictions of future 
harm based on risk factors achieve a significant level of accuracy (Grayson and 
McNulty, 1999). 
 The relationship that linear models should have with the intuitive decision making of 
human judges is a matter of debate. Some who see risk assessment models as benefiting 
CPS casework, like Doueck, English, DePanfils, and Moote, (1993) and Sheets (1992), 
nonetheless point out that such models should not and cannot replace the judgment of 
well-trained, experienced staff. Others, like Ruscio (1998), believe linear models should 
largely determine CPS decision making. That linear models in general are more accurate 
than subjective human judgment, even expert human judgment, has been established in 
dozens of studies in dozens of judgment situations (Dawes, 1994). The great watershed 
in this line of research was Meehl’s 1954 book, Clinical Versus Statistical Prediction: A 
Theoretical Analysis and a Review of the Evidence (Dawes, 1982). Meehl marshaled the 
findings of previous studies in which intuitive predictions by psychologists of such 
numerical variables as the ratings of students who had just completed a Ph.D. were less 
accurate than a linear regression of constituent variables such as GRE scores, grade point 
averages, and ratings of letters of recommendations. Linear regression is only one of a 
set of possible operations that optimize the accuracy of a model’s prediction, but even if 
some non-optimal operation is used, making it an “improper” model rather than a 
“proper” one, the experts are still outperformed. The linear model is therefore robust, 
retaining its superior predictive strength through a wide range of operations (Dawes, 
1982). 
 
Intuition Theories 
 
 Intuition is notoriously difficult to define, mainly because, as Hammond (1996) has 
pointed out, lack of awareness about the origins and workings of intuition is precisely 
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what makes it intuitive. Hammond himself defines intuition negatively, as “a cognitive 
process that somehow produces an answer, solution, or idea without the use of a 
conscious, logically defensible, step-by-step process” (1996, p. 60). Damasio (1994) has 
perhaps gone farthest in trying to explain the neurological mechanics of at least one kind 
of intuition. His decision-making experiments with people having brain damage have led 
him to the conclusion that intuition functions as a somatic marker attached, by learning, 
to a decision alternative that sets off an alarm when it is contemplated, directing the 
decision maker to other alternatives. Intuition saves cognitive bother by quickly 
narrowing the range of decision alternatives. Though non-rational, intuition nonetheless 
improves the accuracy and efficiency of decision making. 
 In one set of striking experiments, Damasio and his colleagues measured the skin 
conductance responses of persons learning to play a gambling game. The object of the 
game is to make as much money as possible, and avoid losing as much as possible, in 
drawing cards from each of four decks of cards. Each deck has mostly cards that award 
payment and some that exact penalties. Two decks give small payoffs, but also small 
penalties, and are much less risky than the other two, which offer larger payoffs and 
much larger penalties. After a number of draws from all the decks, participants began to 
show physical signs of anxiety as they contemplated reaching for the riskier decks. So it 
is, Damasio contends, that we come to know without knowing how we know or even, in 
some instances, that we know. 
 Damasio’s formulation is similar to the affect heuristic proposed by Slovic, 
Finucane, Peters, and MacGregor (2002). They postulate a process whereby memories of 
events, persons, and objects become associated with degrees of positive or negative 
feeling. When people make judgments they consult an “affective pool,” which allows the 
quick and efficient sorting of options by their associated affective markers.  
 Hogarth (2001) sees intuition as the interaction between two learning systems – the 
deliberate, which processes information in conscious, working memory, and the tacit, 
which is automatic, requiring no expenditure of cognitive resources, and takes place 
below consciousness. The tacit system marks the frequency of occurrences in the 
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environment, notices and remembers conjunctions and emotional experiences, and is 
also adept at identifying patterns. Intuition derives from deep familiarity with a 
particular environment. When a stimulus offers itself to perception, a preconscious filter 
determines whether to store it, react to it, or send it up into consciousness. Intuition, 
which Hogarth says may be thought of as a kind of expertise, occurs when a recognition 
or association in the tacit system suddenly erupts into deliberative consciousness. 
 Klein’s (1998) understanding of intuition is quite similar. He and his associates have 
studied what they call naturalistic decision making in settings where there is severe time 
pressure, the stakes are high, information is inadequate, and goals are often unclear – a 
prime set of conditions, Hammond would say, for the exercise of intuition. Klein’s first 
subjects were fire commanders, who manage fire fighting crews as they work to put out 
fires. He asked them to tell stories about both typical and atypical fire emergencies they 
had overseen. He expected to find confirmation of the classical decision making model, 
according to which, one identifies at least two options, determines a method of 
evaluating them, evaluates them, and picks the option with the best score. Klein found, 
however, that decision makers in the field never made decisions this way. Instead, “their 
experience let them see a situation, even a nonroutine one, as an example of a prototype, 
so they knew the typical course of action right away” (Klein, 1998, p. 17). The fire 
commanders thus did not choose among two or more options. At any given time, they 
saw but one option, and they acted upon it until events showed it was not working. Klein 
calls this recognition-primed decision making (RPD). It is essentially the identification 
of deep principles at work in a given situation coupled with an understanding of what 
groups of problems have in common.   
 The RPD model is illustrated by a story from one of Klein’s subjects. A fire 
commander, a lieutenant, believed he had saved the lives of several of his crew by using 
extrasensory perception: 
 
It is a simple house fire in a one-story house in a residential neighborhood. The fire 
is in the back, in the kitchen area. The lieutenant leads his hose crew into the 
48 
building, to the back, to spray water on the fire, but the fire just roars back at them.   
“Odd,” he thinks. The water should have more of an impact. They try dousing it 
again, and get the same results. They retreat a few steps to regroup.  
Then the lieutenant starts to feel as if something is not right.  He doesn’t have 
any clues; he just doesn’t feel right about being in that house, so he orders his men 
out of the building – a perfectly standard building with nothing out of the ordinary.   
As soon as his men leave the building, the floor where they had been standing 
collapses. Had they still been inside, they would have plunged into the fire below. 
 
 Upon questioning, the lieutenant was able to recall some of the cues that were 
available to him before he made his decision to pull the firefighters out of the house. He 
had no suspicion that the fire was really in the basement, but was aware, at a level below 
consciousness, that the behavior of the fire was unusual. The living room, where the 
crew was standing, was hotter and quieter than it should have been had the fire really 
been in the kitchen. The fire therefore did not fit the lieutenant’s stored mental pattern of 
a kitchen fire in a small house, even though he could not, at the time, have said why; nor 
at any time could he have described his stored mental pattern with thoroughness and 
precision. He had knowledge he did not know he had, and it expressed itself in his 
consciousness as a vague sense of discomfort and dread, what he later believed was a 
flash of ESP. In Damasio’s terms, the fire commander at an unconscious level felt the 
alarm set off by one his somatic markers. For Klein, it is this movement of decision 
making from a conscious following of rules to an ability to function at an almost wholly 
intuitive level of perception that is the hallmark of naturalistic decision making 
expertise. 
 
Intuitive Judgment Found Lacking 
 
 Concerned more with how naturalistic decision makers function, rather than how 
well, Klein does not undertake to evaluate his fire commander’s decisions against any 
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sort of standard. He does not examine the possibility that if, instead of an experienced 
fire commander in the scenario above, there had been a mobile linear model with sensors 
attached, measuring noise volume, room temperature, and fire reaction, the decision to 
evacuate would have been made even sooner. Klein does acknowledge that the 
recognition-primed decision making model can and does err, when an expert lacks 
experience, lacks information, or clings too long to a mental model that should be 
abandoned, explaining away contrary evidence.   
 Other researchers have found that intuitive decision making suffers from a great deal 
more than that. The very processes that make it efficient, they say, make it full of holes. 
One reason is that human experts tend to rely on nonlinear cues in their decision making 
(Johnson, 1988). One kind of nonlinear cue is the configural, where the cue’s value 
derives in part from the value of another cue.  Someone on a long driving trip, for 
example, considering an overnight stop at a particular motel, will assign weights to the 
motel’s positive cues (seems quiet) or negative cues (looks expensive) depending upon 
how tired he or she feels and how far it is to the next town.  Another nonlinear cue is the 
so-called “broken leg” cue, one that, when present, trumps other cues.  It takes its name 
from a scenario in which one is asked to predict whether another person will go out for 
dinner on a given night.  If the judge learns that the person in question has recently 
broken a leg, that cue’s weight will likely be given determinative weight, in disregard of 
other values that would normally be considered, like whether the person has gotten an 
invitation or has a habit on eating out that night of each week.  Ganzach (1994) has 
found that experienced CPS workers also display a high degree of configurality in their 
decision making.   
 Experts’ use of nonlinear cues would seem to be applications of their knowledge of 
the interrelatedness of behavioral and environmental factors in client homes and to 
reflect extensive knowledge of the domain. How is it that their judgments suffer 
compared with those of linear models? Dawes (1982) suggests it is because people in 
general, and experts in particular, are “much better at selecting and coding information 
than they are at integrating it”(p. 394).  That is, they cannot process a disparate mass of 
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evidence without seriously undervaluing or overvaluing some portion of it.  Linear 
models, precisely because they are not sensitive to anomalous or inconsistent cues, are 
less apt, on average, to leave important evidence out of consideration. 
     One of the many efforts to model juror decision making, the stochastic model, 
postulates a “freezing” of the judgmental process in response to a critical event.  This 
would occur when the decision maker encounters a piece of evidence that functions as a 
“broken leg” cue and trumps any other evidence that may already exist or has yet to be 
introduced (Kerr, 1993). Even so, confidence in the accuracy of one’s judgment 
continues to increase with the introduction of new information (Oskamp, 1965). This 
burgeoning illusion of correctness results from the new evidence, if it does not fit the 
now-completed decision model, being undervalued or misinterpreted so that it does fit 
(Tversky and Kahneman, 1982a).  
  Camerer and Johnson (1997) give several possible reasons why experts rely on 
configural rules and why they can lead to error. They are used because they are faster 
and more convenient than the weighing and balancing of a possibly large number of 
parameters. They also seem to arise naturally from explanations of past cases.  
Configural rules can lead a decision maker astray, however, because even though they 
often arise from unusual cases, they are thereafter applied generally. Also, small errors 
inside a particular cue, which would have minimal impact as part of a linear model, 
would have much larger impact as a “broken leg” cue. 
 Another major line of research that demonstrates systematic weakness in human 
judgment and decision making goes under the general name “heuristics and biases.” Its 
founders, Kahneman and Tversky, and their followers have, in study after study, shown 
that, when faced with any sort of assessment of probability, people use rough and ready 
rules of thumb, or heuristics, that are often biased away from true odds. People equate 
likelihood with representativeness, judging an event more likely the more it represents 
its parent population (Tversky & Kahneman, 1982b). For example, after reading a 
description of a man as “intelligent, but unimaginative, compulsive, and generally 
lifeless,” and having been good at mathematics in school, but not so good in social 
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studies and humanities,” Tversky & Kahneman, 1982b, p. 92), subjects in an experiment 
assign a high probability to his being an accountant, when asked to rate the likelihood of 
each of several possible descriptors. They say it is unlikely that the man plays jazz for a 
hobby, but rate the combination “is an accountant who plays jazz for a hobby” as having 
a higher probability than “plays jazz for a hobby” alone. The resemblance of the 
combined condition to the set of given factors causes subjects to overlook fact that the 
probability of two propositions both being true is necessarily less than the probability of 
either one being true by itself. Nisbett, Borgida, Crandall, and Reed (1982) speculate that 
emotionally interesting information is likely to be overweighted because it calls up 
existing schemas, or scripts. One then follows that script, losing sight of the evidence at 
hand. 
 Tversky and Kahneman have also found that intuitive decision makers also fall prey 
to an availability bias, whereby they “estimate a frequency or probability by the ease 
with which instances or associations could be brought to mind” (Tversky and 
Kahneman, 1982c, p. 164). Because of the prevalence and power of unreliable heuristics 
like representativeness and availability, Kahneman and Tversky take issue with other 
theorists who say that human beings do apply elemental logic in their decision making, 
though badly, moving from a state of prior belief, through application of evidence, to a 
state of posterior, or new belief, on the whole following Bayes’ theorem. Kahneman and 
Tversky argue strongly that people are not bad Bayesians.  They are not Bayesians at all 
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1982a).  
 The dangers of the representativeness and availability biases for CPS investigators 
are manifold. The perpetrator factors identified in the research outlined above, or others 
distilled from an investigator’s experience, can create an assumption that an alleged 
perpetrator having those characteristics is likely to be guilty. Investigators may also 
assign the same weights to evidence in the present case that the evidence in their last 
case, or in that big case last year, had or should have had. The net result, Fincham, 
Breach, Moore, and Diener have suggested (1994), is an inflation of substantiated cases. 
 Other kinds of what Edwards and von Winterfeldt (1986) have called “cognitive 
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illusions” that would seem to pose a threat of error to CPS decision making include: 
• Confirmation bias 
Once people arrive at a hypothesis concerning a given body of evidence, they 
tend to discount, undervalue, or misinterpret additional evidence that does not fit 
the hypothesis (Lord, Ross, and Lepper, 1979). Schutlz-Hardt, Frey, Luthgens, 
and Moscovici (2000) found that confirmation bias occurs in group decision 
making, just as it does in that of individuals. Russo, Medvee, and Meloy (1996) 
found that confirmation bias can exist even before a hypothesis is formed, that it 
can arise from a non-evidentiary preference for one of two or more possible 
outcomes. 
• Elastic justification 
According to Hsee (1996), decision makers are often tempted to base decisions 
on factors they know they should ignore, such as personal loyalties, preferences, 
and associations.  These factors often exert an influence on the decision process 
through the way the decision makers interpret the justifiable, or legitimate, 
decision factors.  This is particularly apt to happen when the justifiable factors 
are elastic, or ambiguous in nature, requiring interpretation before they can be 
used as evidence. 
 Parental non-cooperation with the investigation, identified in the research as 
validation and risk factors, has the elastic character Hsee describes. The 
investigator can find it present or not present, assign it greater or lesser weight, 
and attribute it either to the stress of the situation or to an effort to thwart an 
investigation liable to reveal their crime. Personal feeling could easily influence 
the interpretation of this factor. 
• Motivated reasoning  
Boiney, Kennedy, and Nye (1997) found that when decision makers are 
motivated to support a particular conclusion, they adopt decision strategies most 
likely to yield the desired conclusion.  
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• Groupthink 
Janis and Mann (1977), summarizing Janis’ previous work, use to the term 
groupthink to characterize the way groups fail to consider alternatives and weigh 
evidence conscientiously in their efforts to reach unanimity. The characteristics 
of groupthink include: 
o Absolute faith in the group’s ethics, blinding members to the moral 
implications of their decisions; 
o Collective efforts to rationalize in order to discount warnings which 
might lead the members to reconsider their assumptions before they 
recommit themselves to their past policy decisions; 
o Stereotyped views of rivals and enemies as too evil to warrant genuine 
attempts to negotiate; 
o Direct pressure on any member who expresses strong arguments against 
any of the group’s stereotypes, illusions, or commitments; 
o Self-censorship of deviation from the apparent group consensus; and 
o A shared illusion of unanimity. 
 Kelly and Milner (1996) performed documentary analysis on the case 
conference minutes in four child death cases in Great Britain, in an effort to 
determine the group decision-making processes at work, and then apply the 
model to the specifics of each case. They found that groupthink manifested 
itself in the case conferences as uncritical support for the first alternative 
suggested by a powerful member, lack of disagreement, pressure on 
dissenters, and limiting representation of other agencies and professions at 
meetings.   
     The way a case was initially framed was also seen to have a determinative 
affect decision making. In their early assessments in each of the death cases, 
the CPS investigators had identified a number of deficits in the children and 
in their environments, such as developmental delay, poor care, and not being 
taken to school. Removal of the children from the home and placing them in 
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foster care would have created an opportunity to overcome the deficits, but 
would also have meant the loss of the parent-child relationship. Once the 
cases were formulated as choices between potential benefits and certain 
losses, the caseworkers began to underestimate the significance of the deficits 
they had identified. 
     Finally, the conference minutes revealed that group polarization took 
place. That is the tendency of groups to move from an initial moderate 
position of caution or risk tolerance to a polar position of the same character. 
Once the decision-making teams adopted a moderate tolerance of risk to the 
child, they were soon able to tolerate more and more of it.   
     The three processes – groupthink, group polarization, and framing – 
permitted the caseworkers in these death cases to overlook and even suppress 
dissenting viewpoints and to commit increasing levels of resources to a 
course of action that was failing to provide adequate protection to the 
children in their care. Kelly and Milner say that as long as a group has control 
over its procedures, it will not engage in measures that could serve as 
correctives, such as appointing a devil’s advocate or holding second chance 
meetings.  The very processes the group would be trying to correct for would 
cause these measures to be deleted or undervalued. 
• The teller-listener extremity effect 
Gilovich (1987) found that when person A retells to person B a story told by 
person C about him or herself, B will form a more extreme impression of C, 
positive or negative, than A did. Gilovich attributed the difference to the fact that 
the reteller tends not to reproduce situational elements in the original account, 
making the original narrator’s behavior seem more volitional. Inman, Reichl, and 
Baron (1993) sought to test this explanation by getting retellers to include 
situational factors in their narratives. They found that the number of “situational 
bits” communicated by retellers did not, however, affect the hearer’s judgment to 
a significant degree. The authors speculate that one possible cause of the 
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extremity effect may have to do with the reteller’s access to the nonverbal 
behavior of the original narrator, which the hearer of the reteller’s second-hand 
account does not have. Another possibility is that the account given by the 
original narrator was rehearsed, well organized, and chronological, whereas the 
retelling was comparatively unstructured. The listener, therefore, has to work 
harder cognitively to understand the story, which leaves less capacity for taking 
into account what situational information is provided. 
 Kelly and Milner (1999), in a second study of CPS case conferences in 
Britain, found that the way a case was framed, by the person who presented it to 
the group, was generally predictive of the outcome. Initial portrayal of a child 
being at risk would result in the group’s embarking on a course of increasing 
commitment of resources. Self-justification, on the part of both the initial 
presenter and the group, would thwart consideration of alternatives. The child’s 
degree of risk would seldom be reevaluated.  
• Acceptability and rationalization heuristics 
Tetlock (1997) found that decision makers who do not feel committed to a 
particular decision outcome often save cognitive effort by making decisions they 
believe will be acceptable to the decision’s prospective audience. When decisions 
already made are challenged because of negative outcomes, decision makers are 
motivated to put forward as many reasons as possible to justify the decisions. 
Says Tetlock, “By generating supportive cognitions, decision-makers who 
practice defensive bolstering blind themselves to changing policy in ways that 
would better promote their long-term values” (Tetlock, 1997, p. 673). 
• Feedback ambiguity 
Hogarth in 1981 challenged the validity of many of the heuristics and biases 
studies, saying that their focus upon decisions as isolated events involving 
unfamiliar decision situations overlooked the adaptive nature of real human 
judgment, how, over time, it uses feedback from the environment to refine its 
methods and improve its accuracy. Ten years later, however, Hogarth, along with 
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colleagues Gibbs, MacKenzie, and Marquis (1991), expressed skepticism of the 
value of feedback. Since it carries information about both the nature of the task 
and the quality of one’s performance, one cannot be certain, for example, 
whether one’s score on a test has more to do with one’s knowledge of the subject 
or the teacher’s manner of grading. This ambiguity can make feedback unreliable 
as a guide to better performance, especially in environments that do not offer an 
ideal balance of rewards and punishments. Brehmer, too (1980), has found the 
usefulness of feedback limited by the way decision makers use it. Cognitively ill 
equipped to recognize the probabilistic structure of a task environment, they look 
for, and erroneously find, simple causal rules to account its stimuli. 
• Rule of optimism 
A tendency among social workers to give the most positive interpretation 
possible to parents’ behaviors, to provide the least coercive intervention possible, 
to overlook contrary evidence, and to have a general belief in the relativity of all 
judgment, was suggested by Dingwall and Eekelaar (1984).  
• Differences in cue weighting 
Differences in judgments made by CPS investigators even when using the same 
judgment criteria was a finding in several of the factor studies summarized 
above: Shapira and Benbenishty (1993), Rossi, Schuerman, and Budde (1999), 
Craft, Epley, and Clarkson (1980). Einhorn (1974) found this lack reliability to 
be a feature of even expert intuitive judgment. The weights that different experts 
assigned to the same cues in a judgment task vary widely. Good calibration, or 
the accurate, consistent assignment of value to variables (Lichtenstein, Fischoff,  
and Phillips, 1977) is difficult to attain. Rossi, Schuerman, and Budde (1999) 
hoped to arrive at an estimation of the error rate of CPS investigators by 
comparing their removal judgments to those of experts. They were defeated, 
however, by the lack of agreement among the experts themselves, because of 
wide variations in cue weighting. This led Rossi et al to conclude that CPS 
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decision making was probably rife with both the false positive false negative 
types of errors. 
 Other sources of judgment error have been uncovered through research into CPS 
practice. Munro (1996, 1999) examined the reports of 45 official inquiries into the 
conduct of British child protective agencies in cases where a child had died from abuse 
or neglect after agency involvement had begun. She assumed that all 45 deaths 
represented mistakes on the part of the CPS caseworkers that handled the cases, but of 
these, some were avoidable mistakes and some were unavoidable. A mistake may be 
considered unavoidable if the tragic outcome could not have been predicted from the 
evidence, which was as complete and as thoroughly understood as possible. Avoidable 
mistakes involve failure to collect relevant evidence or to understand the significance of 
evidence collected. Munro sees in the inquiry reports strong evidence of caseworkers’ 
general unwillingness to alter their beliefs. A powerful form of confirmation bias 
allowed casework decisions to be ruled by early, positive opinions about families. 
Conflicting evidence was discounted or ignored and alternative explanations of collected 
evidence were rejected out of hand.  Munro attributes this in part to agency bias toward 
keeping families intact and maintaining Dingwall and Eekelar’s (1984) “rule of 
optimism.” In addition, caseworkers gathered too little information about families, and 
various persons involved in the cases too often failed to share or pay attention to what 
information they had. 
 McGovern (1991) and O’Donohue and Fanetti (1996) have also noted that 
confirmation bias, in the form of failure to consider alternative explanations of evidence 
in child sexual abuse cases, has led not only to judgment error on the part of CPS 
workers, police officers, physicians, and psychologists, but to the imprisonment of 
wrongly accused parents. In at least one study, however, consideration of alternative 
explanations did not increase judgment accuracy. Mandel, Lehman, and Yuille (1994) 
found that, while CPS workers tended to make few unwarranted assumptions and 
generated more hypotheses regarding evidence than college undergraduates did, their 
decision making accuracy was exactly the same. 
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 Drury-Hudson (1999) found that new CPS workers, compared to workers with at 
least ten years’ experience, had little knowledge of theory, research, and legislation 
related to the field. This lack of knowledge impaired the novices’ ability to recognize 
risk in a hypothetical scenario, and would, in general, Drury-Hudson says, cause them to 
rely on their “own values about children and families when making decisions about the 
removal of children from the home” (Drury-Hudson, 1999, p. 154).  
 Summarizing previous research, Gambrill (1997) listed the various cognitive and 
environmental factors that hamper accurate decision making by caseworkers. Barriers 
include: 
• Limited knowledge: incomplete or misleading information; 
• Limited ability to process knowledge: jumping to conclusions, inflexible use of 
basic strategies, limited use of different methods, selective perception, defining 
problems too narrowly (framing), stereotyping, focusing on vivid events 
(representativeness), faulty memory; 
• Poor problem-solving methods: vested interest in certain outcomes, a focus on 
winning arguments rather than finding the truth, too much interest in social 
approval, reliance on unreliable rules of thumb, ignoring feedback from previous 
bad decisions; 
• Inadequate background knowledge and investigative skill; 
• Emotional bias:  fatigue, anxiety, anger, low tolerance for ambiguity, wishful 
thinking, unrealistic expectations for quick success; and 
• Obstacles in the task environment:  large caseloads, lack of clear agency policy, 
contradictory demands, time pressures, distractions, pressure to conform. 
 
Intuitive Judgment Found Not So Bad, After All 
 
 Reviewing this long list of things that can and do go wrong with intuitive judgment, 
one might wonder if the proponents of linear models are not right in wanting to strip it of 
decision-making authority whenever possible. Some theorists, however, have challenged 
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this gloomy portrait. Dawes and Mulford (1996), for example, have shown that 
overconfidence at low levels of accuracy and underconfidence at high levels of accuracy 
can be explained entirely by the regression effect. Similarly, Gigerenzer (2000) has 
argued that much of the heuristics and biases research has been flawed by focusing on 
single trials or instances. Probability, understood as patterns of frequency in large sets of 
data, does not and cannot concern itself with the characteristics of a single member of 
that set. Take, for example, the experiment cited above, concerning possible descriptors 
of an intelligent, but unimaginative man, as being an accountant, playing jazz for a 
hobby, or doing both. The fact that most people choose “both” as being more likely than 
the less likely of the two single descriptors, even though the “both” condition contained 
the less likely one in it, purportedly demonstrated the existence of the representativeness 
heuristic. Gigerenzer showed that when the problem is posed properly as a frequency 
estimation, asking how many of roomful of 100 intelligent, but unimaginative persons 
were likely to be accountants or accountants and jazz players, the heuristic disappears.  
 Gigerenzer contends that decision heuristics, rather than being lazy substitutions for 
a fully rational decision making process constitute the real-world, adaptive rationality 
that people use to their benefit every day (Gigerenzer, Todd, and the ABC Research 
Group, 1999). Such “fast and frugal” heuristics are essentially algorithms that set rules 
for guiding and stopping searches through alternatives and for making a final decision 
based on the results of the search. The decision rule can be as simple as letting a single 
reason determine a choice, no matter how many the search produced, or eliminating 
alternatives until only one remains. If these heuristics are evaluated by their practical 
utility, and not compared, as a process, to the workings of the probability calculus, they 
do not come off so badly. 
 That human beings are inherently bad at processing ill-structured data is disproved 
by the most basic act of perception, according to Hammond (1996). Following the 
psychologist Egon Brunswik, Hammond argues that the environment offers our senses 
multiple fallible indicators, which appear to us strongly or weakly, and which we must 
then use to fashion our judgments and behaviors. Brunswik’s lens model shows how 
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external stimuli are inductively transformed into perception and judgment. Every 
perception is an inference, is necessarily quasirational, and is a judgment within an ill-
structured domain, based upon large amounts of simultaneously presented evidence. We 
are all expert perceivers; our competence is demonstrated continuously by our successful 
adaptation to a dynamic environment. 
 To hold that intuitive judgment is fundamentally valid is not to say that error never 
happens or that any of the susceptibilities and frailties identified in the research do not 
exist. A feature of human judgment that theorists often overlook, however, is its ability 
to self-correct over time and adapt to environmental demands. This, as we saw earlier, 
was Hogarth’s initial take on the value of decision feedback (1981), though he later 
(1991) came to consider it tempered by an inherent ambiguity as to whether feedback 
conveys information about performance or environment. Not knowing why a decision 
turned out wrong will indeed make it difficult to know which element of one’s decision 
making to change, and one could easily change the wrong thing first. Even so, the 
message that change is necessary is received and acted upon. That change will produce 
new and somewhat less ambiguous feedback, which will in turn be acted upon through 
the making of additional change. The ambiguity makes this process inefficient, but does 
not prevent progress. The same reply may be made to Brehmer’s (1980) objection that 
feedback cannot give corrective help if the decision maker fundamentally 
misunderstands the probabilistic nature of the task structure and continues search for 
simple determinative rules where none exist. These fictitious rules may be simple 
compared to the probabilistic reality, though they do admit of a certain degree of 
configural complexity. Rules may be changed, though, and new rules may be added in 
response to negative feedback, achieving over time an increasingly useful, if steadily 
unwitting approximation of the reality. 
 Asare and Wright (1995), for the purpose of analyzing judgments made by auditors 
addressing a task in which a number of hypotheses were initially viable, distinguished 
between errors, caused by incomplete knowledge of or incorrect application of the 
probability calculus, and mistakes, which they defined as departures from task-specific 
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standards. The auditors did, as expected, make normative errors such as failing to adjust 
probabilities for the elements of a hypothesis set when one element was eliminated and 
maintaining an initial belief its warrant has been discredited.  Nonetheless, because the 
auditors had substantive expertise, they were able to review evidence skeptically, code it 
appropriately, and consider alternatives before reaching judgment. This led to correct 
decisions and high performance.  Errors, in other words, did not lead to mistakes. 
 In addition to adaptation over time and domain-specific procedural knowledge, 
decision makers’ awareness of potential evaluation by others also exerts a corrective 
effect on the judgment process. Lundgren and Prislin (1998) found decision makers 
possessed of impression motivation, a desire to maintain good relations with other 
decision makers, though they modified beliefs in the interests of social harmony, were 
objective in their gathering and processing of information, more so than decision makers 
motivated by defensiveness, which occasioned the bolstering and protection of a 
conclusion already reached through restriction of evidence search. Adding accuracy 
motivation to either impression motivation or defensiveness fostered more balanced 
information seeking, even if it did not eliminate biased thinking altogether. Boiney, 
Kennedy, and Nye (1997) identified what they call a reasonableness constraint, a de-
biasing effect resulting from the need to justify a judgment process or outcome to others. 
The reasonableness constraint does not fully eliminate bias created by motivated 
reasoning, but it does oblige the decision maker to display the minimum bias necessary 
to reach the desired conclusion. It would seem to follow that the greater the socially 
imposed reasonableness constraint, the less the decision-making bias. Curley, Yates, and 
Abrams (1986) found that ambiguity avoidance in decision making was attributable to 
anticipation of a decision being evaluated  by others. Tetlock (1997), too, has found a 
strong de-biasing effect in pre-emptive self-criticism, which is reliably induced by the 
prospect of having to be accountable for decision processes and outcomes to an 
unknown audience. And Garfinkel (1967) found that it is a desire to conform to the 
assigned social role that motivates jurors to choose what is legal over what they privately 
consider fair, to delay judgment, and to base outcomes solely on the evidence presented. 
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Phronesis 
 
 A fourth corrective to bias and probability blindness in intuitive decision making is 
the exercise of what Aristotle called phronesis, the intellectual virtue often translated as 
prudence, which is described in the Nichomachean Ethics (Aristotle, Ethics, VI, 5, trans. 
1941) as the ability to deliberate well, to make judgments about what is best to do, both 
for oneself and for others.  It is concerned, as opposed to sophia, or theoretical wisdom, 
with the present and with concrete human problems. 
 In none of the factor studies or judgment procedure studies summarized above, 
where “expert” judgment was the object of study, did the researchers distinguish among 
participants by degree of expertise. They operationally defined expertise as the 
possession of credentials, degrees, position, or years of experience. They did not try to 
determine which of the experts were superior in terms of procedure or outcome. That 
some experts are more expert than others seems obvious, however. In Johnson’s study 
(1988) of medical school faculty selecting interns and residents from an applicant pool, 
the best expert outperformed the worst expert by 42% and the expert average by 26%. 
That person even beat a linear model by nose. Camerer and Johnson (1997), citing 
Goldberg, said a well-known neurologist, who worked slowly, achieved an 83% 
accuracy rate in his diagnoses, compared to 65% for his colleagues.  
 According to Langer (1989), most experts, having become so practiced at a task they 
do it mindlessly, are apt to become trapped in counterproductive cognitive habits. They 
continue to follow a routine even after it no longer yields benefit. Langer advocates 
mindfulness, the three characteristics of which are the continuous creation of new 
conceptual categories, openness to new information, and constant awareness of other 
points of view. These traits would seem to be correctives against the lure of the 
inappropriate configural rules and the overweighting of “broken leg” cues that tend to 
drag down the effectiveness of expert judgment. 
 Similarly, Kitchener and Brenner (1990) postulate a Kohlberg-like developmental 
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scheme for reflective judgment, the seventh and highest stage of which is characterized 
by an awareness of the provisional and fallible nature of knowledge. Stage 7 persons 
understand that even well-structured problems are capable of certain answers only within 
a clearly defined context, that uncertainty in real life situations is ineliminable, but that 
conscientious epistemological effort yields serviceable truth. King and Kitchener (1994) 
suggest that in order to acquire reflective judgment during their college years, young 
adults must become acquainted with ill-structured problems within their areas of 
expertise, must learn what it means to justify beliefs, and must receive both intellectual 
and emotional support as they progress. Provided these conditions are met, students 
attain an openness to alternatives and non-confirmatory evidence that stands them in 
good stead, whatever judgment task they undertake. 
 These theorists are, in essence, offering intellectual virtues as antidotes to the 
potential insensitivity and carelessness of intuitive judgment: a blend of enterprise and 
humility, an awareness of limitations coupled with a willingness to be alive to new 
possibilities. They furthermore maintain the possibility these virtues may be learned, 
even in the process of learning the expertise itself. 
 Schön (1987) points to artistry as the difference between higher and lower levels of 
competence in a given practice. Artistry is defined as “an exercise of intelligence, a kind 
of knowing, though different in crucial respects from our standard model of professional 
knowledge” (Schön, 1987, p. 13). It is the intuitive knowledge that Klein and Hammond 
describe and it allows practitioners to negotiate situations that have a high degree of 
uncertainty, that do not fit pre-conceived patterns, or that involve questions of value. 
 Artistry cannot be learned, Schön says, in a classroom, though it can be learned 
through coaching. He advocates the use of practica in professional education, the 
creation of an educational space in which the student practice doing the work of the 
profession under one-to-one tutelage and in a low-risk, supportive environment. This 
allows the student to acquire the crucial component of artistry, reflection-in-action, an 
ability to engage in sensitized perception and critical thought while engaged in the work 
activity.  Since this ability involves subtle, tacit, even inexpressible dimensions of 
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thought and feeling, it cannot be realized except in context and cannot be conveyed 
except through embodied, personal, continuing example. 
 Practical wisdom, Aristotle’s phronesis, is for Schön, then, a real and attainable 
quality. And, like the other writers taken up in this section, Schön links practical wisdom 
to ethics. It is, as he says, a kind of knowledge that is not like other knowledge. Nor is it 
a skill. It is a way of applying knowledge and skill, an ethical commitment to evidence, a 
modesty before it that can never be captured in a protocol. For Aristotle, phronesis is a 
kind of knowingness one needs in order to be good. That which separates the wise from 
the merely expert may be a kind of goodness one needs in order to know. 
 It should be pointed out that some critics consider error in CPS decision making to 
go beyond the foibles of individual investigators or groups, and thus would not be 
subject to amelioration by adaptation over time, domain-specific expertise, even if 
exercised with intellectual virtue, or accountability. Howitt (1992) argues that certain 
biases are woven deeply into the theory of child protection because they justify the 
agencies’ power to intervene. No correction from within can therefore have any effect. 
Self-serving theory causes investigators to regard certain caretaker characteristics – 
poverty, step-parenthood, single parenthood – as red flags, and because CPS agencies 
seldom waver from a course of intervention once it has begun, errors that result from 
such labeling should be regarded not as isolated events, but as resulting from a process at 
work in every investigation.  
 Taking a wider perspective still, some experts (Hill, 1990; Jones and Gupta, 1998) 
contend that the social construction of child abuse and neglect as aberrant behavior on 
the part of individual parents hampers our ability to understand its true nature. Poverty 
and cultural patterns created by social inequity are more responsible for the mistreatment 
of children than are the actions of a few stupid, indifferent, or overwhelmed caretakers. 
The definitions of child abuse and child neglect, expressing, as they do, the political will 
of a privileged minority, may themselves be the most significant source of decision 
making error in CPS. Furthermore, just as the role of individual parents is socially 
exaggerated, so, too, is the role of the individual CPS investigator. When a child already 
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on the CPS caseload dies or is seriously injured because of subsequent abuse, politicians 
and the press tend to scapegoat the worker assigned to the case, right along with the 
abuser. Doing so permits continued belief that the community is good and the CPS 
system is good, and that all we need to do to keep everything good is punish malefactors, 
along with the lazy government employees who failed to do their jobs properly. Such 
scapegoating has a devastating effect on investigators and upon the quality of their work. 
“Staff become depressed, anxious, and demoralized, and as a result, their work becomes 
both defensive and routinized” (Jones and Gupta, 1990, p. 103).  
 Nonetheless, as Nurius, Kemp, and Gibson found (1990), CPS workers, despite 
being aware of social and environmental factors that affect decision making, nonetheless 
believe that it is primarily a responsibility of the individual person and that 
characteristics of the individual decision maker, such as flexibility, balance, and 
intuitiveness, contribute more to sound decisions than supervision and even co-worker 
consultation do. It is that sense of responsibility and virtue among CPS investigators that 
is the primary object of this study. 
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CHAPTER III 
METHODOLOGY 
 
 Between May 10, 2001, and January 11, 2002, I interviewed 20 employees of the 
Texas Department of Protective and Regulatory Services (TDPRS), all of whom worked 
in or with the agency’s Child Protective Services (CPS) program. Nineteen of the 20 had 
some role in the investigation or deliberation of child abuse or neglect allegations. 
Eleven were investigators; two were supervisors; two were Program Directors (PDs), 
who supervise supervisors; one was an attorney; and one was an ombudsman, who 
handles appeals from designated perpetrators who believed allegations against them 
were wrongly validated. The twentieth interviewee was a CPS policy maker who had 
recently been a trainer of new CPS workers and before that an investigative supervisor. 
Sixteen of the 20, including all the investigators, supervisors, and PDs, worked in what 
the agency refers to as Region 7, a 30 county area centered around its headquarters in 
Austin. Most worked in Austin itself, but three of the investigators, one of the 
supervisors, and one of the PDs worked in rural parts of the region. The attorney, the 
ombudsman, the policy maker, and one of the Risk Directors had statewide 
responsibilities. Figure 2 shows the participants’ positions on an abbreviated 
organizational chart for CPS. 
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Investigator
(Arnold, Dorothy, Elsa, Gretchen,
 Helen, Leo, Louise, Melissa,
Teresa, Wanda, Yvonne)
Supervisor
(Carmen, Sarah)
Program Director
(Jennifer)
Lead Program Director
(Ida)
Regional Risk Director
(Frieda)
Program Administrator
Regional Director CPS Policy Making
(Pauline)
State Risk Director
(Barbara)
Director of Child Protective Services
Director of Programs, TDPRS
Ombusdman
(Victor)
Director of Ombudsmans Office, TDPRS
Lead Attorney
(Nancy)
General Counsel, TDPRS
Exexutive Director, TDPRS
 
Figure 2 
Partial Organization Chart for CPS in Texas 
 
 
 Before beginning my interviews, I sought permission from the top administrator of 
Region 7, the Regional Director, to approach persons in the Region to request 
interviews. She gave it, with the understanding that I would interview staff during work 
hours. She also asked her lead PD for Travis County to suggest which investigators I 
might approach first. That person gave me a list of eight persons, all of whom agreed to 
be interviewed. At the end of each interview in that first round, I asked each participant 
if he or she knew of any other investigators who might be willing to take part. In this 
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way I got the names of several more persons, nearly all of whom agreed to be 
interviewed.  I also approached a few participants because of the positions they held (the 
ombudsman, the attorney, the Risk Directors, and the Program Administrators), as it 
became my goal to have representation from each of the six positions having 
responsibility for investigating or deciding individual cases.   
 Each interview lasted between one and two hours. I did second interviews with nine 
of the 20 participants. My original intention was to do second interviews with everyone, 
but two of the investigators who gave first interviews didn’t return calls or respond to e-
mails about second interviews. In one instance the participant had seemed reluctant and 
ill at ease during her interview, and I believe she avoided a second one because she 
found the process disagreeable. In the other instance, though, the first interview had 
seemed to go well.  It seemed possible, then, that job pressures were such that she felt 
she couldn’t spare the time for further participation. Also, with the investigators, one of 
my main goals for the second interview was to have them analyze a pair of case 
scenarios, described below, and most of those I recruited later in the in data-gathering 
phase were administrators. I feared they might feel they had less time for multiple 
sessions than the investigators did. So, with the second half of my participant group I 
tried to do as much as possible in a single, somewhat longer interview and didn’t ask for 
a second one.   
 Each participant signed the consent form approved by the university’s Institutional 
Review Board (See Appendix A). I have given all the participants made-up names. No 
documentation identifies the participants by their real names. 
 My general goal for all the interviews I conducted was to discuss judgments and 
decisions the participants had made about child abuse investigations with which they had 
been involved. To that end, I asked each of them to give me case narratives, and I used a 
variety of questions to solicit them. Typically, I began each interview by asking the 
participants to describe their roles in the investigation or deliberation of abuse and 
neglect allegations and the nature of the judgments they were called upon to make. Then 
I would request examples. I would ask them to describe a case they had investigated or 
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reviewed recently, or a case from any point in their career that had been particularly 
difficult to decide, because of conflicting or ambiguous evidence. Most CPS 
investigation follows a well-worn track. The nature of a case is often apparent from a 
glance at the initial intake or from the first minutes of an interview with a child victim.  
They are, as Teresa, an investigator participant put it, blatant in one way or another. My 
assumption was that asking about non-blatant cases would produce better data. Klein, 
who also asked for stories about “tough cases, nonroutine events” (Klein, 1998, p. 189) 
in his research among fire commanders, called doing so the “critical decision method.” 
He had found that experts respond with generalities when asked simply how they are 
effective or how they use judgment. Narratives about unusual cases, on the other hand, 
afford “a pathway into their perspective, into the way they are seeing the world” (Klein, 
1998, p. 189). 
 As the interview progressed, I would try to prompt additional narratives by asking, 
when an investigator, say, delivered an opinion as to the value of a particular 
interviewing approach, “Can you give me an example?” or “Are you thinking of a 
particular case?” Or, as recommended by Chase (1995), I would ask “How did you learn 
that this was important?”  
 In addition to seeking out case narratives, I asked participants’ opinions on several 
subjects related to investigative decision making. I asked what made someone a good or 
bad judge of evidence. I also wanted to know whether they found the program’s Intranet 
Risk Assessment Tool useful and how they conceptualized the legal standard of proof 
“preponderance of the evidence.”  Also, I asked whether and under what circumstances 
they had found “reason-to-believe” in cases involving two categories of allegation that 
are notoriously problematic – physical neglect and emotional abuse.   
 When I interviewed investigators, except for the two with whom I wasn’t able to get 
second interviews, I presented them with two short case vignettes, developed by Jackson 
and Nuttall (1997), describing allegations of sexual abuse. In their study, 655 social 
workers, pediatricians, psychologists, and psychiatrists, 72% of whom had direct 
experience working with sexually abused children, rated each of 16 vignettes, based 
70 
solely upon the evidence presented, on a 6-point scale from “very confident it did not 
occur” to “very confident it did occur.” The two vignettes I used were those whose 
averages were closest to the 3.5 null point of “unable to determine” (3.38 and 3.77). I did 
not ask my participants to rate truth likelihood in the same way, however. I simply asked 
them, in an open-ended a way as possible, what reactions they had as they were reading.  
Once they had given an initial “take,” I followed up with questions such as:   
• If this were all the evidence available in the case, how would you decide 
it? 
• What additional evidence would you like to collect before deciding? 
• What features of the case strike you as the most significant?  Why? 
• What makes this evidence difficult to analyze? 
• Does this case remind you of any of your own? 
I would also pursue whatever issues the participants themselves raised in connection 
with the vignettes.   
 I believe I enjoyed good rapport with all the participants, except for the one instance 
already mentioned. I did all but one of the interviews in the participants’ own offices. 
(That person, not the same one I seemed to make uncomfortable, only had a cubicle in a 
big office building, so we used a vacant classroom in my building.) Because I had 
contacted them through the agency E-mail system or had been referred to them by 
someone within their program, they knew I also worked for the Texas Department of 
Protective and Regulatory Services, too, although in a different branch. And during our 
conversations I freely made reference to my own investigative experience with Adult 
Protective Services. These factors, and, perhaps, the unstructured, conversational tone I 
tried to maintain, seemed to make nearly all the participants feel at ease in talking to me. 
For the most part, I was surprised and gratified by the candor participants displayed. 
 I tape recorded each interview and transcribed 22 of the 29 of the interviews myself. 
I did not aim for a high level of exactitude, as, for instance, Linde (1993) does, with 
notation to indicate overlapping or contiguous utterances, or as Ochs and Capps do 
(2001), with notation specifying the speed and volume of participants’ speech and 
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measurement of pauses in tenths of a second. Instead, to save transcribing time and to 
enhance readability for the analysis stage of the research, I rendered the conversations as 
simple play scripts, putting my words and the participants’ in alternating paragraphs, 
marking mine with an “I:” I should say, too, that from the start I supposed I would 
analyze the interview data almost entirely at the paragraph and sentence level and would 
not have need of more finely focused transcription. This assumption, not surprisingly, 
proved correct. In very few instances have I attributed significance to pauses, parts of 
sentences, or individual words. I did, however, try to reproduce the exact wording of the 
participants’ responses (but not my own), including all their “ums” and “ahs.” I indicated 
both pauses and incomplete thoughts with ellipses. I italicized words the speaker 
strongly emphasized. Occasionally I bracketed observations of conversational behaviors. 
I also bracketed words I wasn’t sure I understood correctly from the tape. 
 Here is an excerpt from the transcript of my interview with Pauline: 
 
I:  Did you feel like that you were a fairly good reader of people before you started 
work at CPS? 
 Yeah. 
 I:  And did you feel like you were a fairly assertive person before you started in 
CPS? 
 [long pause]  I don’t know if CPS had anything to do with… my ability to be 
assertive.  I… I don’t know, Robert, it… it may have.  I al… I just attribute it to… 
I’m getting older.  It’s more of a maturity thing of… figuring out what’s worth a 
fight, what isn’t worth a fight, what’s… per… what my personal investment is.  And, 
me picking and choosing situations of… you know, how assertive I’m going to be to 
get what I want.  Um… but, you know, when I was in the field, Robert, I didn’t feel 
like it was about me.  It felt like it was about the kids.  And it’s easier for me – I 
mean, just my personality makeup – it’s easier for me to advocate for others than it is 
to advocate for myself.  I’ve always been like that.  And so I think when I was in the 
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field it was just a way of… of expressing that, that it wasn’t about me.  It was about 
what I can do to get in there and help that little guy.   
 I:  Well, going back to that intuition thing, I feel like I cut you off before you had 
a full chance to answer that.  You do think it can play a positive role in keeping 
oneself safe as an investigator, and knowing when something’s screwy and needs 
pushing.  Can it… Have you had occasion to think… to be misled or see it mislead 
people you were supervising? 
 Um… I think, Robert, I’ve seen it misused in, you know, with Vera’s child 
death.  You know, her intuition was, you know, this is nothing; I’m going to walk 
away.  And I… I think it’s that we make those decisions so quickly that we tr… that 
we rely on our intuition, and we hope that it’s, um… You know, I think that the 
more you do this – you’re in this business – the more maybe disciplined your 
intuition is?  It’s a little more f.. fine-tuned than it.. when it was in 1990 when I 
started this.  But I think I’ve always been able to… to read people and to… and to 
empathize.   
 I:   That’s a good phrase – disciplined intuition. 
 That’s kind of what I think it is. 
 I:  …may make that the title. 
 There you go. 
 
 I paid for seven of the interviews to be transcribed by others. I edited those 
transcripts carefully, correcting errors as I compared them with the tapes, and bringing 
the format, style, and level of detail into uniformity with the transcriptions I had made. 
 My primary means of analysis was the constant comparative method of Glaser and 
Strauss (1967). My goal was to identify similarities and differences in the ways the 
participants talked about various topics. I used the N5 software program to code the 
contents of each transcript as belonging to one or more of a number of categories. I did 
not create any categories before I began to code, but did so as I felt the need. After I had 
gone through all the interviews I had a total of 28 categories. As I went along I stopped 
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using some I had created in favor of others, and occasionally transferred data from one 
category to another. In selecting and grouping the data I was guided by the same 
questions that had guided my interviewing: How did investigators reach conclusions 
about the evidence they gathered? How sure did they need to feel before committing 
themselves to a particular judgment? How do they use intuition? What sources of 
judgment error were they aware of in themselves? In others? In the system? How do they 
feel about the agency’s risk assessment tool? The categories that had most in them after I 
had coded all the interviews, and from which I drew material for analysis were:  
• Caseload volume (501 sentences from 15 interview transcripts) 
• Burnout/cost of job (619 sentences from 17 interview transcripts) 
• System agency (398 sentences from 11 interview transcripts) 
• Development/hierarchical difference (1262 sentences from 22 interview 
transcripts) 
• Preponderance (676 sentences from 19 interview transcripts) 
• Risk Assessment Tool (751 sentences from 17 interview transcripts) 
• Emotional abuse (401 sentences from 13 interview transcripts) 
• Intuition (357 sentences from 10 interview transcripts) 
• Group decision making (231 sentences from 11 interview transcripts) 
• Characteristics of good investigators (597 sentences from 17 interview 
transcripts) 
• Case narratives (4918 sentences from 24 interview transcripts) 
• Decision points (253 sentences from 12 interview transcripts) 
• Cues (406 sentences from 11 interview transcripts) 
• Role persona (572 sentences from 13 interview transcripts) 
• Techniques (investigation and deliberation) (958 sentences from 17 interview 
transcripts) 
• Bias/personal mission (603 sentences from 13 interview transcripts) 
• Linda scenario (981 sentences from 13 interview transcripts) 
• Harry scenario (862 sentences from 14 interview transcripts) 
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• Custody (727 sentences from 16 interview transcripts) 
• Interaction among roles (458 sentences from 11 interview transcripts) 
• Bureaucratic/legal obstructions (425 sentences from 9 interview transcripts) 
 I never bothered to create a hierarchy for the coding categories, as the software 
allows. I simply printed out “reports” of the text in each of the coding categories, and 
wrote the findings chapters (IV-VII) directly from them. 
 In addition to developing various themes via the constant comparative method I have 
also subjected a number of narratives to analysis. My goal was partly to add illustrative 
depth and richness to the thematic findings, but more than that I wanted to see what the 
narratives revealed about the participants’ emotions and thought processes as they did 
their investigations. Nothing absolutely prevents cant and conventionality from taking 
narrative form, of course, but, like Klein, I found that participants’ narratives are, in 
general, more revealing than opinions. Stories not only tell, they embody. The story of 
an investigation, especially when rendered with vividness and detail, reproduces the 
inferences and deliberations that lead, or, sometimes, fail to lead, to a final 
determination. And not all of these inferences would gain admission to a generalized 
account of how investigations are done, in many instances because, however pivotal to 
the investigation they were, they were not conscious. They were based on personal 
associations or beliefs that the investigator would know, were he or she to recognize 
their existence, ought to be excluded from any decision-making role. So though they are 
self-reports, narratives tend to be less filtered and synthesized than characterizations of 
experience that make up opinions or generalizations, and therefore may be considered 
analogs of experience, as well, providing something like direct observation of the actual 
investigative process.  
 In analyzing narratives I have not used any particular method. I have not distilled 
stories to produce core narratives (Mishler, 1986) or rendered the participants’ data as 
stanzas (Gee, 1985). I have paid much more attention to the stories’ content, their full 
content, than to their form. I have simply, as Clandinin and Connelly (2000) describe, 
looked for “narrative threads, tensions, and themes either within or across an 
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individual’s experience and in the social setting” (p. 132). To a great extent, the threads, 
themes, and tensions I found were those that I set out to look for, having either been in 
my mind since my days as an investigator and a reader of investigative reports, or having 
emerged during the interviews or their transcription. As Riessman (1993) has observed, 
commenting on Mishler (1991), transcription more or less is analysis; decisions we make 
concerning the arrangement and display of data necessarily reflects our understanding of 
its meaning. That my analysis was largely complete by the time I started to write the 
findings came as a happy surprise to me. The work of transcription had been like 
crossing an enormous bog; every step sank deep in the mud, and progress was 
appallingly slow. I anticipated that writing the findings would be more of the same, but 
instead it was as though I’d emerged from the swamp onto a hard, level road, by the side 
of which somebody had left a BMW with the keys in it. In only one instance did I 
become aware of a theme after I had finished transcribing: That was the way the 
participants fitted Jackson and Nuttalls’ Harry scenario (1997) into a number of different 
story genres as a way of getting a handle on it. I feel sure, however, that if I were to 
return to the data again I would find new themes and correspondences, so rich is the data 
contained in the interviews. 
 Another aspect of the interviews to which I have given short shrift is the 
performative. I have taken it for granted that the participants in this study were not 
simply providing information about their cases and their judgment processes. They were 
endeavoring to represent themselves to me, and to anyone who might read what I write 
or hear what I say about them, as good investigators and good people. This did not 
prevent many of them from revealing mistakes they had made, but that was always 
within the context of having learned from those mistakes and become better 
investigators because of them. Because I assumed all of the participants to have this 
performative motive, and to approximately the same degree, I have not made it a subject 
for analysis. 
 When the Chair of my Committee, Dr. Carolyn Clark, read the first draft of the full 
dissertation she thought I had perhaps not done enough to conceal the identities of the 
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participants. Though I had used made-up names for them, I had given each person’s real 
job title, in some instances, their real work location. Dr. Clark is also a strong believer in 
the principle that qualitative research is, or should be, a collaboration between the 
investigator and the participant. So she urged me to give the participants a chance to 
comment on the material and negotiate changes. I discuss the reactions I received in an 
epilogue (page 206). 
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CHAPTER IV 
INTUITION AND ANALYSIS IN CPS 
 
The process of investigating and deciding child abuse and neglect cases within CPS is 
spread out over the full expanse of what Hammond et al (1997) calls the cognitive 
continuum that runs from intuition to analysis. As we saw in Chapter II, Hammond 
claims that most human judgments are quasirational, made at a point on the continuum 
at least some distance from either end, displaying both intuitive and analytic aspects. The 
point along the continuum at which a particular judgment is made depends on the 
structure of the task at hand. Good judgment results when there is high congruence 
between the mode of judgment and the task structure. If there is plenty of time to make a 
decision, the elements involved can be measured, and a decision protocol for it has 
already been developed, then an analytic approach will produce the best results. If time 
is short, the elements are not measurable, or even fully knowable, no valid protocol 
exits, and the decision maker has a good mental map of the task environment, intuition is 
appropriate. CPS decision making can display both sets of characteristics, particularly at 
different points in the case. During investigation, when facts are still being gathered, 
judgments about child safety and about the conduct of the investigation must sometimes 
be made in the absence of complete information and under time pressure. Later, when 
the evidence collection has all been done and the issue of the child’s safety has been at 
least temporarily resolved, conditions become favorable for the tools of analysis. Also, 
the ambiguity and partiality that evidence may have for investigators and supervisors is 
seldom reproduced for decision makers further up the ladder. The process of making 
verbal and written reports of cases simplifies and refines the evidence; those who rely 
only on those reports to make decisions are more likely to see it, and the issues it raises, 
as clear-cut. 
 We see a general movement, then, from intuition toward analysis as a case 
progresses from intake through investigation to deliberation and resolution. The same 
movement can be seen in the decision-making styles of individual persons as they gain 
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experience on the job, and in the CPS decision-making hierarchy, with investigators and 
supervisors generally nearer the intuitive end of the continuum, and administrators 
nearer the analytical end.  
 Since Tolman first used the term “cognitive map” (1948) to describe how rats 
respond to stimuli indirectly, through mental representations of the environment, map 
and landscape metaphors have often proved useful for describing the synthesizing of 
experience, the refinement of procedural knowledge, and the formation of theory 
(Azevedo, 1997; Girere, 1988; Ziman, 1978). As Gieryn (1999, p. 7) has put it: 
 
People navigate not just streets and highways, but the culturescape: we wend our way 
through or around entrenched institutions, decide which rules to apply where, subvert 
expectations by exiting, discern the signs given off by material objects, locate events in 
some historical narrative – and we routinely do so quickly and effortlessly. 
 
 The intuition-to-analysis movement I am suggesting readily lends itself to the same 
kind of comparison. The moment a person enters unfamiliar life territory – starting at a 
new job or school, forming a new relationship, moving to another country – he or she 
begins to build a mental representation of that territory, in order to gain navigational 
skill. The formation of that representation, or map, is, in its early phases, like the 
formation of the land itself, when the earth is still new. Change is rapid and massive. 
Mountains are thrown up, chasms open, glaciers tear new valleys, seas burn away. As 
time passes, these violent, prolific events subside. The land settles, falls under the plow, 
and the great formations are replaced by sharply demarcated fields, changes to the 
boundaries and features of which happen not through natural cataclysm, but through the 
workings of commerce and law. 
 All the participants in this study believed that their ways of making decisions served 
them well and that they made many more right ones than wrong ones. There was a 
concomitant tendency among those participants whose decision-making style was closer 
to one end of the cognitive continuum to feel that those nearer the opposite end were 
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prone to judgmental error because of it. This is particularly true of those whose tasks or 
temperament are strongly analytical. 
 
It’s difficult to get people to be analytical and... uh... actually take a step back when 
they're putting their documentation together or considering a given situation. 
Especially in CPS, I think, it's easy to forget that you're dealing with an entire system 
and not just an alleged victim. And the way that you go about your investigation can 
either aid your ability to get the information or preclude you from getting it. If you 
alienate everybody at the beginning of that investigation by rescuing the victim, then 
you're not likely to get enough information to make sound decisions. If you have to 
have some respect for that... the entire system you're dealing with, and I think many 
don't. 
 
The speaker here is Victor, who works in the ombudsman office of TDPRS, CPS’ 
parent agency. He reviews, and often reverses, investigation findings from all over the 
state, when designated perpetrators appeal “reason-to-believe” findings against them. He 
regrets not being able to support conclusions reached at the local level, but he is often 
prevented from doing so by what he considers to be inadequacies in the investigation. 
These inadequacies stem, in Victor’s view, from investigators’ becoming so committed 
to achieving a certain outcome in a case that they pay insufficient attention to 
investigative procedure. One can imagine the outrage an investigator might feel over 
Victor’s contention that premature rescue of a child can forestall comprehensive 
evidence collection, but in fact, Victor, too, is aimed at having the case reach a 
successful conclusion. The rescue he is deploring will only be temporary if the reasons 
for it are later shown to be faulty. For him, punctilious adherence to policy is the only 
way to achieve the desired outcome, and the more purely utilitarian view he believes 
some investigators have, which allows them to select means to achieve ends, and which 
can conceive of policy not as a necessary condition for success, but as a possible 
hindrance to it, is short-sighted and morally objectionable. Victor embraces a rule-based 
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ethic, in which all good follows from correct process and nothing good ever follows 
from violating it. Also, he clearly sees his primary ethical obligation as an agency 
decision maker is to the agency itself. What is good for the agency will also be good for 
its clients and their families. Though he does not say so explicitly, Victor seems to 
believe that the investigators whose findings he must overturn, who do not respect the 
system, are instead feeling an obligation to themselves, to their sense of right and wrong, 
to their self-image as heroic rescuers, and to their private notion of truth. His own values 
call for individual desires to be subordinated to the good of the whole. 
Nancy is a CPS attorney who worked as an investigator and supervisor before she 
went to law school. She complains that the tendency of many investigators to form 
broad, intuitive judgments about families often keeps them from thinking in terms of the 
evidence that she and other agency attorneys must produce to get judges to issue 
protective orders: 
 
In training we try to tell them don't use conclusory words, like, you know, uh… that 
the parent was “in a stupor.” Say, you know, “Their eyes were glazed over. They 
couldn't seem to talk. They didn't seem to have focus.” Or, you know, describe… 
you know, the filth. “The filth is on the floor in the kitchen, the roaches and the rats 
and… you know.” If you are specific and give that information, you may have the 
evidence that you think you do. 
 
 Nancy says she has had great difficulty in getting front-line staff to see her point. “It 
seems,” she says, “like you go… we go over it and over it and over it and it’s really 
difficult to… to, for caseworkers, it seems like, to understand.” 
 
We had one training, for instance, where they were saying the mother had… uh… I 
think it was the child was alleged to have been sexual abused, and… sexually 
abused, and so… uh… we were doing sort of some mock questioning to the 
caseworkers, and we were trying to get… The question was, they were trying to say 
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that the mother… There were things about the mother that were consistent with her 
being the parent of a sexually abused child. And so we were saying, “What…Tell us 
how, with this mother, how… What things and dynamics in the family indicated to 
you…?”  And they would say, “The mother has poor self-esteem.” And so we're like, 
“Okay, does every mother whose… has poor self-esteem, does that indicate to you 
that there might be sexual abuse in their family?” You know. And they just… they 
would just say these things that were sort of like… global social work statements 
that… that were, you know… that I know they really do mean something, and I 
believe they probably are exactly right in what they're saying, and they know what 
they're talking about, but they can't explain it in a way that makes sense to someone 
who's not a social worker, particularly, you know, within the legal system. It's like 
you can't say that, you know, mother is low… has low self-esteem and, I don’t know, 
has an alcohol problem or something.  So that leads me to think her child's been 
sexually abused. It just doesn't go there. 
 
A psychiatrist or psychologist, Nancy says, might be able to get away with testifying 
that a person has low self-esteem, even if this were no more than an impression, but a 
social worker cannot. Like Victor, Nancy freely admits that intuition can be a valuable 
aid to investigation. Victor says “gut feelings” are tools that investigators “have to use.” 
And while Nancy sees some benefit in the increased prescriptiveness of policy and 
documentation that CPS has imposed on investigators since she was in the field, she 
sees, too, that nowadays “system can drive the case more than the social work skills and 
abilities sometimes.” Intuition can be sufficient grounds for investigation judgments, in 
other words – who to talk to next, whether a person is telling the truth or not, what 
documents to check – but not for final judgments, especially ones that have significant 
impact on people’s lives. To be credible and persuasive in court, investigators have to 
portray themselves as systematic decision makers. It has to be apparent that during an 
investigation the processes of evidence collection, analysis, and judgment were 
sequential and discrete. Analytic decision makers find it easy to work backwards from 
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any conclusion they reached and say what evidence and what inferences led to it. 
Intuitive decision makers, though, do not so much make judgments as feel them, and 
they are often not able to give a good account of their origins. Consequently, they may 
find it difficult to refute a claim that their judgments come, at least in part, from emotion 
or bias. But we were there, they answer. We saw. Front-line employees consider it unfair 
that truth they capture from being on the scene should be devalued because they lack the 
right sort of degree. They would also remind their analytic superiors that the costs of not 
acting on a perception of risk, however one came by it, can also be high. Gretchen, an 
investigator with three years on the job, describes how an intuition she had in one case 
made her aware of, and prompted her to act upon, an abusive situation: 
 
Sometimes if there’s a certain amount… well, you just know. There’s a little bit of a 
gut instinct, you just know something’s the matter. You have no injury, you have 
little things, like going to visits, somebody’s home, and all the lights are out in the 
middle of the day, and it’s just pitch black inside. There’s no TV on, but there’s two 
people wide-awake in the house. And you’re just… you know, you just kind… 
You’re thinking, “That’s just not how normal people sit around… during the day.  
What’s going on?” Um… and this was a child who had spina bifida and was a 
medical neglect. Mom just was not meeting his needs. Um… and I just knew…  I 
mean, and she was…she looked…  she and her boyfriend were sitting around in the 
dark. That… and she had a negative UA [urinalysis], so I didn’t have drugs, and we 
had no allegations of previous drug use. She didn’t have any history, and neither did 
the boyfriend.  And I was just… I could simply not figure that out. But I knew 
something was just deeply, deeply… the matter. It was a 9-year-old kid who should 
have been able to take care of his, his disease a little bit better than he was. And 
mom should have been able to take care of his disease, for as long as they’d been 
dealing with it. And… um… we were able… and I remember really fighting for 
that… we were able to eventually remove on a medical… neglect. And we took him 
and his brother, um, and I really fought with the D.A. on taking the brother. And we 
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had the kids in care for… for a while, and they started feeling safe and they started 
talking – they were being sexually abused in the house by both parents.   
 
The judgment Gretchen describes herself making about the people sitting in the dark 
is certainly far along the continuum from Victor’s position as he described it above. 
Gretchen displays all the qualities he lamented – a prizing of her own perceptions above 
what was revealed through prescribed method, a utilitarian justification of actions by 
their results rather than their conformity to a set of rules, and lack of identification with 
the system as a whole. Had she been without those qualities, however, she would have 
closed the case, and the abuse of the second child would have continued. 
I asked Gretchen if she ever found out what the parents were doing sitting in the 
house without lights on, and she said she never did: 
 
If I were investigating now… That’s… cause I’d only been working for about three 
or four months when that happened. I just…I was… I remember being intimidated as 
hell, walking into that situation and just thinking, “This is weird,” but not being able 
to say anything. If I were to go out on an investigation now and walk into a house 
like that, I would say, “What the hell are y’all doing sitting in the dark?” 
 
 Analysis is the application of a method or model to a situation. A single analytic 
judgment later proven either right or wrong does not by itself validate or invalidate the 
particular method used. Only a series of trials can establish efficacy. If 90 out of a 
hundred judgments made using a particular technique are accurate, the technique may be 
considered sound despite the ten misses. Intuition is, and is felt to be, the application of 
oneself. All the decision maker’s experiences, emotions, and beliefs are at least available 
to the process. Since intuitive judgment is rendered whole, often in a single flash of 
insight, the decision maker often has no awareness of all, or even any, of the decision’s 
inputs or processes. Whatever the nature of these, however, they are indisputably one’s 
own, and the judgment is necessarily expressive of one’s general worth in this sphere of 
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activity. An intuition proven right is personal vindication. One proven wrong 
demonstrates personal fault, in perceptiveness, in understanding, or in both.  
 Helen, an experienced investigator, suffered the disaster CPS investigators fear most, 
the death, by abuse, of a children on their caseloads. Helen had investigated an abuse 
allegation involving an eight-year-old child whose behavior had suggested she was being 
abused in some way, but who would never admit that anyone had hurt her, never made 
what in CPS is called an outcry. Without it, and without physical evidence, which was 
also lacking, Helen had no choice but to close the case. Some months later the child’s 
father beat her to death. Helen describes the effect this had on her: 
 
When I heard about that, it just took me as shock, cause I was thinking, “God, a kid 
on my case… just died.” And… it kind of made me second-guess myself at that time. 
And I had been doing this for seven years by that time. And it was like, “Wait a 
minute. What did I miss? What could I have missed?”  
I used to not ask so many questions. I was kind of like, “Okay, yeah.” You know, 
I’d ask the normal little questions, but now I find myself digging deeper, and asking 
a lot, lot, lot more questions, questions they probably wouldn’t even think you would 
ask.   
 I have to make a list to say, “Okay, when I get out here […] make sure I ask this, 
cause you got so many things running through your mind, you’ll forget, so while I’m 
on the spot I want to make sure… I ask this one specific thing from this case, 
cause… that could make a big difference. 
I’m a little bit more systematic… just trying to get a little bit more.  And starting 
to dig a little bit more, being a little bit more complex, instead of just looking at the 
top problem. I kind of get all of ‘em now. 
 
 Helen, as we’ll see later in this chapter, remains a highly intuitive decision maker. 
But the child’s death has caused her to lose some of the confidence in her intuition that 
she had formerly. She is trying to compensate for what she now considers the 
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inadequacies of her former methods, by adopting some of the tools of systematic 
decision making. She no longer relies on her intuition to tell her what questions to ask; 
she makes lists.  
 Pauline, a policy writer who has worked as an investigator, supervisor, and trainer, 
says she used to tell her students about a friend of hers named Vera who was assigned a 
case of a ten-month-old child on whom someone had seen bruises: 
 
Vera went to this house, knocked on the door; it was eight o’clock in the morning.  
This very well-dressed, very articulate, friendly woman answered the door. And 
Vera identified herself as being with CPS. The woman said, “Vera, I appreciate you 
trying to do your job. I just got a new job. I’ve got to be there at 8:15 or I’m going to 
lose my job. Can you please meet me back here tonight at 5:30?” And Vera said, 
“Okay.”  And she walked away, and then the next day she went back, or that 
evening, whenever they had agreed to a meet, she went back to the house and the 
client wasn’t there. And so Vera just kind of…you know, we get so many cases that 
she kind of put it on the back burner. And a couple weeks later somebody calls law 
enforcement because there’s this horrible stench coming out of the house, and law 
enforcement responds, and they find this infant had been murdered and was in the 
house. The… the dead body was in the house. 
 
 Louise, another experienced investigator, tells of a case she had in which the 
allegation was risk to a small child because of possible violence of the father toward the 
mother, both of whom were Haitian. Louise investigated, found no cause to remove or 
impose services, and closed the case. A short time later the father took the child to Haiti 
and murdered her in front of his wife’s family. Like Pauline’s friend, Vera, Louise felt 
she had been fooled by the father’s appearance of respectability. “I can still see him 
sitting in this chair,” she said, indicating the one next to me in her office, “legs crossed, 
business suit, using these big words, and saying everything I needed to hear.” Like 
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Helen, Louise says she was crushed by the incident and blamed herself for being so 
taken in.  
 These terrible failures to see past appearances, to recognize the hidden danger, and 
prevent children’s deaths naturally haunt everyone who had anything to do with them. 
The investigators and their supervisors try hard to learn the lesson – that appearances can 
be deceiving, that intuitions come from within as well as without – and commemorate 
the dead with permanent changes in the way they think about investigation and their 
abilities. Nevertheless, none of the participants in this study, even those who had 
suffered calamities, and even the administrators who are strongly conscious of the 
judgment errors caused by false intuitions, felt that intuition did not or should not form a 
significant part of the investigative process. They feel that no systematic method of 
investigation can do justice to the subtlety and complexity of even the simplest family 
situation. Investigation, done conscientiously, requires the application of one’s whole 
self, fallible though it is. To shut down one’s receptivity to impressions and insight in 
order to avoid error would be to close oneself off from sources of information that can 
save children’s lives, and often do. 
 Asked what separates good investigators from average ones, Gretchen, whose 
parents-sitting-in-the-dark story we heard above, says: 
 
I think it just… there’s… um… a skill at being able to pick up the small details, 
of being able to, one, recognize when something… to… I think it has to do with 
trusting yourself. Something doesn’t sound right; it doesn’t jog right. Whereas 
somebody else might just, “Oh, that must be just me… seeing that.” And not 
really… If something, when you’re in investigations, if something doesn’t seem 
right, find out why. If the explanation doesn’t quite jibe, if you just have that 
funny feeling, then look into it.  Just don’t dismiss it. 
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 Leo, whose generally more analytic style of investigation we’ll explore in the next 
section, also says intuition is what distinguishes good investigators. He defines intuition 
as “a certain ability to kind of connect with people and get a sense of what’s going on.”  
 He adds: 
I have a real inquisitive mind in terms of, you know, taking guesses and hunches and 
following through with those.  And nine times out of ten I’ve been pretty right.  
Well, maybe not nine, but seven or eight out of ten, I’ve been pretty… pretty close. 
 Pauline, whose friend Vera walked away from the house in which a child was later 
found dead, told that story to new investigators as a warning about the power of 
assumptions to mislead. She never meant it to deter them from heeding their intuitions. 
She says she would say to them, “You got to pay attention to those subjective things, 
those things that you’re sensing.” They not only light the path of investigation, they can 
also keep investigators themselves from harm in the dangerous situations they have to go 
into. In a phrase I’ve borrowed for the title of this dissertation, Pauline says the more 
experience investigators acquire, the more “disciplined” their intuition becomes. For 
Hogarth (2001), intuition is the result of unconscious learning within a particular 
knowledge domain. He has argued that intuition can be “educated,” or improved, if 
learning environments are organized such that the feedback it provides is unambiguous, 
reliably rewarding good performance and negatively reinforcing bad. By this view, 
intuition is disciplined, or trained, by definition, however unschooled it feels in contrast 
to the methods of analysis. The disciplining Pauline describes may be seen as the 
attainment of expertise in what was really a rational, and deliberative process from the 
beginning.    
 Carmen, a supervisor, speaks, quite respectfully, about the differences she sees 
between her sensibility, as one who is every day immersed in the details of casework, 
and that of administrators like Victor and Nancy: 
 
The program directors, the regional directors, they’re completely out of the field.  
They are completely, and there is a completely different chain… or…or thought 
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process that goes into doing their job than doing a supervisor’s job.  Um… their job 
is to make sure that we’re doing our jobs…  You know?  And they kind of forget 
how tough it is.  Um… but their thought processes… you have to (laughs)… 
um…you have to… um… remind them about people not wanting to be cooperative 
in the field.  Um… you have to remind them that we’re looking at it from a totally 
different perspective… 
 
 Carmen’s belief that those in higher positions, whose mental map of the CPS 
landscape may once have been like hers, heavily marked for hazards and unknowns, 
have naturally and necessarily lost their field perspective from lack of use. Their tasks 
are different now, and their sensibilities have changed in adapting to them. Carmen 
seems to be trying not to be pejorative about these differences, but implicit in her 
remarks is a sense that the administrators’ maps have become artificial to some degree 
and no longer reflect the realities of the landscape. “You have to remind them,” she says. 
 The “reminding” Carmen speaks of is both mutual and pervasive. In CPS decision 
making, intuitive and systematic forms of judgment constantly remind one another of 
what they are missing and what they are getting wrong. This happens up and down in the 
hierarchy and across functions within the organization. It also happens within cases and 
within individual decision makers. 
  
Reliance upon and Resistance to Narrative 
 
 The intuitive and analytic domains of the cognitive continuum correspond to 
Bruner’s two modes of thought (1986), the narrative and the paradigmatic. Paradigmatic 
thought is logical and scientific. It proceeds by categorization and is aimed at finding 
general causes. Narrative thought is particular; it is concerned with specific action taken 
by a specific person, the intentions that led to the action, and the consequences that 
follow. Though both modes deliberate chains of cause and effect and have explanatory 
power, they are “irreducible to one another” (Bruner, 1986, p. 11). In no instance may a 
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categorical proposition be fully rendered as a narrative, and no narrative may be fully 
rendered as a categorical proposition. Though the cognitive continuum rejects a sharp 
demarcation between the functions of intuition and analysis, it recognizes that one may 
predominate, depending upon the nature of the particular decision task. In the same way, 
the narrative mode of thought may predominate with certain persons traveling over a 
certain portion of the judgment landscape. 
 Pennington and Hastie (1988, 1993a, 1993b) have demonstrated the narrative 
character of mental representations jurors create to absorb and understand the evidence 
presented in a trial. Analysis of interviews with “mock” jurors who reviewed evidence 
from a real trial showed that their mental representations combined trial evidence with 
inferences about that evidence (actions, motives, mental states) in a story structure. A 
juror’s particular story structure determined his or her verdict.   
 After viewing a videotaped trial “mock” jurors were asked to say whether each of a 
set of utterances characterized evidence that had been presented. Included among 
statements that correctly represented evidence were inferences about the evidence that 
had not been presented. Participants were more likely to identify as evidence those 
statements, both evidentiary and inferential, that supported their own verdict. They were 
also less likely to identify as evidence those accurate statements about the trial evidence 
that did not support their own verdicts. “Mock” jurors were more likely favor 
presentations of evidence in chronological story form over evidence presented in random 
order or that displayed thematic organization. 
 Pennington and Hastie conclude from this body of research that story construction is 
the primary cognitive means of organizing and comprehending trial evidence. The 
materials used to compose the story are the evidence presented at the trail, the jurors’ 
own knowledge about similar kinds of events, and their sense of what makes a good, 
complete story. Four “certainty principles,” adapted from Thagard’s theory of 
explanatory coherence (1989), are applied to determine whether a given story should be 
accepted as true.  These are:  
• Coverage – the story’s ability to account for the totality of evidence 
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• coherence – the extent to which a story avoids self-contradiction (consistency), 
accords with one’s knowledge of the world (plausibility), and has no significant 
omissions (completeness) 
• uniqueness – the degree to which a particular story has coherence and coverage 
in comparison to its possible competitors.  Uniqueness governs how much 
confidence the juror feels in a given story. 
• goodness-of-fit --  the extent to which the story fits the verdict category, the 
findings necessary to reach a particular outcome (e.g., that premeditation was a 
factor in a murder, which would be necessary for a guilty verdict in capital 
murder) 
 Stories are organized into units, or episodes, each of which begins with an initiating 
event, which causes the persons involved to exhibit psychological responses, to form 
goals, and take actions that lead to certain consequences.  A story may be considered a 
“hierarchy of episodes,” at the top of which is the central account of “what happened.” 
 The fitting of presented evidence into story frames is, by Pennington and Hastie’s 
description, a spontaneous, even involuntary process.  To what extent the juror can 
control, direct, or modify it is unclear.  It is at least possible that in this process, the juror 
is at the mercy of cultural templates, received assumptions, and personal bias.  In other 
words, there is no accounting in this theory for greater or lesser degrees of accuracy in 
story construction, or story mapping, and no criteria for conscientiousness in the process. 
 Pennington and Hastie have also examined (1993a) the logical tools jurors use to 
make meaningful inferences from the raw data presented in the trial. Borrowing a logical 
calculus developed for simulating plausible human reasoning in computer programs, 
Pennington and Hastie described the basic inferential forms in story construction: 
• deduction, which maps properties of a set onto a subset (All men are mortal.  
Socrates is a man.  Therefore Socrates is mortal.) 
• analogy, which maps properties from one set onto a similar set (They say frog 
meat tastes like chicken.  Chicken is good.  I will probably like frog meat.) 
91 
• induction, which maps properties of subsets onto other subsets of the same set 
(The Yankees have a very high winning percentage in World Series games.  
They are in the World Series.  They will probably win.) 
• abduction, which maps a subset with the same property as a set into the set 
(Intelligent people use big words. Murphy uses big words. Murphy may be 
intelligent.) 
 Each operation may take a spatial or a temporal form.  Each may be used to make 
positive or negative attributions.  Also, there are these operations: 
• attribution, which asserts a causal relationship when all properties of a given 
subset are present 
• alternative, which rejects one of two causes as unlikely when the other is known 
to be true 
• contradiction, which rules out one of two mutually contradictory causes or 
properties as false 
 Together these operations, in different combinations, account for the great majority 
of reasoning found in a first person account of deliberation by a juror.  In particular, 
Pennington and Hastie found that reasoning by negation, contradiction, and negative 
deduction was surprisingly common, as was reasoning by analogy from one’s own 
behavior.  Also there was frequent rejection of alternative causes and conditions. 
 Though Pennington and Hastie do not evaluate the quality of juror reasoning, many 
of the inferences they identify in their participants’ reasoning are blatantly fallacious: 
“Asthma is associated with nervous problems. Johnson has asthma. Johnson has nervous 
problems” (Pennington and Hastie, 1993a, p. 147). “If someone were going to fight with 
me, I wouldn’t want to go anywhere near them. Johnson is like me. If someone were 
going to fight with Johnson, he wouldn’t want to go anywhere near them” (Pennington 
and Hastie, 1993a, p. 148). Once again, the problem of accuracy in product and 
conscientiousness in process is left unresolved. 
 Bennett (1997) has also described how stories function as tools with which jurors in 
criminal trials can understand a complex mass of evidence. His account differs from 
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Pennington and Hastie’s in that he links the telling and hearing of stories to the basic 
structures of cognition, called frames or scripts by cognitive scientists, rather than to 
elements of logic. Within these structures associations are formed among the facts of a 
given case, the background information needed to make sense of the facts, and the social 
context within which the interpretation is taking place.  
 Bennett identifies three basic interpretive tasks a juror must perform when faced with 
trial evidence. First, the juror must determine the central action, the key event around 
which the evidence revolves. Second, the juror must determine the relationships among 
the various elements of the evidence as they bear upon the central incident.  Finally, the 
juror must decide whether the symbolic elements surrounding the central action cohere, 
are complete and fully explanatory. 
 A story sets up connections among the elements of a case. Where an element seems 
to be missing, it may be supplied empirically, by other factual evidence. It may also be 
supplied through logic, or one’s sense of language and of how the world works, or even 
an aesthetic sense of what symbolic relations are most pleasing: 
 
The very process of building an interpretation by working back and forth among the 
three cognitive operations and testing the result both against the other side’s story 
and against the standard contained in the generic frames of reference is what we 
mean ordinarily by being objective and fair. (Bennett, 1997, p. 96).  
 
 Bennett’s account of narrative construction appears to be a more active and 
conscious process than that of Pennington and Hastie. An evaluator of evidence proceeds 
by trial and error, forming and testing hypotheses until a satisfying match of content to 
form is found. 
 Toward the beginning of each investigator interview I did, I asked the participant to 
tell me a story about a case they had had that was difficult to decide.  Louise, an 
experienced investigator with a law enforcement background, told me about one that was 
still open:  
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I have one that I’ve been working for a while, and there were allegations that a 
mother was poisoning, or attempting to poison the child with arsen…. and the child 
was… um…  tested, and it was determined that her arsenic… that the level of arsenic 
in her body was extremely high. 
I:  Where had the report come from? 
Medical doctor.  Um… and when I saw it, it frightened me, you know?  It’s like, 
okay, I see about this stuff on TV, but… 
I:  Yeah. 
… to actually have to deal with something like… I mean, arsenic, you know… 
And so… um…  my first thing was, okay, this mom is a bad mom, but after talking 
and interviewing, and… and… Mom had a criminal history background. She was 
dealing with depression and drugs and she had a couple of DWIs, and I said, “Well, 
maybe she is doing this,” you know? And after really talking to her and talking to 
other references… um… I found that out it was not the case, that she was not doing 
this, and the way it w… the case presented to me was she was the only one that could 
have done this. She was the only one that had access to it… 
I:  Had you had this case from the beginning, or did you take it over… 
From the beginning. 
I:  From the beginning.  Had somebody other than the doctor actually… 
suspicions? I mean it was just…just the… 
No, that....  The child was living with her father and stepmother, and the child 
was sick. Normal flu symptoms – cold, uh, cold symptoms. Vomiting, diarrhea, 
nausea, stuff like… just normal symptoms of a flu or a cold or a virus or something 
going on.  And ironically the stepmom… um… told the doctor, “Well, check for 
arsenic.” And the doctor did, and that’s when we determined that the level was very 
high. Fortunately for the child and for our agency… um… after going through and… 
and dealing with it and reading doctor’s reports and talking to people… um… the 
case was “ruled out,” that….  It… arsenic, or this particular arsenic in the child’s 
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body was not… um… enough, or was not a concern for anybody to think that 
anybody was trying to hurt or deliberately harm this child, and there was so many 
factors that could have come from this, such as sea food, some drinking waters 
contain it… so many… um… ways that arsenic can, can be… The father… um… 
or… owns… um… properties that have been in the newspaper for rat, rat infestation, 
and so the child could have could have gotten to it. I mean, it was pesticides and 
insecticides in the home… 
I:  Yeah, but what made the stepmom ask the doc… 
That was my concern. You say, “Okay, test for… uh… what is it?… E choli… or 
something like that… 
I:  Yeah, yeah. 
And never test for arsenic, and that was my… 
I:  Unless it comes at the end of a long list of other stuff. 
Right, okay, and… um… her reason, ‘cause that… I was really focused on that… 
I:  Yeah. 
And… and this was a custody battle kind of sort of thing. 
I:  Sure, sure. And you could envision a scenario where she’d give ‘em a little bit 
to frame the real mom. 
Exactly, and that’s what I was thinking, and so we really… um…  get into that… 
Law enforcement didn’t see enough… because there was not enough substantial 
harm or risk to the child, but um… to this day, I’m still really concerned. Why would 
she say, “Test for arsenic”? 
I: Yeah.  Yeah. 
And her reasoning for it… ‘cause I asked the doctor, “Well, how did she say it 
without… bringing suspicion? You know, how did this come up? And she said she 
was concerned, too, she said, but the… she said that the stepmom mentioned that she 
had done some work… uh… as a dietician, and… how that, yeah… how that comes 
about I don’t know, but she said that she had read about it or heard about it… 
I:  Well, I mean, I guess, I guess… I guess a dietician needs to know if you 
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accidentally give somebody some arsenic, what to look for… That’s weird.   
It was really weird 
I:  That is weird. That’s a weird story. What kind of vibes did you get from the… 
from the different people involved in the case? 
Um… again… all the fingers were pointing at this mother. 
I:  Because of her history? 
Uh-huh, her history, and… um… a judge had actually taken the child from her 
because of her history and given them to the father. Um… 
I: What did you say it was? Depression? And what else? 
Yes, she had just recently lost her mom, and she turned to popping pills and 
drinking and… On one, or maybe two occasions she would drive under the influence 
with the children in the car, and so… that wasn’t good. Couple of times she’d be out 
in public high and intoxicated and that’s what… Then, of course, she’s on probation 
for… um… the… you know, that type of scenario. But, you know, the whole time 
my eye… or my focus was on this stepmom, you know. Why, and you know, it still 
bothers me today. Why? That question is still there. Why ask for arsenic? I’m going 
to work very closely with the Travis County deputy.  And… um… 
I:  Is this case still open? 
No, he closed his case, as well. Because again, there was not enough. The 
toxoligist from the Medical Examiner’s office said that it… it just wasn’t enough. 
And then the doctor, the primary care physician, put the child in the hospital and ran 
tests, and eventually it went out, and it’s not coming back, and so… It was just 
basically determined as a one-time thing. Needless to say… um… good thing came 
out of it. The children were returned to the mom. Um… she’d gotten her life 
together.  
I:  Good. 
And see, the ironic thing was mom had supervised visitation at Kid’s Exchange.  
So she couldn’t do it at home. She had to do it at Kid’s Exchange, where the 
visitation is documented by someone who’s… supervises the visits, and any… you 
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can’t…  Once you come in, you can’t go out int…  You know, if she says, “I’m 
hungry,” and they go out and get hamburgers at McDonald’s, they can’t do that. 
Once they’re in this room, visitation, you stay there. And the supervisor who’s there 
shares in the food, as well.  So…  And I didn’t also tell you that there were twin 
girls.  Six year-old girls. Twins.   
I:  Twins. 
And only the one was… um… sick with that. 
I:  That’s a very strange case.  And what possible motive could anybody suggest 
for her wanting to – the mom, I mean, for her wanting to do this? None? 
None. None whatsoever.   
 
 Louise has told here a good investigation story and told it artfully. She refrained 
from divulging the key question in the case until it jumped out of my mouth. I got caught 
up in the narrative, forgot my listening role, and participated with her in a conversational 
effort to make her narrative attain full form and reach a satisfying conclusion. That goal 
eluded us, but the chase was momentarily exhilarating. All narrative activity, according 
to Ochs and Capps (2001), is “a tool for collaboratively reflecting upon specific 
situations and their place in the general scheme of life” (p. 2), and investigation 
narratives would seem to bring this function into sharp relief. 
 Typical of investigation stories, Louise’s actually has two narratives in it.  The 
narrative on the surface, the story’s process narrative, is epistemological and existential. 
Its subject, or fabula, to use the formalist term, is, of course, the investigation itself.  Its 
chronology is not that of the events that are the subject of the investigation, but that of 
her discovery of them.  We hear first about the allegation, then about her interviewing, 
fact gathering, and evidence analysis, and theorizing. This structure is instantly familiar, 
of course, to readers of detective novels. Told from the investigator’s point of view, they 
generally start with the discovery of a crime, wind their way through the hunting and 
analysis of clues to end just as Louise wishes hers could, with a revelation, one that 
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answers a crucial who, what, how, or why question, ties up the loose ends, and gives the 
reader a satisfying sense of seeing through to the truth.   
 The purpose of the process narrative is, of course, the construction of an ontological 
or essential fact narrative, one that orders and makes comprehensible all the elements of 
its fabula -- the actions, thoughts, and desires of the people in the case. This is, or aims at 
being, the story of what really happened. The fact narrative is thus embedded in the 
process narrative. Bal (1997) has identified several relationships that can exist between a 
primary and an embedded narrative.  The embedded narrative may reflect, explain, or 
interfere with the primary narrative.  Either one may control the other.  On the one hand, 
the sought-after fact narrative would appear to be determinative for the investigation 
story as a whole.  It is necessarily prior to the process narrative and furnishes its 
substance and impetus. The process narrative would seem limited to being a description 
of how and in what order the pieces of the fact narrative come together. It is the process 
narrative, though, that brings, or fails to bring, those pieces of the fact narrative together. 
The selective powers of that activity Geertz (1983) calls “imagining the real,” are 
absolute, yet it feels nothing so much as constraint.  The process narrative never 
becomes complacent in the constitutive license it really has, but labors under an 
oppressive, almost filial sense of obligation to an idea of truth.  The idea of truth, of 
course, has very worldly origins in a slowly developed sense of what others, particularly 
powerful others, agree upon, yet it is never identical with that and never quite loses its 
Platonic, otherworldly nimbus. The process and fact narratives generate one another and 
also frustrate one another as they try to reach satisfying ends. Though both have their 
own plots, characters, settings, and moods, neither can exist independently. In Louise’s 
story, because the process component failed to reach its proper end, the crucial facts 
remain outside the door, in darkness. This, of course, is a source of frustration to 
investigators, but it is a frustration they learn to tolerate in honoring their obligation to 
the truth. 
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 This raises the question of how investigation stories can even be stories when they 
fail to have crucial components of stories, when dilemmas remain unresolved and 
behavior unexplained. 
 Here is Arnold, an experienced investigator: 
 
You know, with each case it's… it's almost like reading a different book, to be honest 
with you. Each case is a different story behind it. Um…each family has different 
circumstances. It's kind of exciting, to be honest with you, because you're reading 
and looking into the book and as you get past the first chapter you're moving on to 
the second and third and you're kind of "Okay" and as the book narrows down 
toward the end and you're like, "Okay.  Either the family's going to make it or we're 
going to have to take these other steps to make sure that they make it." 
 I:  That's interesting. Is it like the interesting thing about it is just learning about 
other people's lives? Or the… the… are you immediately interested in finding out the 
answer to the question of whether there was… 
 A lot of times you really don't… really, truly know the answer? So it's more or 
less just finding out where that family is and what's going on, what's the dynamics. 
Becau… I don't think you ever truly know what's going on behind the scenes. You 
have an idea, but I've yet to say I've had a case and I know everything about this 
family, you know. And I don't think you'll ever truly be able to pinpoint because it 
could be something that somebody's blocked out in their mind from a childhood 
experience that’s caused them to react that way. They just can't figure it out at this 
point.   
 
 Arnold finds his cases satisfying as books, as stories, even though, without a single 
exception, they leave important questions about character and even plot permanently 
unanswered. Since these unknowns exist in a narrative context, however, they have a 
potential discoverability, a realizable form – those lost childhood memories, for example 
– that charges with signification the darkness in which they remain. We may go a step 
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further and say that the investigation story, partial, obscure, and forestalled as it might 
be, perhaps even because of those qualities, delivers in unusually pure form the hunger 
for meaning that is the engine of story-making generally. 
 Stories made from first-hand experience are the main way that features appear on an 
investigator’s mental map of the investigative activity. Successes create roads, passes, 
and bridges. Failures create swamps and deserts that have to be gotten around; they can 
also destroy roads and bridges that have been previously built. A story need not derive 
from experience, however, to have such an effect. Other people’s stories, if they are 
vivid and relevant enough, can be just as powerful as experience in shaping one’s mental 
representation of a domain. 
 A striking example of how this can happen is given by Jennifer, a regional 
administrator. She describes how difficult it is sometimes to get new investigators to see 
the risk in children’s environments. She goes on: 
 
I think I’ve seen too many child death reports. Uh…when I was at State Office I was 
on the statewide child death committee. And we hear stories about children 
drowning… Neglect cases. Cases we never investigated for physical abuse.  We 
went in – dirty house.  And here it is a month later and that child drowned. Um… 
I’ve heard so many of those horror stories that anything like that just gets my… gets 
me.  And it’s like, “Okay, I don’t want any drowned kids. I don’t want any babies in 
the… well. [laughs] Babies in the highway: We’re not going to have that.”   
 
 For Jennifer, the reading of those child death cases taught her, as well, if not as 
painfully as personal experience could, what kinds of innocent-seeming situations can 
lead to a child’s death. Reading the cases alone created permanent features on her mental 
map of the CPS landscape, and she is trying now, with her newly hired workers, to 
duplicate those features on their mental maps, without them, and potential future victims, 
having to suffer their creation through disaster. 
 Pauline, in a less dramatic way, describes how, when she went to supervisors’ 
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training, she benefited most from the narratives of the other class members: 
 
When I walked away from that class, the only thing that I felt… in… made the class 
rich for me was the personal stories and experiences that the other supervisors had 
been through. They said, “Well, this is how…  Let me tell you about the mistake that 
I made.” And they were open about that, and… and… I, I thought about like that that 
makes a lot of sense. That made more sense to me than lecturing from the 
curriculum.   
 
 Sarah, a supervisor, had an open case in her unit at the time I first interviewed her. It 
involved an 18-month-old boy who had a broken femur. He was the youngest child of 
six in the home, four of whom were the father’s from a previous marriage. One night the 
whole family went out to eat. When they came home the dad and five of the children 
went out to the garage and only the mother and the youngest child were in the house. 
According to the mother, she was watching television and the child was sitting on the 
carpeted floor playing with a towel. She went to the kitchen for a moment and heard the 
child, in Sarah’s words, “kind of… yell.” The mother said she turned around. The child 
was now lying on the floor crying. She tried to console him and couldn’t.  The father and 
the other children came in from the garage, and the mother said, “I don’t know what’s 
wrong with him.” 
 They took the child to the emergency room, and x-rays showed him to have a spiral 
fracture of the femur. This kind of injury, an orthopedist told Sara’s investigator, could 
not have resulted from the child falling over. It usually results from severe twisting of 
the leg. 
     Sarah and her investigator were now in the position of having to reconcile the expert 
opinion of the orthopedist and the testimony of the mother, which on its own terms 
seemed believable, and was not contradicted by evidence from any of the other family 
members. Sarah said: 
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Everybody’s story checked out, exactly… as events of the evening went. They had 
all gone out to eat.  “Once we got home, this is that,” you know, everybody… totally 
consistent with the events of the evening. So the only person who was in that house 
at the time of the injury is mom.  And she’s just…  You know, initially it’s like, “I 
ca… I don’t know.  I don’t know what happened.” And she says, “I… I really don’t.” 
There’s no previous history on this family. There’s nothing going… I mean, the 
children all report… I mean, there’s no… there’s no drugs, there’s no alcohol, 
there’s no domestic violence. The police report that they’ve never been called out to 
the home. I mean, money-wise they’re both working.  Financially they’re able to 
meet all… you know, the needs about six kids. I mean, there’s all those risk factors 
that you look at. They’re not there. So you still have this child with…this injury. 
 
 Sarah is remarking here on the absence of characteristics that an abusive household 
would usually have. These missing elements, though, in addition to being characteristics 
that permit ready categorization of the family as high-risk, are motives. It is as motives 
that drug and alcohol abuse, domestic violence, and poverty have the strong categorizing 
power that they do, from an intuitive standpoint. Even without knowing any more about 
the mother than that she lived under one or more of these conditions, we would find the 
fact that she broke her own child’s leg in a sudden act of violence less mysterious. 
Though the act is not fully explained by such a context, it nonetheless acquires a general 
and potential explicability, much a as a string of bizarre-looking words acquires 
translatability, though not translation, once it can be assigned to a particular language. 
Risk conditions associate the home, the family, the mother, and the child with a loose-
jointed master narrative in which those who live squalid lives do squalid things to one 
another.   
Since, however, the usual explanatory conditions do not obtain in this case, Sarah 
has to forage more widely for an explanation: 
 
I mean, I have some suspicions. I don’t know that mom actually did anything. I’m 
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not sure. But I have, you know… of course, I have… She’s… younger that dad. 
She’s got these four other kids whose… mother was killed in a car accident, about 
five years ago. And then dad married her, so she took on this big responsibility of 
somebody else’s four kids, and then they have two other kids. So you can kind of 
[turn around.] Well, now they’ve just bought this new house. You know, so now 
there is some financial stress probably, although they don’t admit to that. You know, 
she’s kind of the primary caretaker for six kids. You know, so then you start looking 
at it that way, you… Well, I don’t know, maybe this child wasn’t a planned 
pregnancy, maybe she didn’t want to have. And that, though she doesn’t say that… 
But you look at all that, so…  I said, “Well, we’re going to go ahead and open it for 
services, and maybe something will come.” 
I:  These suppositions about what might be, you know, the tensions that might be 
there. Did these get reported to you by your worker or are these things you’ve 
wondered about just looking at the… at the…? 
Just wondered about. You look at it from a different perspective from outside, 
and you think, “Well, okay […] let’s see. You got six kids. That’s a big stress level 
by itself. You just moved into a new house, that… you know, yeah, you’ve got 
additional financial responsibilities. You know, so you’ve got all these other things. 
‘Course, you’ve got four kids that aren’t her kids.” You know, cause we look at… all 
the things that could… that in other cases can be a stressful… stepparents… you 
know, that’s… obviously… […] 
… Nobody’s perfect, you know?  Nobody’s perfect.  So that makes me 
suspicious right there.  “Well, you’ve got six children, four of which don’t belong to 
you.  Not that you don’t love them.  But you’ve got teenagers in the house.”  Three 
of those four are teenagers.  That’s just… 
 
     Here we see the question of why the mother might have done it taking over, for the 
moment, the question of whether she did it. There can be no story without an assignation 
of motive, however tentative and speculative. Without it the cognitive schema that forms 
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the basic structure of narrative, that of SOURCE-PATH-GOAL (Johnson, 1993), can’t 
be brought to bear on the case’s assortment of elements, since there is no proper starting 
point for and no path toward the culminating event, the broken leg, which, without a 
reason for its being desired, is prevented from being conceptualized as a goal. Motive, as 
Ricouer has said (1984), is one of a set of interlocking elements that distinguish mere 
physical movement from human action. And O’Toole, Turbert, and Nalepka have found, 
in their study of theories underlying the medical understanding of child abuse, that 
assignment of cause and motive is a crucial part of the construct and “is particularly 
important in diagnosing child abuse (1983, p. 358).  
     Had one or two of the other family members come in from the garage a moment 
earlier and seen the mother grab and twist the child’s leg, Sarah’s interest in knowing 
what her motive had been would not be as keen. A reliable witness to corroborate the 
doctor’s opinion about the injury’s cause would have rocketed the case into the “reason-
to-believe” class. Whether would have been established on its own terms and not be 
forced into dependence on why. Sarah would have no doubt much preferred to settle the 
case that way, and have the motive question left for wondering about in an idle moment, 
because the psychological discomfort of uncertainty is certainly greater when both 
whether and why are unsettled. Also, a settled whether must, perforce, have a why in it 
somewhere, even if we can’t see what it is. A witness would have permitted us to 
consider the broken leg to have been a goal after all, even though the source and path to 
it remained obscure. In a way, however much, Iago-like, the mother kept silent about her 
motive, or even continued to deny having done it in the teeth of persuasive evidence, our 
sense of being deprived of our story, and thereby the sense of the event, is greatly 
reduced. 
     Sarah considers one other possible explanation for the fracture besides the mother 
having done it out of stress: 
 
… We haven’t finished the investigation part, but yeah, I think it’s going to end up 
being unable to determine.  I mean, at this point it’s hard to say.  We’re… I mean 
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there’s the other piece of it that we’re suspicious, but maybe one of the older kids 
actually did something and the parents are covering up for them.  You know, those 
kinds of things.  Maybe there’s other issues.  It… So there’s all these things we just 
don’t know.  I mean, although the kids are all… they’re in sports, they’re in… 
they’re great… they do good in school.  The older kids, I mean…  We where 
thinking, “Well, maybe one of those kids really are jealous of the baby.”  You know, 
there’s just all those…  I know, it’s… 
 
 Hirt and Markman (1995) did a series of experiments to determine why imagining 
multiple outcomes for a decision tends to reduce bias and improve decision-making 
accuracy. They found that consideration of a second alternative, instead of bringing 
about an averaging with the first, or a lowering of probability estimates for both, forced a 
more realistic evaluation of the first. Both outcomes are tested in a judgment heuristic of 
simulation. Mental models of each outcome are imaginatively “run,” and probability 
estimates are derived from the ease with which the different scenarios permit themselves 
to be imagined. Sarah’s consideration the different narrative strands that might 
ultimately be part of a coherent, compelling fact narrative can easily be characterized as 
the running of mental simulations that Hirt and Markman describe. Narratives lend 
themselves very well to this sort of heuristic, and may, in fact, be what makes it possible. 
They have great mental vividness, they can entertain highly complex chains of causality, 
and they are modular, in that one can easily switch out different pieces of it. A story’s 
events, settings, characters, or, as with Sarah’s story, motivations, can be taken out and 
others substituted for them. Each new story can then be rerun mentally to see if it has 
better coherence, coverage, uniqueness, and goodness-of-fit than previous versions had. 
We see here just how narrative functions as a form of rationality. It is a means of 
generating multiple explanatory hypotheses and, at least in a preliminary and relative 
way, testing them.  
 Klein (1998) sees mental simulation as a key feature of his recognition-primed 
decision-making model. He sees it not only as the means whereby decision makers under 
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time constraints can quickly evaluate possible courses of action, but also as explaining 
the use of stories as a decision-making tool. Stories, for Klein, are “packages of different 
causal relationships” (Klein, 1998, p. 181). A finished one is like a report of an 
experiment, conveying the result of certain actions taken under certain conditions, and so 
becomes a repository for procedural knowledge. A story still under construction is still 
working its way toward knowledge, arranging and rearranging a changing set of 
elements, using, as a principle of choice, a sense of “storyness” distilled from the vast 
library of finished stories in memory. 
 A primary function of narrative, says Bruner (1986) is the subjunctifiation of reality, 
in the sense of postulating actions not as accomplished facts, but as contingent and 
hypothetical possibilities. Moreover, the possibilities are generally not created by 
random events impinging upon the story’s characters, but by different combinations of 
their desires, purposes, fears, and other features of their subjectivity. Sarah uses narrative 
to subjunctify the case facts and consider various possible affective and motivational 
links among them. 
 An interesting feature of her effort to find the story in this case is that it never takes 
up the doctor’s claim that the fracture could not have been accidental. She never 
considers the possibility, for example, that he was feeling so much stress over smaller 
Medicaid reimbursements, pressure from his HMO to see more patients, and rising 
malpractice insurance premiums that he misread the x-ray. There is, of course, no 
evidence to suggest that any such error occurred, and the likelihood of it is so small that 
launching a trial narrative in that direction would seem merely fanciful. Sarah’s 
acceptance, however, of the doctor’s opinion as foundational, rather than as testimony on 
the same footing with other testimony, is typical of the attitudes of participants in this 
study. CPS decision making relies heavily on expert opinion, to assess injury, to 
determine the credibility of child victims, to identify and quantify developmental 
damage, to profile accused perpetrators, and generally bring clarity and resolution. 
Disagreement between two experts in a case provokes a decision-making crisis for CPS 
in a way that other evidentiary conflicts seldom do. Since the disagreement has more or 
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less dethroned expertise within the boundaries of the particular case, a third opinion 
would hardly solve the problem, unless it were of a much higher order of magnitude than 
the first two. Such cases become the subject of interdisciplinary conferences, with 
regional administrators and the disagreeing experts in attendance.  Should the experts 
continue to disagree, and the anchor chain not be mended, the case must be taken up the 
decision-making hierarchy, and bureaucratic authority must reluctantly substitute for that 
of expertise. I say reluctantly because, as I will in explain the next section of this 
chapter, people in CPS are comfortable wielding power only as they can think of it as 
being authorized by something other than the state. In addition to the principles of 
children being safe and families needing to stay together, the aims and institutions of 
medicine, and, by extension, psychology, are seen as providing just cause for CPS’ 
power to intervene.  To be deprived, even for one case, of ringing, confident clinical 
justification brings a sense of exposure. 
     Though Sarah searched for a story to help her make sense of her case, none of the 
narrative possibilities she came up with seemed especially compelling, and she had no 
thought of trying to prove one or another of them. In the following narrative, told by 
Melissa, an investigator with less than a year on the job, a fact narrative rises up out of 
the evidence that not only compels her belief, but rouses her to try and establish its truth: 
 
I have a child death case right now that I’m working on, and I finally just… um…  
called… um… the investigator that I’m working with in the criminal side and said, 
um… “I know what you’ve ruled, and I know what the autopsy shows, but I have to 
tell you what I feel inside, because God forbid, something come… something like 
this happen in five years and I didn’t tell someone how I honestly felt.”  And… 
um… he said, “Okay, just let me know what you’re feeling.”  I said, and I told him, 
“I really feel like there was some criminal intent here, and I really feel like mom did 
something wrong.” 
I:  What was the… how did the child die? 
Um… four month old child died… um… of SIDS. That’s what the autopsy report 
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ruled. Um… when I interviewed the mother the very next morning, she did not cry.  
She has not cried. I’ve been to her home several times and she’s never cried.  She was 
just real indifferent. And I’m a mother, and I know people do not react in the same 
way to… uh… trauma, and I know that there’s the honeymoon period, but… w…. 
having a child and bearing a child, the love that is there is, it just incredible, and I 
think you would have to drug me to get me to talk to someone about my child dying. 
And I just think the situations… She was very defensive toward me. I asked her if she 
worked. She said, “I’ve been pregnant for two years.  What do you think?” Uh… I 
asked her to tell me what had happened that day, before the child died, and, you 
know, she hasn’t worked, she’s not from this area, doesn’t have a real support system 
as far as family and friends, has been on Prozac for postpartum depression from her 
first child. Um… Dad gets home from work. Dad works seven days a week. They’re 
young.  She’s 19.  They get home… he gets home from work.  They go to HEB… 
um… buy some groceries that she has to prepare. She prepares the meal. They eat, 
and then he leaves to go… um… spend some time with his friends that evening, and 
she stays with the fussy children.  Well, she doesn’t know what happened.  She just 
went in there to check on him, and he was dead, he was not breathing. Well, she told 
me he was blue. The neigh… When I talked to the neighbor, the landlord who gave 
the child CPR, he said the child was not blue.  I said, “Are you certain?” He said, “I 
held the baby in my hands. He was not blue.” So that leads me to believe she’s trying 
to tell me that the child was dead for a while because he was lacking oxygen. But 
when I talked to the neighbor, he’s telling me that that child was not dead for a long 
time, because he was not blue. So, I don’t know why she would want me to think that. 
I don’t know what… what’s going on, but I just… Her behavior, her indifference, her 
not crying or showing any kind of grief, kind of almost acting as though she’s 
relieved.  Then I pull… I get criminal history and I talk to her doctors. That same 
month, ten days prior to his death, that baby was in the ER for a swollen elbow. A 
four month-old with a swollen elbow. Mom says that she’s the sole caregiver, was 
home with the child alone, doesn’t know… didn’t witness any trauma. How does a 
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four month-old get a swollen elbow?  They did X-rays, and there was no… no 
evidence of any… no bruising… But I still don’t know how a four month-old gets this 
bruised… a bruised elbow. That just doesn’t happen. It’s… that’s just too close… 
together. I’ve… I feel like… s… some…you know, it just takes a minute. 
[I put my hand over my nose and mouth.] 
Right. 
I:  I put my hand over my face. 
Yeah, yeah, and.. 
I:  So where does it stand now? 
Well, the autopsy report said SIDS. 
I:  Right. 
So basically, you know, that was the cause of death. 
I:  But SIDS isn’t a… isn’t actually a positive finding. I mean, they don’t… 
Right.  That means they… 
I:  There’s nothing they… That means they don’t know. 
Right. And I talked to the detective, and he didn’t see any kind of criminal intent.  
But after I told him what I honestly felt… um… he felt… he felt funny as well. So I 
don’t know if he’s going to reopen the case. But I’ve already been e-mailed several 
times about why isn’t my child death closed? And I just want to e-mail ‘em back and 
say because I’ve… I’m worried about this situation, and there’s another child in the 
home. That’s why, you know. 
I:  In terms of your testing procedure, what test could you still do, on her or the 
family? [Earlier in the interview Melissa had described her investigative method as a 
kind of “testing” procedure. She formulated hypotheses, which she would then test 
with further investigation or with surprise home visits.] 
Well, I want to talk to her regular doctor, and find out… I did talk to the doctor 
who… um… worked on the baby when it was in the ER that one day? And he could 
not believe that that baby was dead. He was in awe. And… but I want to talk to… 
See, she gave me the name of the doctor in this area, who said… she said put her on 
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Prozac. That is not correct. When I talked to that doctor and got her medical records 
from him, he… she talked to him about what she was feeling, and he said, “You need 
to go to your doctor in Austin.” So there’s a doctor she did not tell me about. So I 
would like to talk to him and find out exactly what are some side effects of that 
depression that she was going through, that postpartum. I’m just seeing 
overwhelmed… you know, not working for two years, sole caretaker, no support 
system, postpartum depression, and irritable children, financial constraints… 
I:  Her husband’s out drinking. 
Yeah, yeah. You know, and this mom being really indifferent and not shedding 
one tear. I just really have some issues with that. 
     Melissa’s story search is similar to Sarah’s. It takes up the question of motive in the 
same way and attaches in the same way to the idea of stress: A very young stay-at-home 
mother has a husband who works long hours. She feels overwhelmed and takes an anti-
depressant, but the feelings of loneliness, frustration, and despair continue to grow. One 
day she grabs the baby too roughly and bruises his elbow. A short time later, when her 
husband is out with his friends, she decides she can’t stand it any longer and suffocates 
the baby in his crib.  The police have not prosecuted because the autopsy produced no 
physical evidence that the child’s death was caused by foul play. Also, presumably, they 
were satisfied with the mother’s account of how she discovered the child not breathing. 
The possibility that the mother murdered the child surely occurred to them, but without 
evidence, it could become nothing more. Melissa, though, has three reasons for believing 
the story to be true. First, the mother said the baby was blue when she went to check on 
him and a neighbor who came in when she called for help said he wasn’t. Second, the 
baby had had a suspicious injury ten days before. Third, the mother didn’t cry when 
Melissa interviewed her. This last reason seems most important to Melissa. It’s the first 
one she cites, and she repeats it again at the end by way of summation: “… this mom 
being really indifferent and not shedding one tear. I just really have some issues with 
that.” 
 Melissa gives insight into the nature of these issues at a different point in the 
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interview. When I asked her if she felt that most families could be kept together if they 
received the right kind of services, she answered: 
 
I don’t know. I don’t want to say yes, because a lot of our f… you know, we’ll work 
with them, and then a couple of years later we’ll get something else. I don’t have the 
solution. I wish I did. I wish I could say, “This is how we fix all this,” but I don’t 
have that problem. You know, it’s just a matter of decisions. You know, I was a 
single parent. I had a child out of wedlock when I was 18. [“My original plan was to 
go to law school,” Melissa said earlier.]  I had to quit college and I was on welfare 
and I was on food stamps and my daughter went to Head Start, and I did all those 
things, too. I was there. And I was faced with, “Should I go get drunk tonight 
because my life is really stressful or do I need to stay home with my daughter and 
save my five dollars for diapers?” And, you know, I made the right decision, thank 
goodness. But I could have easily been a CPS client. So, you know, when I get 
young girls that come into my office and tell me I don’t know what it’s like… I 
know what it’s like. 
 
  We see from this that the story Melissa reads in the child death case is compelling to 
her partly because it so closely parallels her own. She “knows what it’s like” to be young 
and wanting to have a good time, but instead having to take care of a baby with too little 
money and help. She feels anger toward other young women who have babies, but who 
fail to act responsibly, an anger that may be sharpened by regret over lost opportunity. 
The mother in the death case is caught up in this anger. Her impassivity and seeming 
“almost relieved” was a sign to Melissa that she lacked a mother’s heart, and was 
thereby capable of acting to end her state of bondage in the most direct and final way 
possible. One can imagine Melissa’s own heart having been less motherly at some 
moments than at others, and getting drunk may not have been the only temptation she 
ever had. But even if Melissa felt no identification, conscious or unconscious, with the 
mother in this case, her search for the explanatory narrative seems tightly bound up with 
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complex personal “issues.” 
 The associations and evocations that appear to have affected Melissa’s construction 
of the fact narrative in this case are, to some degree, inevitable:  
 
It... it’s...  I... I think it's very difficult... to be an investigator and not become 
emotionally involved... at times.  And to a large degree, I think that's why the 
turnover is so great in CPS, is because you have to become emotionally involved at 
some times with some cases. Um... not being able to manage that... uh... I think is 
what causes people to leave and in a large part is what causes some of the poor 
casework that we see. 
 
 This is Victor the ombudsman once again; the ombudsman’s’ office is the last level 
of appeal for designated perpetrators. He says he and his colleagues reverse 40% to 50% 
of the cases they review, often, he feels, because of emotional bias on the part of the 
investigators, supervisors, and even Program Directors in the region. That feelings of 
sympathy, animosity, frustration and despair should arise as one grapples with these 
disturbing cases, especially if one has contact with the people involved, is 
understandable to Victor. He is obliged to overturn the findings in a case, however, when 
those feelings make themselves apparent in the supporting logic. We have seen in 
Pennington and Hastie’s story model how the process of fitting evidence into a story 
framework proceeds via the making of inferences about the evidence – of probability, 
truthfulness, cause and effect, and so on – based partly on our understanding of how 
stories go, how the world works, and what motivates people. These background beliefs 
become part of what Toulmin (1958) calls the warrant of an argument or judgment. The 
warrant is a general principle or belief that permits a particular claim to be made, given 
particular grounds. An example of a typical case is shown in Figure 3.  
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                Grounds                                                          Claim 
Michael Smith yanked on his four  
year old son’s arm, dislocating the 
shoulder. 
      Michael Smith committed abuse. 
 
Warrant 
The abuse definition defines abuse, 
in part, as “physical injury that 
results in substantial harm to the 
child.” 
                   AND 
Dislocation of the shoulder is  
substantial harm. 
 
Figure 3 
Argument Structure in a Typical Case 
 
 
 The contention that dislocation of the shoulder is substantial harm, which is an 
essential part of the warrant, is not a fact. Were it to be challenged, no case data could be 
produced to prove it. The contention could be supported, by precise description of the 
tissue damage a separated shoulder causes, by the time it takes to heal, by definitions of 
the words “substantial” and “harm” used by relevant authorities, by the way such 
injuries are classified for different purposes in medicine or law. It may also be 
supported, psychologically, if not rhetorically, by the arguer’s own experience of having 
had a dislocated shoulder, by sympathy for the victim, or by animosity toward the 
perpetrator. These personal warrants may be expressed or unexpressed, conscious or 
unconscious. If they are not conscious, they can yet add evidentiary weight to the 
conscious warrant elements or increase confidence in the accuracy and justice of the 
claim. 
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 Nisbet & Ross contended (1980) that there is enough cognitive bias in the average 
judgment error to make an emotion-centered explanation unnecessary. But emotion may, 
at bottom, account for the weakness of many practical inferences that seem merely 
illogical. In Melissa’s story the evidentiary import of the fact that the young mother 
didn’t cry during the interview is constructed as in Figure 4. 
 
 
                Grounds                                                          Claim 
The mother didn’t cry       The mother may have killed her child 
 
Warrant 
Women with true motherly feeling 
cry as they talk about their 
children’s deaths 
 
                   AND 
 
A poor, lonely young mother without 
True motherly feeling would kill her 
child if she thought she could get 
away with it. 
Figure 4 
Argument Structure in Melissa’s Narrative 
 
 Crombag (1993) and Twining (1999) have proposed, in a scheme similar to 
Toulmin’s, that narratives as used in law, the narrative of an indictment, or a summation, 
say, must, in order to be persuasive, have each of its elements anchored in general rules, 
beliefs or values held generally in the culture. Where the anchor is judged, or, at a 
visceral level, felt to be merely idiosyncratic, the claim, and the narrative as whole, will 
fail. Were Melissa to find the second doctor she wanted to interview and get from him or 
her a strong opinion that the mother was indeed capable of murdering her child, she 
might consider that enough to reach a “reason-to-believe” finding.  She would not, in her 
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documentation, reproduce the reasoning about the failure to cry that initially raised her 
suspicions. She would base her finding on the mother’s opportunity, history, motive, and 
capability. And then Victor, should the case make its way to his desk, would overturn.  
He would not know about Melissa’s real train of thought, about the personal experiences 
that infused the warrants, or anchors, in her argument with power and conviction. He 
would only know that they had no such power for him and did not support the claim of 
the mother’s guilt. 
 As a matter of fact, I do not think Melissa would validate abuse against the mother 
even with favorable evidence from the second doctor. Such evidence could only 
strengthen the possibility that the mother had committed murder. It could not make the 
necessary leap from the mother’s desire and ability to the action itself, which, after all, is 
very often contemplated, but very seldom taken. As Melissa’s own actions were 
constrained, so, in the end, will her inference be. Permeable as the logical operations of 
story construction are to emotion, association, and a kind of personal imperialism, they 
are also subject the rigorous “testing” Melissa employs in all aspects of her 
investigations. I’ll show the constraint process at work in another story later in this 
chapter. What her disingenuousness has allowed us to see here is an interim stage of the 
judgment process. Like Sarah’s, Melissa’s case story at this point is fiery, amorphous, 
and protean. It is still experimenting with forms and outcomes, assimilating and 
discarding elements.  
 Though the desire for completion and coherence guides the construction of every 
investigation story, it is not always as apparent as it is in Sarah’s and Melissa’s 
narratives.  Some investigators, like Louise, whose arsenic poisoning story we heard at 
the beginning of this section, believes that her background in law enforcement has taught 
her an investigative method that differs from that of most of her co-workers, most of 
whom have social work educations. “Because of my previous experience,” she says, “I 
think I’m more attentive to details… um… more solid in getting to the facts and 
bypassing the… uh… social work… stereotyping sort of thing.”  
 Here, as an example of the kind of investigative approach Louise describes, is a story 
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told by Leo, an investigator with three years’ experience. Note that Leo seems to avoid 
motivational “stereotyping” to focus instead on details of physical evidence. 
 
… I was just documenting a very complicated case that we had – a two-year-old 
child with a pretty serious burn on her right buttock cheek that was about two inches 
long and about a half inch in diameter, or width I should say. And the explanation 
that we were given from the family was that the child burned herself on an iron, a 
clothes iron. That didn’t seem to match what the burn looked like.  We have history 
with this family. In fact the mother had previously been given a “reason-to-believe” 
disposition for physically abusing a niece. And yet the child was not really making 
any kind of an outcry to us, other than that she burned herself. And you know, the 
burn was about, I think, 17 inches up from the floor on her. The table where 
supposedly this all happened was, um… Excuse me; the table was 17 inches off the 
floor. The burn on her was 14 and a half inches, and so that math doesn’t calculate.  
And… 
I:  Did you measure those yourself? 
Yeah.  And the detective with APD I was working with did as well. We do basic 
things like that. They actually took the iron as evidence, as well. And the department 
ended up getting this lady another iron, as a way to facilitate good rapport.   
I:  Your department, not theirs.  (laughing) 
Right, right. 
I:  They don’t do that too… 
No, they don’t do that kind of stuff. No, they don’t. And so…  And the mother, 
she took a lie detector test, which was inconclusive. 
I:  Hmmm 
Mom has some mental health issues, but it’s clear by the way she’s interacted 
with her child, and vice versa, that there’s love and care there. And there’s not fear.  
And so.. 
I:  Is that, is that kind of a routine thing, where you observe the child with this 
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AP to see how they relate? 
Right. You know, are they comfortable getting in the mother’s lap or the father’s 
lap?  Are they… Do they light up when a hug happens? Do they shy away from the 
parents when they’re calling them? Or …  All those sorts of things are real… are 
indicators of the relationship. Sort of those unspoken things, which I’m sure you 
know, communication – a lot of it is unspoken. So, it was a very, it is a difficult case, 
and after staffing this case with several people, including our risk director, and our 
district attorney and supervisors, we really couldn’t say conclusively that the mom 
burned this child intentionally. You know, accidents happen all kinds of ways, and 
it’s hard really to know, without a witness, what happened. And the mom was 
insisting she was innocent. She did all the things that an innocent person would do.  
You know, flatly deny it, venemently deny it. And um… 
I:  Agreed to the polygraph. 
Agreed to the polygraph, even though it was inconclusive. Um… and then the 
child wasn’t telling us anything.  
I:  How old was this child? 
The child was two.   
I:  Two, right, yeah. 
Um… and so we were really in a quandary as to what to do next. And so 
ultimately it was decided that the case would go to Family Based Safety Services, as 
a way to monitor the family. And maybe get the mom some parenting classes to 
make sure she’s following through with the things that she’s got to do. And really 
that’s all we could do at this point in time. 
I:  Is that something she has to agree to? I mean, would you remove because if 
she refused? 
No.  We wouldn’t in this particular instance. We wouldn’t… There was not 
enough legal evidence to remove the child.   
I:  But you’re not… In your heart of hearts, you’re not sure.   
Yeah, I’m really not sure. And that’s… That really is where it gets difficult.  
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Because I’ve seen how close the mother is to the child, but it’s also not out of the 
realm of possibility that in a moment of anger she did burn the child, while she… 
maybe while she was even ironing. It’s strange because the burn looks like a curling 
iron burn, and that’s the part that we could never figure out, because no one would 
ever tell us there was a curling iron. We couldn’t find a curling iron. We didn’t … 
there wasn’t a … 
I:  Because it was straight. 
Yeah, and there was sort of a little bend in it where it looked like the little.. the 
clip is, a little line. So it was very peculiar. And troubling. Troubling case. 
 
 Leo’s story, though it sounds the same plaintive note of not being able to quite reach 
the truth as the others we have heard, has a different character. Whereas the previous 
three focused on motive as the crucial missing factor that forestalled the formation of a 
complete, satisfying story, Leo’s focuses on the mismatch between bits of physical 
evidence. The table is 17 inches above the floor, but the burn is only 14 and a half inches 
up on the child.  (Even given that he has just been documenting the case, that he 
remembers these figures so precisely, and those relating to the size of the wound, is 
striking.) The shape of the injury is like that of a curling iron, but there’s not one in the 
house. These discrepancies, along with the child’s not having made an outcry, are what 
trouble Leo about the case, not the lack of a reason for the mother to have hurt the child.  
In fact, her mental illness would seem to offer foothold for speculation about her 
motives, but Leo neglects it. His whole approach reflects a style of comprehension that 
is closer to the analytic end of the cognitive continuum than the intuitive. 
 Leo’s lack of interest in the sort of narrative explanation that Sarah and Melissa are 
after may be would thought wise by those who argue that comprehension and 
deliberation through narrative almost inevitably leads to judgment error. Dawes (2001), 
from a purely logical standpoint, contends that a narrative, because it consists of a 
“single sequence of events often linked with a set of hypothesized causal influences” (p. 
112, italics Dawes’), and therefore cannot establish general causality or even be valid as 
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evidence in a particular case. For Dawes, understanding causality depends upon the 
ability to make comparisons. Knowing the characteristics of abused children, for 
example, tells you nothing if you don’t also know to what degree those same 
characteristics are present in children who have not been abused. Stories do not make 
comparisons, only associations.  “Even when we have a perfectly valid statistical 
explanation for a phenomenon,” he says (p. 137), we may ignore it because no ‘good 
story’ accompanies it to persuade us that we should believe it.”   
 Spence, a psychoanalyst, contrasts historical truth, accurate knowledge of past 
events, with narrative truth, which he defines as “the criterion we use to decide when a 
certain experience has been captured to our satisfaction; it depends on continuity and 
closure and the extent to which the fit of the pieces takes on an aesthetic finality” (1982, 
p. 31). Narrative truth often displaces historical truth, and not only when lack of 
methodology and resources made historical truth inaccessible. “Hermeneutic pressure” 
(Spence, 1982, p. 108), a desire to make disparate life events fit together in a coherent 
narrative, is so powerful that it guides unconsciously our tests of historical truth and 
allows us to overlook an absence of evidence. 
 Dershowitz (1996) refers to a famous declaration of Chekhov’s that if in the first 
chapter of a novel we are shown a gun hanging on the wall, it has to be fired in Chapter 
Two or Chapter Three. In skillfully written fiction and drama there are no loose ends. 
Every incident and bit of descriptive detail functions thematically. But life, Dershowitz 
argues, does not follow Chekhov’s prescription. “Events are often simply meaningless, 
irrelevant to what comes next; events can be out of sequence, random, purely accidental, 
without purpose” (p. 100). Narrative, when it is brought into the adjudication process, 
can cause the confusion of fact and fiction, to the detriment of justice. 
 Dershowitz gives an example from the criminal trial of O. J. Simpson. The 
prosecution worked hard to plant in the minds of the jurors a story about a man who 
abused his wife on several occasions and finally, under what he perceived to be intense 
provocation, murdered her. By establishing the abuse as fact, the attorneys hoped to 
show the murder was a logical and necessary development, to lead jurors to make what 
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Pennington and Hastie would call an abductive attribution (Men who abuse their wives 
are apt to murder them. The defendant abused his wife. He must have murdered her.)  
The defense sought to prevent the inference by introducing as evidence statistics 
showing that fewer than one tenth of one percent of abusers go on to commit murder. 
 The implication of Dershowitz’s argument is that a person trying to make sense of a 
mass of evidence may have a tendency to construe it as a story, but may also, with effort, 
refrain from doing so. With Bennett, he sees the story construction as a deliberative, 
rather than spontaneous process. Evaluators of evidence may establish and observe a 
probabilistic threshold; an inference that falls below a certain level of likelihood must be 
rejected. If that leaves two events or qualities hanging, suspended in psychological space 
unconnected without connection to one another, so be it. This is a definition of 
objectivity that goes beyond Bennett’s, who described it as the conscientious comparison 
of competing stories against one another and against a generic frame of reference.  
Dershowitz would say objectivity also demands a conscientious abstention of story 
making where it is not warranted and a refusal to penalize a particular theory of evidence 
solely on the basis of its narrative inadequacy. 
 We see this abstention taking place in yet another ambiguous case narrative, told by 
Carmen, an experienced investigator who had just become a supervisor at the time I 
interviewed her.  
  The case involved a teenaged girl who had accused her stepfather of having sexually 
abused her. Her outcry seemed sincere and fully detailed. Subsequent investigation, 
however, could not corroborate her account. The stepfather was able to show, with 
documentation from his job, that he had not been at home when the child said the abuse 
happened. He, too, was believable in the way he denied the allegation and he cooperated 
fully with Carmen’s investigation. It also came to light that the stepfather had thrown the 
alleged victim’s boyfriend out of the house, which could be seen as giving her a motive 
to make up the sexual abuse story in order to take revenge against him. Though this was 
suggestive, it was not conclusive. Because Carmen could find no evidence to support the 
allegation, she could not reach a finding that there was “reason-to-believe.” Neither 
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could she “rule out” the allegation, dismiss it as false, because of the inherent credibility 
it continued to have for Carmen. Her finding was “unable-to-determine.”  
 Here is Carmen’s narrative in full: 
 
Yeah.  Sometimes it’s in the gray.  Definitely.   
Iteration 1 
A lot of times you will get a child, and I’m talking from my experience and going 
out on cases, you’ll get an outcry and then there’s a lot of inconsistency with the 
outcry. And there’s no way to match up what the child is saying to, maybe, the 
perp’s schedule.   
Iteration 2 
 Let’s say, for an instance, a case I had as a child – she outcried for sexual abuse, 
but we could never seem to put her in the same location as the AP [alleged 
perpetrator], together, alone, at any time. And the AP was a manager. The AP 
brought time schedules of when he actually went home for lunch and clocked back in 
and the child was at school, was reported at school, so every time she was absent, the 
AP was at work. I mean, there was just… We could not bring it to meet. And it’s 
things…   
Iteration 3 
 That makes it very difficult because here we are, having a child who’s verbal, not 
developmentally delayed and is giving us a full, detailed outcry. 
I:  And usually, when you have those conditions, it’s the truth. 
It’s the truth, right. 
I:  But not always.   
No, in fact when you get an outcry that good, you’re pretty excited because 
you’re just like, “We have the information.  We got it.  This is what we need.”  And 
then you go…  You go to the next step, which is, “Okay, we need to approach the 
perpetrator and the caregivers and you start trying to piece it together and it’s like 
four different puzzles trying to come together.  They don’t fit, you can’t match them 
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up.  You cannot match up the child’s outcry with the caregivers.   
I:  Well, if you can remember…  this is a case that you worked, right? 
This is a case that I worked, yeah. 
I:  Well, when you first heard the story, were you pretty convinced that they were 
sincere and telling the truth? 
Iteration 4 
 I was pretty convinced. The child was crying, full emotion, had the withdraw 
look, the body language of being tucked in, didn’t want to look at me in the face, 
which is also an indicator that she’s not telling the truth, but then, it can also be an 
indicator that she’s so embarrassed that this has happened to her, that she’s not going 
to look at me in the face. I mean, it can go both ways. People say, “Oh, she didn’t 
look you in the eyes? They’re lying.”  But what about if she’s so…  she might be 
embarrassed, self-esteem. There is a lot of gray and you have to kind of cipher it out 
and keep at it to see where you can get to maybe a clearer section. But with this 
child, we didn’t have that. We had a very clear and detailed outline of an outcry.  
When I went to the caretake…  I mean the perpetrat, alleged perpetrator, it was 
impossible that this could have happened.  I mean it looked impossible that this 
could have happened.  There’s never… 
I:  So what did you finally do? 
Well, APD [Austin Police Department] was involved, in course. APD’s involved 
with every physical abuse and every sexual abuse case we get, no matter what, 
they’re assigned. So we work very closely and jointly with APD. APD couldn’t bring 
closure to it either. They couldn’t bring a connection which validified everything that 
I was saying, that I couldn’t bring a connection to the outcry to the perpetrator. APD 
could not… They couldn’t also. I mean there was just no connection. We left that 
case “unable-to-determine,” because you don’t want to rule it out. Because we do…   
Iteration 5 
 Here that child’s given an outcry. You don’t want to “reason-to-believe” it because 
we just can’t make it fit. We have denial from the perpetrator. We have another child 
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in the home that denies everything. We have a sibling who nothing’s happened to; 
everything’s fine. And then we have a boyfriend that pops up later on in the picture 
who the victim was very angry with the perpetrator because she had kicked the 
boyfriend out one time.   
Iteration 6 
So you start…  it starts… you start questioning the outcry but it’s still, again, a 
very clear, detailed outcry. So you can’t disregard it. You can’t just blow it off the 
wayside. So what we…  I staffed it with the supervisor and it goes through other 
staffings with APD and we all came to the conclusion that this is a case we have to 
Unable To Determine it, because we don’t…  If something else happens later on, 
then we can go back to this and see…  try to see maybe we missed something. Or 
maybe something… We have new information now that can make the old one click a 
little better than it did. 
I:  Well, at the time you closed the case, how were you thinking about it at that 
point? 
Iteration 7 
 At that point, I…  When I first got the outcry, I was convinced.  I mean, it was a 
beautiful outcry. And in itself, that doesn’t sound appropriate, because… 
I: I know what you mean. 
You know what I mean, okay. But it was a clear – I guess I should use clear -- It 
was a clear outcry. No questions about it. 
I:  With detail. 
Yes, with detail and everything. So I was fully taken in. I believed the child. I 
believed the child a hundred percent and I was there to support her and protect her 
and make sure that this was not going to happen to her again. And then as I couldn’t 
piece it together, I started having more doubts about the outcry. The outcry didn’t 
change, though. She didn’t change her outcry, and she was already above the age to 
do a video, so there was a written statement. The written statement that APD 
received was the same statement that I had verbally gotten from the child, so she 
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wasn’t changing her story. We just couldn’t… The perpetrator was gone the majority 
of the time because he had an ill father, so he was never in the home. 
I:  What was…  Did you interview him? 
I interviewed him. 
I:  What was his demeanor like? 
Very, very appropriate. Looked me in the eye, had full box body to me at all 
times, cooperated with anything that we asked him to do, cooperated with APD. I 
mean, wasn’t hiding anything. We asked for time sheets because I wanted to see if at 
any time was this man home when this child maybe skipped school, or was saying 
she was home when this man was home. And he brought in documentation, no 
problems at all.  I mean we just couldn’t get it […] 
I:  Well… 
I mean so, it made me have doubts about the outcry and when this boyfriend 
popped up couple of weeks later and she was very upset that the perpetrator had 
kicked the boyfriend out, had changed the locks, ‘cause she had given the boyfriend 
a key to get in the house whenever the parents were gone… 
I:  I don’t see the significance of that.  May… what… 
Well, that she was upset at this man for being…  for kicking her boyfriend out 
that she was trying to get back at him, to get him out of the house. This was not the 
biological father. 
I:  All right. 
So, you know, then we started looking at was this a revengeful act? 
I:  So it created a possible motive. 
Right, for it being a false outcry. And which happens. I mean, that’s not unheard 
of. We get those a lot. We get a lot of referrals that are custody battles and they want 
more fire for the fight, more fire for the court case. We get a lot of, you know, “She 
stole my boyfriend away, I’m going to call in on this one.”  We get a lot of those 
type of calls. But again, when look at that case, when we get it, the first thing we do 
is we…  everything we read, we have to assume that this is all happening, so we go 
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out there with the right frame of mind to protect…  at any costs that we have to 
protect the children. 
I:  Well, this is the kind of case I’m most interested in, because this is where your 
decision making abilities really come into play. When you have all the physical 
evidence, and confessions, that’s easy, of course. And the obviously made up things, 
those are easy, as well. But those that you have to wrestle with.. 
Right. Back and forth, back and forth. 
 
 The discovery of the alleged victim’s motive to be angry with her stepfather and to 
fabricate an allegation against him would, for other investigators, I think, have been 
sufficient reason to reach a finding of “ruled out.” Carmen, however, does not find that it 
settled the matter or proved that the child had lied. She says only that it made her 
“question” and have “doubts” about the outcry that she had first found so believable. In 
fact, Carmen several times in the narrative describes the investigation outcome in terms 
of its failure to reach a satisfactory conclusion: “no way to match it up,” “could not bring 
it to meet,” “couldn’t bring connection,” “can’t make it fit,” “couldn’t piece it together.” 
The revelation of the child’s apparent motive does not overcome what is to Carmen the 
essentially negative, unsuccessful character of the investigation. She ends with an 
admission that some child abuse allegations are malicious, motivated by a desire to gain 
traction in a custody fight, or pay someone back for stealing a boyfriend or girlfriend.  
“We get a lot of those type of calls,” Carmen says, but she stops just short of saying that 
this was one of them. It could be; it seems to be. But a final, definite classification is 
withheld. Moreover, the revelation is curiously delayed in the narrative, appearing only 
after several references to the investigation’s inability to validate the “beautiful” outcry. 
It comes more as an afterthought than a dénouement.   
 Carmen’s narrative is divisible into seven “iterations,” I shall call them, which gives 
its structure a stop-and-start quality. Each iteration contains a restatement of the basic 
dilemma ─ that the outcry gave every appearance of being true, but could not be proven. 
The narrative seems reluctant to move beyond that starting point and returns to it several 
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times, like a rock rolling back to the bottom of a hill after being pushed part of the way 
up. Each iteration adds a bit more of the plot. Only in the seventh, and longest, are we 
given the entire story, with the beauty of the outcry, the stepfather’s unbreakable alibi, 
his own appearance of truthfulness, and the significance of his having kept the child’s 
boyfriend away.   
 If we look for Labov’s formal properties in the narrative (1967), we find that abstract 
is clearly present; in fact, it is the seven repetitions of it that mark the beginning of each 
iteration. We are given little, however, in the way of orientation.  Carmen does not say 
when the investigation happened. She tells us nothing about the setting. She does give 
physical description of the characters, but as witnesses, not as persons. She describes 
how they looked giving testimony, but says nothing about their ages, races, or 
personality characteristics. This lack of visual and representational material gives the 
narrative a certain abstraction and starkness, a clinical, rather than anecdotal feel. The 
main complicating action is the failed effort to verify the child’s allegation, and 
description of that effort is built up through the iterations.   
 We find evaluation throughout the narrative. Carmen characterizes the child’s outcry 
as “good,” “clear,” and “beautiful,” one that she was “excited” by. She also evaluates the 
stepfather’s testimony as “very, very appropriate.” It is just as persuasive and technically 
sound as the child’s. There is comparatively less evaluation of the case as whole. 
Beyond portraying it as a failure to match the outcry to the other evidence in the case, 
she has little to say about it. The story seems to have no particular moral for Carmen, 
even as a failure, beyond the fact that some cases are like that. 
 I have remarked already on the narrative’s apparent lack of resolution. The discovery 
of the child’s motive to make a false allegation, despite its potential to supply closure, is 
not permitted to do so. This process narrative, through Carmen’s apparent reluctance to 
regard the case as closed, refuses to furnish the truth reward that we generally expect of 
the genre, just as it holds back the amenities of visual imagery and emotional cueing. In 
fact, with its constant falling back to the abstract, the narrative seems unwilling to 
develop as a narrative at all, and does so only partially.  
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 A significant element of the investigator identity is discovery of, and advocacy for, 
the truth. Investigators are expected to present narratives that reflect wholly and without 
distortion the events of the case fabulas. To the extent that inferential linkages are 
necessary, of motivation, for instance, they, too, are expected to be the “real” 
motivations of the persons involved, or would be proven such were it possible to verify 
them in some objective way.   
 Epistemologists distinguish between coherence and correspondence theories of the 
truth (Schmitt, 1995). Coherence theories locate truth in the mind of a believing subject 
and derive from coherence among a set of propositions, sense data, or pieces of 
evidence. The greater the coherence, the stronger the belief one has in the emergent 
truth. Correspondence theories see truth as a relationship between a set of propositions 
and a state of affairs in the world. The stronger the correspondence, the more justified 
one’s belief in the proposition set. Some version of the coherence theory would be 
adequate for investigation. In their day-to-day practice, investigators justify their 
judgments about cases by seeking and asserting coherence among the pieces of 
testimonial, physical, documentary, and demonstrative evidence they collect. Even so, 
investigators, almost of necessity, embrace a correspondence theory of truth, seeing it 
not as a feature of their own belief processes, but as a univocal relationship between 
their belief and “what happened.” Only that kind of truth, in their minds, justifies taking 
action that separates a child from its parents, perhaps permanently, that labels a person 
as an abuser and subjects him or her to prosecution, or, conversely, that leaves children 
in an environment where they have previously been harmed and may well be harmed 
again. (This belief, though not adopted pragmatically, may nonetheless foster greater 
decision-making accuracy. Stasser and Stewart (1992) found that groups who are asked 
to solve a problem perform better at a judgment task than groups, given the same task, 
asked to render a “most likely” judgment.)  Hammond, too (1996), applies the concepts 
of coherence and correspondence to the cognitive continuum. Correspondence, or 
accuracy of judgment, is the general aim of intuition, whereas validity and reliability of 
process is the general aim of analysis. For Carmen and other investigators, no decision 
127 
making process can have value independent of the outcomes it engenders.  
 Carmen, in her narrative, repeatedly laments the lack of coherence in her evidence, 
the mismatch between the alleged victim’s outcry and the tightness of the alleged 
perpetrator’s alibi. For a thoroughgoing coherentist, however, the coherence of the 
evidence against the outcry, including the alibi and the revelation of the child’s motive 
to lie, would be seen as warranting a final judgment that it was, in all likelihood, not 
true.  Carmen does not make this judgment. The lack of coherence obscures what is to 
her a real event. Either the stepfather did sexually abuse the child and managed to cover 
it up through false documentation and skillful lying, or the child, with equal skill and 
preparation, made an elaborate false report. Neither the process narrative nor the fact 
narrative could determine which of these happened, and the truth could not be found. 
Because of conflicting evidence, the investigation failed. 
 To some degree, investigators are conscious of the paradox of trying to realize 
objective truth through the medium of subjective perception and judgment. They realize 
that personal and cultural beliefs related to class, gender, age, ethnicity, religion, and a 
host of other factors can affect they way they perceive the facts in a given case. They 
work to maintain what White and Quinn (1988) call internal independence, a separation 
of their decision making from their potentially biasing attitudes, by, first, trying to 
become increasingly aware of their specific characters, and, second, minimizing their 
power to exert influence by gathering more and more evidence, testing and rethinking 
evidence already collected, and conferring with other workers. Even if it were possible, 
though, like Galahad, to purify oneself enough to be able to perceive the truth, one is till 
up against the brute unyieldingness of historical reality. The evidence is never truly 
complete and clear.  There exists in every case a larger or smaller core of 
unintelligibility. Investigators have to recognize both the absolute obligation to bring out 
the truth and the absolute limitation on their ability to do it. I believe the hesitations, 
delays, and omissions in Carmen’s investigative narrative reflect her consciousness of 
that obligation and that limitation. 
 Pennington and Hastie’s work shows that narrative construction proceeds by 
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inference. In fact, its utility as a means of organizing information derives from its ability 
to make large numbers of quick inferential links. We see several inferences in Carmen’s 
story. Among them: 
• In the past, children who described having been abused with visible emotion, 
who looked withdrawn, and who displayed fearful body language were nearly 
always proved to be telling the truth. The child in this case showed that 
demeanor. She was therefore very likely to be telling the truth. 
• Men who abuse one child in the home often abuse the others. The second child in 
this home denied having been abused. Therefore the likelihood of his having 
abused the first child was reduced. 
• An alleged perpetrator who cooperates fully with the investigation and has 
documents purporting to show he was elsewhere when the abuse is supposed to 
have occurred is unlikely to be guilty. The stepfather behaved in this way.  
Therefore he is unlikely to be guilty. 
 These inferences, though they lead to opposite conclusions, are sound in and of 
themselves. As evidence is collected in an investigation, however, many inferences offer 
themselves, as alternative versions of the fact narrative drift in and out potentiality. 
When Carmen first heard the child’s outcry a candidate for the fact narrative took shape 
in her mind, a narrative in which the child was being truthful and the stepfather had 
snuck home to do what she claimed he did. This narrative lost its forcefulness and 
momentum when the stepfather answered the charges forthrightly and established a solid 
alibi. A second narrative takes the place of the first; it is one in which the child, angry at 
her boyfriend being locked out of the house, makes up a story about having been abused 
and tells it convincingly. Carmen permits neither of these scenarios, however, to become 
the fact narrative. That of the stepfather’s guilt is rejected for lack of supporting 
evidence. That of the child’s malicious reporting does have supporting evidence, but 
would require making this inference: 
 However believable a person may be, if other evidence contradicts her story and if 
she has an identifiable motive to lie, she must be lying. This child’s story is 
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contradicted and she does have a motive to lie. Therefore she is lying. 
 Carmen will not make this inference. The child’s outcry remains compelling, despite 
the evidence against it. The possibility remains that the stepfather is lying, not her, and 
that his documentation is less complete or less authentic than it appears to be. Disdaining 
the inference, however, means disdaining the story that it makes possible, and there is no 
third story to take its place.   
 What I am suggesting is that concern for the accuracy of the fact narrative, a 
necessary aspect of one’s identity as an investigator, demands the exercise of an 
executive function within the narrative construction process that polices the constituent 
inferences. It consists of a series of logical, experiential, evidentiary, and common sense 
filters that prevent the establishment of faulty case narratives, however compelling they 
may otherwise be. Conscientious habitation of the investigator role therefore means 
resisting the momentum and the satisfactions of narrative at times, in favor of inferential 
accuracy, and at the price of continuing, even permanent uncertainty.  
 Carmen’s process narrative, I believe, demonstrates this resistance to narrative. It 
seems to reenact the “back and forth, back and forth” deliberations of the case narrative 
construction, restating seven times the essential dilemma as though reluctant to go 
beyond it, reluctant, at first, even to broach the revelation of motive, with its false 
promise of resolution. Eventually, in the fifth iteration, the motive to lie appears, and its 
possible significance is given in the seventh. In the end, however, that significance, once 
again recognized and considered, is once again not accepted as being anything more than 
possible.  Carmen goes on not knowing.    
 The process narrative, though we hear it in present time, is largely formed during the 
investigation, side by side with the fact narrative. It reflects the project of the 
investigator guiding the construction of the fact narrative, into which, paradoxically, it is 
constantly trying to submerge itself, in the vain hope that the facts will “speak for 
themselves,” that the evidence, rather than the investigator, may bear and discharge the 
burden of uncertainty. The process narrative, however, cannot resign its primacy, since 
only through it does the fact narrative come into being.  It conscientiously retains the 
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uncertainty it would so like to shed, to keep the fact narrative from charging into a too-
easy truth. Carmen has, in essence, installed what Hogarth (2001) calls a circuit-breaker, 
a process that interrupts the handling of a judgment in the tacit learning system and 
moves it into conscious deliberation. With each iteration she halted the coherence-
making momentum of explanatory narrative, and applied to it an evaluative, if 
vacillating and ineffectual consciousness. 
 For Ochs and Capps (2001), it is unnecessary to invoke Carmen’s training or 
philosophy to account for her hesitation at the doorway of narrative understanding. They 
contend that all personal narratives display simultaneous “yearning for coherence and … 
yearning for authenticity” and that the attainment of storied personal meaning is always 
balanced against a felt obligation to do “justice to life’s complexities” (p. 24). In 
Spence’s terms (1982), the desire to achieve historical truth along with narrative truth 
drives all storytelling whatsoever. But just as intuitive and systematic thinking form a 
continuum and are always present in judgment to some degree, so to are these 
simultaneous impulses toward coherence and authenticity. Individual stories can display 
a great deal more of one than the other. Individual storytellers can prize one above the 
other as goals, and I believe we have seen such difference among the participants in this 
study. My contention is that Carmen, precisely because of her training and her 
philosophy, made authenticity the main goal of her story. In doing so she made the story 
itself rather a sad one that wanders in circles without ever finding the historical truth for 
which it was made to sacrifice all the beauty and pleasure of coherence. That, however, 
is authenticity’s price. It is costly in terms of preparation, labor, and discipline, and often 
takes some luck beyond that. In any given case one is apt to come up short.  
 
Risk Assessment, System, and Moral Agency 
 
 The nature and development of linear models to help caseworkers assess risk was 
described in Chapter II. Texas has had a series of risk assessment tools (Baumann, 
2002). The first was the Child at Risk Field (CARF), which was a somewhat 
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cumbersome consensual model based that assessed five “forces:” child, parent, family, 
maltreatment, and intervention. The CARF model was made more efficient with the 
Structured Model for Assessment of Risk in Texas (SMART), implemented in 1993. 
These were followed by actuarial models. Beginning in 1999 CPS in Texas used the 
Intranet Assessment Tool (IRA), the version of which was current when I conducted my 
interviews called for workers to “answer questions and document their level of concern 
for each of the following areas: 
• Child Vulnerability. Child fragility (age, special needs), child behavior (difficult or 
provoking), and any protective capacities the family has that may mitigate risk; 
• Caregiver Capability. Parent’s knowledge, skills, and capacity to parent; 
• Quality of Care. The quality of the connection between parent and child and the 
quality of physical and emotional care the parent provides; 
• Pattern of Maltreatment. Severity and pattern of injuries and history of prior 
abuse/neglect; 
• Home Environment. Stressors on the family and danger or hazards in the home; 
• Social Environment. Degree of isolation, quality of parent’s social relationships, 
domestic violence, and criminal history; and 
• Response to CPS. Attitude (motivation, hostility, cooperation, minimization of 
risk, or unrealistic attitudes about change) and deception (denial of risk or 
withholding important information). (Texas Department of Protective and 
Regulatory Services, 2002). 
 Most of the participants in this study had mixed feelings about the IRA. A smaller 
number, mostly supervisors and administrators, were strongly positive. Two 
investigators were strongly negative. Investigators who thought the IRA was at least 
somewhat useful saw as its main benefit the assistance it provides to intuitive 
investigation and casework. They recognize that it is difficult, if not impossible, to 
remember to ask questions about each area of possible concern, and the IRA can serve as 
a kind of interview checklist. As Jennifer, a Program Director, puts it, “It really brings to 
the front what you need to be checking all the time.” And Wanda, who, like other 
132 
experienced investigators in this study and others (England, 1994; Gamble, 1994), 
generally dislikes the tool because she finds it superfluous and time-consuming, says she 
wishes she had it when she was new to the job. It’s easy for beginners, she says, to forget 
what questions to ask.  
     Some find that IRA can make an investigator aware of a risk that he or she has failed 
to notice. Sarah, a supervisor says she was helping some of her investigators catch up on 
their paperwork and completed the IRA on several cases: 
 
There were a couple,” she says, “that looked like they were going to be ‘rule out,’ 
but once I started doing the IRA, started thinking about all those other things in 
there, I thought, you know, I’m not comfortable with that… now. And I think we 
need to open it up for services.  
 
 This, of course, would be music to the ears of the IRA’s designers. They would also 
be gratified by the experience of Gretchen, an experienced investigator, who says the 
IRA has helped her identify risks she vaguely perceived in a child’s environment, but 
could not quite put her finger on. She says, “When it came out it really helped clarify 
what some people, you know, what that gut instinct is telling you.”  She goes on to say 
that once she has reached a decision that removal or court-ordered services are 
necessary, her scoring of the IRA for that family can help persuade higher-ups to 
approve the intervention. 
 Those investigators in this study who have mostly or only negative opinions of the 
IRA do not offer the objections some researchers have, that such instruments are based 
on insufficient data, fallaciously judge future likelihood of abuse on past incidence 
(Wald & Woolverton, 1990), show poor inter-rater reliability (Baird, 1997), are not well-
grounded in empirical research (DePanfils and Scannapeico, 1994), have largely 
untested validity, and correlate poorly with clinical findings (Kolko, 1998). Nor do their 
reservations seem rooted in the threat of technological unemployment, theoretical 
identification, or computer phobia, three of seven factors that Meehl (1986) identified as 
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causing suspicion among clinicians of linear models generally. Four other of Meehl’s 
resistance factors do seem to account, however, for the negativity some CPS 
investigators feel toward the IRA. The first is ignorance, a simple lack of knowledge of 
the research demonstrating the value of linear models. The second and third factors, a 
sense that linear models have a dehumanizing flavor and that they violate social work or 
personal ethics, overlap one another. Melissa, the investigator who was dissatisfied with 
the SIDS determination in her infant death case, says the IRA is “too standard.” It 
assumes that all cases can be categorized according to a set of “rules,” and Melissa 
resents this denial of each family’s uniqueness. “On this job,” she says, “no case is the 
same.” Helen, unlike Meslissa, has many years’ experience, but her objection is similar. 
She dislikes the way the IRA looks only at the problems and shortcomings parents have. 
“I really don’t like it,” she says, “because I believe, personally – I’ve always believed 
this – you can find something positive about everybody… And I feel like the risk 
assessment aims more at negative.” Helen says she finds herself typing the positives she 
sees in a parent into comment fields, to try and redress what she sees as the IRA’s 
deficiencies. In so doing, Helen is in agreement with risk assessment tool developers in 
some states who have increasingly incorporated relevant factors that offset identified 
risks (Schene, 1996; Grayson and McNulty, 1999).  
 The last of Meehl’s factors relevant to participants’ dissatisfaction with the IRA is 
the one most cited by those who had any negative feelings toward it. It has to do with 
self-concept. Pauline, former investigator, supervisor, and trainer states the essence of 
this objection clearly: 
 
There’s a sense of… I don’t really want to say arrogance, but it’s… but it sort of is.  
It… there’s this… there’s this feeling of, “I know what I’m doing.  I know a lot… I 
know better what’s going on out here in the field than the researchers know what’s 
going.  So just let, let me operate as the island that I am and go do my business.”  
And I think that they… that they don’t stop and think, “Well, what does the research 
say?  And maybe I don’t know everything.  Maybe it’s okay to let my guard down 
134 
and learn something new.”  And I think that our caseworkers don’t have the… the 
confidence to sit back and say, “I don’t know.” 
 
 Carmen, a supervisor, says that knowledge of what questions to ask to identify risk is 
“already inside of me.” New workers, however, since they do not have the questions 
already inside them, must rely on “a little list.” Carmen says that for them to become 
fully competent the workers have to be weaned away from their lists; if they rely on it 
exclusively they will miss “those hidden answers and that hidden evidence and that 
hidden information.” 
 Leo, a long-time investigator, agrees:  
 
When I’m assessing a case I’ve already asked, thought through most of the 
questions, and if I’ve got yeses, I know what I’m doing. I don’t need to sit down in 
front of that tool and click yes and say, “Oh, I’ve got 12 yeses; I’d better take that to 
the supervisor.”  
 
 Leo believes competent investigators have a “certain ability to kind of… um… 
connect with people and… um… get a sense of what’s going on… um… without 
following a form that says, “Ask this question first; ask this question next.” 
 Leo believes CPS may find some benefit in making all caseworkers, many of whom 
had been doing inadequate work, fill out the form, as a way of showing those who 
evaluate the program that conscientious risk assessment is being done in every case, but 
feels that it provides no help to him personally. Wanda, who wishes she’d had the IRA 
as a new investigator, now finds it burdensome:  
 
I ask those questions while I’m going along. I don’t need to stop and see it on a 
computer. I don’t need to stop and write it down to know what the risk is. I already 
know what it’s going to ask me. I mean, I know all of us have it… pretty much 
memorized, you know. It’s pretty monotonous… 
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 March (1994, 1997) has set out a theory of rule-based decision making, which seems 
very apt for describing decision making in CPS. According to the theory, persons in 
organizations make decisions by recognizing a situation as being of a certain type and 
then applying to it both the rules relevant to the situation and their identities, as persons 
and as members or the organization. “Identity” here seems to be equivalent to Meehl’s 
“self-concept.” Identity is forged, according to Zhou (1997), an exponent of March’s 
theory, through a process of socialization, whereby a set of meanings become associated 
with a given role. New members of organizations feel a natural anxiety at not being able 
yet to perform the tasks for which they have been recruited. They want to achieve 
successful performance as soon as possible and leave behind the stressful state of mental 
map construction and move along the cognitive continuum toward the ability to 
categorize quickly and work efficiently, eagerly swapping adventure for routine. They 
therefore want all the training, mentoring, and hands-on experience they can get. Once 
these measures begin to provide a sense of being up to the job, once the organization’s 
new members find themselves able to make jokes using the jargon, perform tasks with 
ease and confidence they could at one time only accomplish with detailed instruction and 
assistance, anxiety subsides, and a gratifying sense of competence fills in behind. At that 
point they can identify fully with their role. The master carpenter does carpentry, and 
makes the judgments necessary to its tasks, simply by being a carpenter.   
 For many CPS investigators, the IRA seems to constitute a challenge to their hard-
won feeling of competence and their identities as investigators. The instrument seems to 
say to them, “You are not capable of knowing risk when you see it. We don’t trust your 
experience or your perceptions, and you shouldn’t either.” Some investigators reject this 
perceived message, and the IRA along with it. 
 Another important source of dissatisfaction with linear models has been identified by 
Sheets (1996), who helped implement various technological innovations in training, risk 
assessment, and documentation for CPS in Texas. His experience taught him that 
investigators and supervisors have a strong need to grasp the wholeness of a case and 
136 
that risk assessment tools tend to prevent that as they reduce case information to 
fragments. Only when, in training, the importance of case narrative was emphasized did 
investigators feel able to understand a family’s situation fully. “Somehow, the act of 
experiencing a family’s situation through the device of the case narrative helps a 
supervisor to know a family in a way that the risk factors alone cannot” (Sheets, 1996, p. 
11). Narrative comprehension, this would suggest, not only cannot be dispensed with, it 
remains the primary way investigators and supervisors arrive at a sense of understanding 
in a case, however much that understanding may be enhanced, transformed, verified, or 
even contradicted by analysis.  
 Sarbin (1986) has pointed out that reliance on narrative comprehension is made 
necessary partly by the inherent limitations of linear models. The most an instrument 
like the IRA can produce, after one tosses in the answers to its various questions and 
flips the switch, is an estimation of the likelihood of a future occurrence. It could say, for 
example, that in a particular family there was a greater than 60% chance of future abuse 
or neglect. How, Sarbin asks, can an investigator make use of such information? Even 
supposing the assessment were accurate, to oblige all families with similar scores to 
submit to the discipline of services and monitoring would be unjust for the sizeable 
minority whose attributes falsely categorized them as potentially abusive. The 
scrupulous human judge rejects the probability estimation as irrelevant to the immediate 
case and adopts instead an approach that treats the case as unique. And the natural way 
of comprehending the case, in its wholeness and uniqueness, Sarbin argues, is as a 
narrative. Narrative is an extraordinarily powerful organizing principle, allowing the 
lived experience of others and of oneself to assume a comprehensible order. 
 There is a paradox here, of course, in that narrative must have a certain culturally and 
cognitively determined structure, must array its elements in a certain order, must, in 
other words, be typical enough of narrative discourse generally in order to be a narrative 
and become eligible, in turn, for the capturing of its subject’s uniqueness. This 
requirement that a narrative have both typicality and uniqueness is discussed by Bruner 
(1991) using the terms canonicity and breach. “To be worth telling,” Bruner points out, “ 
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a tale must be about how an implicit canonical script has been breached, violated, or 
deviated from” (1991, p. 11). The uniqueness of a particular case, a particular family or 
child, receives expression via such breach of the usual, which instruments like the IRA, 
which derive their predictive power from admitting of the usual only, never permit.  
 The general tendency for the CPS decision-making process, with its detailed, highly 
prescriptive policies and its layers of review, to move both cases and investigators away 
from intuitive forms of case comprehension toward more analytic ones makes it function 
somewhat like a linear model itself. Like a linear model, the agency seeks to de-
emphasize case characteristics that do not fit it into established categories and to 
minimize the impact of individual judgment on final decisions. We can see how this 
works in practice as Jennifer, a regional administrator, and Carmen, a supervisor, 
describe how they manage the investigations being conducted by people under them. 
 Here is Jennifer: 
 
 We had… some… previous workers who were going to school here who we hired 
temporary part-time last summer. And one of them… would interview the family 
members, and then make a decision. And I guess that’s how she had done it in the 
other region where she came from. And it’s like, “Well, why do believe what they 
said? You know, people lie to us all the time. Every day.” And she was just like, 
“Well, because they said that, and I looked at him and he looked good.” It’s like, 
“Well… [laughs]  I need more.  I need a minimum of two collaterals.” You know, 
“Call the school. See how he does in school. You know. Just cause you said he looks 
good and they said he had a good report card, good attendance, that doesn’t mean 
that he did. And, you know, you can support… begin to support what they told you, 
or not. Um… but you have to look deeper than just what you’re… face value and 
what you’re told. And be willing to do that.” And she would get mad that… we 
would make her do that. She felt like she knew what was going on.  But based on 
what? You know, that…that…  that part just wasn’t there. 
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 Jennifer’s insistence on “at least two collaterals” can only seem arbitrary, 
unnecessary, context-blind, and plain stupid to one who felt she already knew what was 
going on. Why, the temporary worker no doubt wondered, should I intrude upon two 
more persons whose information has no likelihood whatever of altering the complexion 
of the case, when there are so many useful interviews waiting to be done? To satisfy an 
abstract, even mechanical, requirement of thoroughness? Only a bureaucrat could see 
that as real justification. 
 Carmen says she imposes similar standards of thoroughness in order to meet 
demands for justification made by those above her in the decision-making hierarchy: 
 
When I’m leading a case and I think that an extra collateral should be called, I will 
be real quick to reject it and send it back, where as a worker, I’m like, “One 
collateral’s enough,” you know, “That was enough information.” But now that I 
know policy and procedure, I have to follow it a lot more closely than I did as a 
worker, not saying that I, you know, skimmed around and didn’t do my job, but as… 
as supervisor you’re responsible for several cases, not just your own, when you… 
like as if you were a worker. And… um…I… I catch myself reading these cases and 
saying, “You know, I need a little bit more.  I need a little bit more.” And so… um… 
I’m a little bit more picky as a supervisor than as a worker. 
For example, let’s say we have a… a… a case that’s “ruled out”, which means 
there’s… the worker, the investigator found no abuse, no neglect. Um… although 
there…  the chil…I’m reading the… I’m reading the investigation… in the child’s 
interview, there is… um… maybe some little questions of she didn’t have good eye 
contact, she was kinda slumpy, or she was a little bit ash… she was a little shy, she 
didn’t want to answer questions about Mom but she answered questions about Dad, 
but yet she made no outcry. So of course, when…. and there was no physical injury 
so we’re going to rule it out. 
…Where the… and the worker’s out there, it’s like, “Oh!  No outcry. No 
physical injury.” You know? “That’s okay… we talked to Mom, denied it; talked to 
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Dad, denied it. School’s never seen any injuries. Let’s close the case.” And when I’m 
reading it, I pick up on those little things that, you know, “Well, let’s call a 
neighbor.” And a neighbor might tell us she hears screaming, or she might see the 
little girl never is outside playing. I mean, a neighbor could tell us, maybe, things 
that a teacher won’t tell us. Because the teacher’s not there, she doesn’t see when 
they come home, she doesn’t know their daily routine at home.  So… um… I would 
look at the case and say, “You know what? Let’s just talk to the neighbor, just to 
validify that rule-out this much more. Because if it goes to casereading, there might 
be a little bit of question. And it’s just… not only for the child’s safety, but it’s also 
for…to protect the worker, to say you did everything you possibly could do to come 
up with that decision as a rule-out. 
… I don’t want to get in trouble.  I don’t want this to come back and bite me, so I 
want to make sure all my t’s are crossed and all my i’s are dotted.  And as a 
supervisor now I want to make sure that… it’s like almost protecting the workers as 
well, kind of baby them and make sure that, hey, you know, I’ve been through this. I 
know when a case can come back and bite you, and I don’t want my workers to go 
through that, even though it’s inevitable and sometimes it’s gonna happen and 
there’s nothing you can do about it… um… I want to try to minimalize that as much 
as I possibly can. 
 
 Carmen candidly admits here that a desire to protect herself and her investigators 
from blame is part of what motivates her to demand a thorough investigation. One can 
easily imagine how, for supervisors who have been called on the carpet too many times, 
“protect the unprotected” could become a less important goal than “cover your ass.” And 
it is that very separation of client outcome from investigation process, the mindless rule-
making and rule-following, regardless of the impact on both investigators and those 
being investigated, that causes some participants in this study, and other CPS staff 
members participants talk about, to have the same misgivings about their bureaucracy as 
a whole as they do about the IRA.  
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 The participant who seemed to be troubled most by what Donzelot (1980), Lasch 
(1977), and others have characterized as the forced subjugation of child rearing and 
family relations generally to state power and professional expertise is Helen. Helen is 
African-American and has spent more time doing CPS investigation, eight and a half 
years, than anyone else in the study. Early in our first interview she lamented the fact 
that some of her co-workers with less experience had not yet learned that in order to be a 
fair judge of a family’s behavior they must “go down to their level and work with them 
from there”:  
 
Some things now, as me being in it for so long, some things that they look at as, “Oh, 
that’s terrible,” to me, it’s more like that’s just a cultural… thing, or that’s, you 
know, I grew up like that, so if it was not… if it didn’t kill me, then… you know.  
It’s a lot a lot of people have to learn that it’s… a lot of things that go on in this job 
is cultural.  You have to know the different cultures and the things that go on with 
them.  Plus you have to understand that, that’s just the everyday life for some of 
these kids.  And some of people haven’t learned that. 
 
 Helen made clear in our second interview that for her the term “culture” included 
differences based on race. Several times up to that point she had emphasized the 
importance of investigators “leaving their values at the door” when they did their 
investigations. I asked her if she thought doing that was more difficult for some 
investigators than others. She replied: 
 
 Yeah, cause a lot of things with that is, um… a lot of it also runs in your culture, how 
you were… Like me being in the Black culture, I know that this is the way some of 
us just live. You know, this is just part of our culture. But coming from another… 
like a Caucasian coming and looking at the Black situation, it’s more like “No, that’s 
abuse and neglect; you can’ do that.” But that’s just the way we live. 
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 At another point she elaborates:  
 
I think you have to be able to, like I said, put your values to the side, be able to… 
understand where people are at. Um… an example I use a lot of times for the people 
I investigate, cause they got this big thing with drugs going on, because you use 
drugs doesn’t mean you’re not a good mother, or you’re not a good father. Because 
there’s a lot of people out there that use drugs that are better parents than I am. And 
so I try to get them to understand is just because they’re in a situation does not mean 
that they can’t be helped… to become a better parent. So, I think [one thing is] you 
can’t be… you can’t expect to run it like you would run your own house. That’s what 
I’m try… You have to be… kind of go 50-50 percent person, be able to see both 
sides, you know. Um… you just can’t… just see… um… I mean, can you… You 
can’t just say, “Okay, she’s a crack-head mother. She ain’t never going to be 
nothing.  Remove her kids.” You know. And that’s not true, you know. So… you got 
to be able to see, like I always say, something good… something positive, that 
she’s… it’s going to be a strength somewhere. She might be a crack-head mother, 
but her kids are fed, they’re clean, they’re everything. So you have to be able to look 
on both sides.   
 
 Helen seems to find herself at odds with a system that classifies persons as abusive 
or neglectful based on criteria that may have little to do with their child rearing and 
much to do with their poverty, powerlessness, and minority status. As we saw earlier, 
her suspicion of such categorization, along with the insufficiency of its recognition of 
compensating strengths, makes her wary of the IRA. One might wonder why, given her 
objections to what she perceives as a pervasive bias in CPS, she continues to work for it. 
There are no doubt practical considerations, but the reason she offers for staying is the 
same as that of others who, in different and milder ways, are also have reservations 
about the agency’s power and the way it sometimes exercises it. “I guess,” she says, “it’s 
my passion for kids is what keeps me going.” Helen feels that her obligation to protect 
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children justifies the intrusion, judgment, and even suffering she must inflict on families 
when she investigates and sometimes separates them. Her first career goal had been to 
become a nurse and work with newborns, the children most in need of protection. As an 
investigator she seems not to question that protecting vulnerable children is the main 
thing she does, even though, at the same time, she would like to protect to their parents 
as well, from a system too quick to label people it does not understand as unfit. Unique 
among the participants in this study, Helen expresses feelings of kinship with the 
parents. She feels she is one of them, partly out race and class identification and partly 
because she is also a parent: 
 
The families that we deal with are just like me and… I always… like I always tell 
‘em, “I could be in the same shoes as you in any day.”  Nothing makes me higher 
than you, so I’ve learned to come down and realized that we’re still all the same, no 
matter what.  And I think this made into a spot when I had my child.  When I didn’t 
have kids it was like, “Oh, how bad for them to do this to a kid.  How terrible.”  But 
once I had my own and I realized how hard parenting was, and some of the situations 
that can happen to where it gets you to that point, then I started saying, “Well, you 
know, I can see how that can… how that can happen,” or, “I can see how they may 
have done this.” 
 
 Sarah, the supervisor with the broken leg case, has also had conflicted feelings about 
the judgmental, invasive character of CPS investigation: 
 
 I can remember when I was a brand new caseworker… um… that feeling of going 
out and feeling that, one, who am I to say… to tell somebody else how to take care 
of their kids? That I don’t want to be intrusive. You know, grew up in a pretty… 
uh… right-wing conservative family, where… very Republican, where government 
wasn’t… I mean, we weren’t like the Republic of Texas, but I’m saying my dad was 
like, you know, “The family is a unit and they are to govern themselves.” You know, 
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that self-…um…whatever you call it. Anyway, um… So that was hard getting out of 
[this house], and I’m… I’m over here in this going towards the left, and…. and I’m 
coming in as supposedly, quote, an authority figure, and I had to keep reminding 
myself – and I think they do the same thing; it’s sort of like, “Ohhh…” – um… is 
that, I’m here for the kids. And that’s why… I’m telling you how to raise your kids. 
That’s why I’m telling you what you’re doing isn’t right: because the kids don’t have 
a voice. So getting them… to separate out and say, “Your job is to protect the kids. 
Parents are going to get mad at you. Grandparents are going to call and tell you 
things. People are going to be mad… and… “Who are you to come in and tell… you 
know…”  That’s my job. And to always remember that every time you knock on the 
door, don’t be… don’t let your fear of all that other stuff get in the way. I mean, 
that’s just so important, and I think that’s where – oops – that’s where… I try to 
work with them, and… when they start saying, “You know, I was really…” Well, 
but why are we here?  Well, we’re here to make sure the kids are safe. 
 
 Sarah characterizes as politically conservative the belief that family life should not 
be subject to state control, and characterizes her own acceptance of the right of 
government to regulate, or at least set limits, to the way people raise their children, as a 
movement to the left. One is tempted, of course, to see it as an evolution of a different 
sort and to interpret her statement “kids don’t have a voice” as a representation of her 
own childhood. Sarah has gotten her voice now, and takes pleasure in using it against 
angry parents and grandparents on behalf silenced children. She wants her investigators 
to likewise become bold, to overcome their fear of asserting themselves and of talking 
back. She seems to see herself and her investigators acting as much against authority as 
on its behalf. And the authority she does exercise, which she characterizes as “very 
sacred,” is legitimized wholly by the plight of abused and neglected children, for which 
life has prepared her to empathize, not by the law and the coercive might at its disposal. 
 The acquisition of confidence and assertiveness with work experience would be a 
predictable course of development in any job, especially in a first job out of college, 
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which CPS investigation often is. An increasing sense of the adequacy of one’s mental 
map of the investigative landscape and increasing faith in one’s ability to negotiate the 
hazards marked on it build confidence in and of themselves. Pauline, the policy maker 
who has been an investigator, supervisor, and trainer believes she became more assertive 
simply by maturing. Yet she, too, feels that, during her time in the field, almost despite 
her growing consciousness of strength, her ability to assert herself had to derive from her 
mission to protect children: 
 
I didn’t feel like it was about me.  It felt like it was about the kids.  And it’s easier for 
me – I mean, just my personality makeup – it’s easier for me to advocate for others 
than it is to advocate for myself.  I’ve always been like that. 
 
 Wanda, who is still in her early twenties and who has been an investigator for a year 
and a half, describes a similar complex of relationships among experience, power, 
assertiveness, and advocacy. She was summoned to testify in court after having been on 
the job only six months. The case involved a custody dispute. A father was trying to get 
the mother’s share of it terminated on the grounds that she did not take proper care of the 
child. Wanda had investigated a neglect allegation lodged by the father against the 
mother as one of her first cases. She had reached a finding of “ruled out,” which made it 
necessary for the father’s attorney at the trial to discredit her. He got quite rough in his 
examination: 
 
 I’ve never cleaned houses, is what he said.  I’ve never been a house cleaner, so I 
wouldn’t know how long it would take her to clean her house. ‘Cause supposedly 
this… this woman had… um… human feces and urine, and it’s hardwood floor. And 
was saying, you know, I don’t see how you could get that smell out of hardwood 
floor. And I went to her house three different times unannounced. APS went to the 
house, ‘cause she had her older, incontinent father living with her. They went to the 
house unannounced, found that… But he decides that there’s no way I can determine 
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how quickly you can get a smell out of hardwood floor, because I don’t clean houses 
for a living. And I was like, “Of all the things to get me on…”  And of course, my 
experience and my age, that was a big […] That was a big deal for him, and that 
bothered me. Very much so. 
 
 Not being taken seriously because of her youth and inexperience was galling to 
Wanda, and presumably this was a general issue for her as a young woman, not just as a 
young woman doing investigations for CPS. Just a year later, however, Wanda has 
begun to feel that it’s an issue over which she can exercise some control: 
 
I’ve gotten more confident in the fact that, yeah, I will stand up to, you know, the 
bigwigs or they however-you-want-to-say-it, and tell them, you know, “Well, this 
was my case. I’m the one who’s seen the family. I’m the one who’s assessed it. You 
know, I’ve done this for two months on this one case, and this is what needs to 
happen.” I’ve gotten confidence in [that] and I will. I’ll stand up to these people now. 
And regardless of, you know, if they’re going to like me from now on. I don’t care 
about that… I don’t care about keeping friends.   
 
Despite how gratifying this newfound assertiveness is to Wanda, and how personally 
beneficial she feels it to be, she concludes as Helen, Sarah, and Pauline did, by saying 
that it is justified by its service to the children. “You know, this is about the kids,” she 
says. “I’ve always been confident about my decisions, but I’m more confident in 
standing up to whoever wants to get in my way… of helping the family.” The brief 
pause before “of helping the family” may be where Wanda first meant her sentence to 
end, but then realized it wouldn’t do to be seen rejoicing too much in power that was 
merely personal.  
 Yvonne is another young investigator with a year and a half on the job. Like Wanda, 
she says she has grown in confidence and assertiveness since she was new, and she has 
developed a high degree of artfulness in how she uses and displays it: 
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I’ve had several cases where past workers have documented that these are extremely 
hostile parents, that… things like that. And I’ll go out there and… be Miss Cheery 
Sunny Day girl and they… they’re fine with me. You know, and so… I don’t know 
if that makes a difference or if something…  I just, you know… I’ve had ‘em yelling 
at me on the phone and be, [sing-song] “Okay, well thank you very much.  I really 
apprec…” You know, just this Sunshine Girl, that you know, is almost sickening, 
but… you know… But I’ve just found that it kind of [fits] people off, I think, a little 
bit. You know, when they open the door, and they’re ready, you know, as soon as the 
hear the word CPS, they’re ready to tear into me, but I’m just like, [sing-song] 
“Well, I just need to talk to you about this and see what’s going on,” and make it like 
it’s no big deal almost, and, you know, we’re going to have a nice little conversation, 
and, you know, and… I… I think I have the best luck out of those kind of cases, 
cause then their guard kind of goes down a little bit. But if I play into that 
defensiveness of… [harshly] “Well, we’re going to talk about this, and you’re going 
to talk to me,” and… well, they’re going to keep that guard up. And… be real, you 
know, guarded on how they answer questions. 
I:  Is that the way you’ve been from the start? Was that sort of your natural style. 
Or is that one you’ve sort of developed? 
Yeah, well, I think I developed it more as a conscious development. Um…  You 
know, th…I, I think I’ve realized it recently that… um… a couple of recent cases 
where I’ve gone to the home and could feel that, like… about to tear into me, cause 
I’m from CPS, but as soon as I smile and, you know, just say, [sing-song]  “Well, 
let’s just get through this and find out… You know, I’m just going to find out what’s 
going on. That’s my job,” and…um… I just… I can almost physically see their face 
just, you know, “Ohhh, okay.” 
That’s the… kind of my style to get myself in the door, and to keep them from 
slamming the door in my face, you know. And then once I get in there, I’m like, I 
think I get a little tougher on ‘em.  I’m like, “Okay, this has happened, what’s going 
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on?” You know. I kind of don’t say, “Well, has this happened?”  I’m more like, 
“This happened.” And… you know, of course I get, the “Oh well, it doesn’t… no, it 
didn’t,” and all this, but…um… And even in that case, I’m like, “Well, the problem 
is [laughs] I’m still being told this is happening, so… this is going to be your 
warning” you know, in a lot of cases, of the… especially the ones like the slap, and 
the things that we really… It’s not really… work… something we’re going to pursue 
as being abusive. But I kind of take it as approach that, “This is your warning, and 
we better not get another report, cause we may take… further action.” 
 
 Yvonne has learned to use her youth and gender to conceal the state power she 
represents. As if in retribution for having accepted the façade she first offered, she 
pretends to assume as proven the allegation she is there to investigate and somewhat 
heavy-handedly tells parents that the state is watching and they must toe the line. And 
why? “I always wanted to work with children.” “The big one [of decisions that CPS 
investigators must make] is whether or not the children are safe.” “That’s our job is the 
safety of children. You know. Are the children being abused?” It is interesting to note 
that Yvonne used the word “children” only these four times in our two interviews, and 
always referred to specific children on her caseload as “kids”. This gives her 
pronouncements about her motivation an oddly artificial and performative quality, like a 
linguistic Potemkin village of appropriate sentiment.  
 For all these women the issues of agency and opposition are crucial ones. They do 
not like to think of themselves as enforcers of system norms, some of which they do not 
themselves accept. Nor do they like to think of themselves as taking satisfaction from 
their ability to dominate situations that used to cause them fear and confusion, to assert 
their will, to see through, dominate, and correct. They prefer instead to think of 
themselves as motivated solely by their love of children and their duty to protect them 
from harm. I do not mean to suggest that there is any hypocrisy in this. Images of the 
beaten and starved children they’ve seen surely do give investigators all the motivation 
they need to climb over the locked gate, sidle past the snarling dogs, knock loudly on the 
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door, and face down the big, drunken, angry man that answers. My point is simply that 
organizational identity is not wholly a creation of the organization itself. The mental 
maps people make of their jobs can only extend or modify the maps they are already 
making of the social world. The system that new members try to define themselves into 
has to define itself into the members’ consciousness, and can only do so through features 
that are already there, like those carved by previous experience of political and paternal 
power, or previous experiences of putting oneself forward. 
 Bruner’s concept of canonicity and breach may be seen as a feature of identity as 
well as of narrative. The CPS system, with its risk assessment tool, its written and 
unwritten rules, its jargon, its practices, and ways of acculturating new employees, posits 
a canonicity that is intended to develop organizational identities, the application of 
which to diverse investigation situations will result in correct decision making. The 
participants in this study frequently identify themselves as against what they perceive to 
be pernicious, or merely blind tendencies, practices, and principles of the organization. 
They have incorporated the values of the system into their identities, where they mingle 
and compete with other values. In application, the system’s power to intervene is 
mediated through those identities and those other values. 
149 
CHAPTER V 
THE MIRROR OF PREPONDERANCE 
 
 By policy, the standard of proof CPS investigators are required to use is 
preponderance of the evidence. Black’s Law Dictionary (Garner, 1999, p. 1201) defines 
preponderance as: 
 
The greater weight of the evidence; superior evidentiary weight that, though not 
sufficient to free the mind wholly from all reasonable doubt, is still sufficient to 
incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.  This is 
the burden of proof in a civil trial, in which the jury is instructed to find for the party 
that, on the whole, has the stronger evidence, however slight the edge may be. 
 
 CPS in Texas began using preponderance as its standard in 1999 (Texas Department 
of Protective and Regulatory Services, 2002). Before that a “reason-to-believe” (RTB) 
finding could be reached on the basis of “some credible evidence.” Victor, the 
ombudsman, says he welcomed the change, as the old standard seemed uselessly vague. 
Pauline, however, was one of the many CPS front-line workers who thought the change 
would make RTBs harder to justify, and children at risk of abuse would thereby become 
less safe: 
 
I started out with, “Holy shit, we… it’s hard enough to protect children. We’ve been 
able to hang our hat on “Some Credible Evidence” being a child’s statement, for all 
of these years. And we’re not doing a great job of protecting kids with that as a 
burden of proof. So now you’re going to increase our burden of proof just so we can 
be more consistent with APS [Adult Protective Services]? Well, fuck APS. [laughs] 
Let us keep our… Let us keep our “some credible evidence.” Um… but you know, 
Robert, what they found is that all over the state we were doing it differently 
anyway. So it seemed like we did need some… The way people were reaching the 
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conclusion of “reason-to-believe.” We all had our own little definition of “some 
credible evidence” is what I mean. So I think that some uniformity and some 
consistency to our definitions was a good thing, and to our burden. I was okay with 
that.  
 
 Pauline’s fear that RTBs would become less frequent have not been realized in other 
states where a similar change has occurred (Levine, 1998), and in Texas the 
substantiation rates did not go down as much as many people expected (Texas 
Department of Protective and Regulatory Services, 2002). Unfortunately, her hope that 
the standard of preponderance would bring uniformity to case decision making has not 
been realized either. As we’ll see, preponderance, as a standard for reaching conclusions 
about evidence in real cases, has within it so many different elements, including quality 
of investigation, analysis of evidence, belief formation, documentation, and rhetoric, that 
it cannot help taking on different, even conflicting aspects for different people. In this 
section I will show that the varying conceptions of preponderance held in CPS, like the 
agency’s decision making generally, cover the full range of Hammond’s cognitive 
continuum. For some, determining preponderance means arriving at correct belief. For 
others it means analyzing evidence and developing the right sort of argument to persuade 
others. One’s conception of what preponderance means reflects one’s role in the 
organization and one’s decision-making orientation. 
 The complex, manifold nature of preponderance is often obscured by the way it is 
explained. Trainers and others who must try to make others understand the Black’s 
definition above often make use of percentages.  If 51% of the evidence in a case 
supports confirmation, they say, then you have preponderance.  Confirmation under the 
“beyond a reasonable doubt” standard would require that 90% or 95% of the evidence be 
in support of it.  A “clear and convincing” standard would require something in between, 
say 75%. These percentages are only analogies, though they are not usually labeled as 
such, and their usefulness as analogies may be more apparent than real. Many people 
hear them and imagine that they can calib
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accordingly, but what human being is capable of dividing up what he or she knows about 
a given case into 100 equal parts, and then place each piece reliably on one side of the 
scale or the other? The percentage explanation promises a great deal more precision than 
it can deliver and shows no appreciation whatever for the way people really make up 
their minds about things.  
 I asked each of the 20 participants in this study to tell me how they would explain 
preponderance to a new investigator just out of basic training. Two of the newest 
employees, Elsa and Melissa, admitted that this part of their training had not stuck with 
them and they could not give me an answer. In neither case did this vagueness on the 
concept of preponderance translate into vagueness on how to reach conclusions in their 
cases. Both displayed a high degree of confidence in their ability to draw good 
conclusions from the evidence. Preponderance for them is an abstraction that 
characterizes in some largely irrelevant way what it is they simply do. 
 This practice-oriented way of thinking about the standard of proof is illustrated in a 
story told by Dorothy, an investigator with three years’ experience. Here is her response 
to my question as to how she would explain preponderance to a person fresh from 
training: 
 
Oh, well, the easiest one is would probably be physical abuse, where you have the 
actual marks and bruises and things like that, so therefore.... and the kid is saying 
that mom and dad or whoever... uh...  spanked me. And... um.... mom or dad admits 
to spanking the kid, then that's.... automatically a “reason-to-believe,” because you 
do have that evidence. And as far as... um... neglectful supervision, ...um... I can 
think of a case whereas the grandmother... was supposed to be watching the two year 
old, but the two-year-old... the two-year-old... uh...  was supposed to be in the back 
yard playing, and... uh... grandma.... Now, she says she was in the kitchen watching 
out the window, but if she had been in the kitchen watching out… So you... what I’m 
say... let me try to explain. I... I... Whenever there's a case like that I go into the 
house to look out that window, to see whether or not she could see the kid. So, she 
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was supposed to be watching this kid. Now, she said she was looking out that 
window. Had she been looking out that window, she would have known exactly 
when that child got out the gate and left. The two-year-old got out the gate and left, 
walked about a half mile to a bus stop, and somehow sat on that bus stop stoop until 
a bus came by and the bus driver... The child had been missing for about thirty 
minutes. And the grandmother said she looked and looked for the kid... uh... you 
know, walked to... around the neighborhood and... and things like that, she would 
have known that that bus driver was at the bus stop with that child. So, in a case like 
that, you go into the house, look out the window, um... and see how far away the gate 
is from the kitchen window and whether or not grandmother... uh... could have 
noticed when the child left. Well, she could have noticed, but, you know, right there 
she told a lie, because she was not watching that kid. Because if she had been 
watching... But anyway, I ended up doing “reason-to-believe,” because you look at 
the distance between the house and the bus stop and whether or not grandma could 
have turned to the right and noticed the bus was there. You know, she could have 
walked to the bus stop to see if the bus driver had... because he sat there for a minute. 
Ended up calling the police… 
 
 Dorothy’s understanding of how much evidence is needed to reach a conclusion 
seems to be almost purely narrative in character. Even after three years the features of 
this area of her mental map retain the shape of the stories that formed them. She has a 
story or set of stories that do not just illustrate, but constitute, the standards of proof for 
each major type of allegation. There appears to be no generalization that covers or 
connects the standards for physical abuse to the standard for neglect. By way of 
summing up, Dorothy says, “To me, that would be preponderance – just gathering your 
information. And I would tell that to that new person. ‘You know, you go and... look at 
the scene yourself.’” 
 At the other end of the spectrum were three administrators. Frieda, a regional Risk 
Director, whose interview I’ll discuss in detail in Chapter VII, Ida, a lead Program 
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Administrator, and Victor, the ombudsman, each gave a version of either the official 
definition or the percentage explanation. “It’s tipping the scale,” says Frieda, “like 
you’ve got a scale out there and it’s more likely to have happened than not…” Ida says, 
“Basically preponderance means that we’re looking at the evidence and determining 
what pieces of it seem credible… and then looking at… is it more than 50%? … Does it 
seem probable? Not that I have no doubts about it. But does the evidence seem probable 
that this event occurred?” And Victor: “It’s basically that the… greater weight of the 
evidence, or more than 50%, if you want to divide it that way, leans one way or the 
other.”  
 Victor’s job, which is similar to that of an appeals court judge, feels no need to go 
further and translate the definition into the language of practice. Determining 
preponderance is what his practice is, almost exclusively, so for him, more than any 
other person I spoke to, the concept speaks for itself and does, in pure form, set a 
standard for his decision making. Ida and Frieda, however, like all the other 19 
participants, do feel the need to go further. Ida says she’s glad investigators have a third 
choice for determining a case other than RTB or “ruled out.” The “unable-to-determine” 
(UTD) option allows investigators to avoid focusing too much on whether the one 
percent evidence near the middle falls on the left side of the scale or the right. “What I 
want them to concentrate on is the risk,” she says. She notes that some investigators and 
supervisors still decide whether to open a case for services based on their belief that a 
specific allegation of abuse or neglect is true. 
 
 And actually my…my philosophy is almost the opposite.  The incident of abuse or 
neglect is important in that we can document in our system somehow if we need to 
that it has occurred and if there is a designated perpetrator, but it’s critical to do the 
risk assessment because that’s the piece on which we take any action.  Incidents of 
abuse or neglect happening… doesn’t mean anything in regards to… ah…whether or 
not we open a case.  It’s the risk factors… that we’re using.  And so it’s just a matter 
of trying to get the staff to understand why that’s so important. 
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 By “risk factors,” Ida means those indicators of child vulnerability, caretaker 
incompetence or indifference, and environmental dangerousness, the assessment of 
which is the purpose of the IRA.  
 For Frieda, too, the concept of preponderance, and with it the entire question of 
whether or not a given incident happened, is secondary to that of risk. Part of Frieda’s 
job is to review completed cases involving children younger than six or who have had 
been the subject of more than one allegation within a year. After giving me the definition 
of preponderance I asked her if she used that standard when evaluating those cases: 
 
Yeah, I guess. 
I:  You guess? 
Yeah. 
I:  What were you trying to pack into that “I guess?” 
Well, it’s like when I’m reading these, I’m not really thinking about 
preponderance. I’m thinking more about, “Is this child safe?  How is this child safe?  
Who’s watching over this child?” Um… not necessarily, “Does this meet 
preponderance?”   
 
 For Frieda and Ida, unlike Victor, the most important goal of CPS investigation is to 
illuminate the future, not the past. What happened in the past provides valuable evidence 
in making estimations of the likelihood of future abuse or neglect, but to fetishize the 
incident, or the search for knowledge about the incident, to get wrapped up in glamour 
of doing what law enforcement is supposed to do, is to forget one’s fundamental 
obligation as a social worker – protection. Protection, by necessary implication, looks 
forward: You can only protect children from what you think might happen in the future, 
not from what’s happened already. 
 Some investigators have the perspective Frieda and Ida would want them to have. 
Elsa, for example, says she believes her social work education and her social work 
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perspective are her greatest assets in doing investigation. She even sees a lower 
investigative skill level in those of her co-workers who do not have social work 
educations. Other investigators, like Leo, though they would surely agree that protection 
was the main business of the agency, see their own role in that enterprise as uncovering 
the evidence to inform credible and defensible estimations about how necessary 
protection is and what form it should take. This activity obliges them to spend their days 
looking at past events, using methods that do have more in common with law 
enforcement than social work. Leo says: 
 
Those social work skills that I learned in school really aren’t used as an investigator.  
This is not a…  This, investigations, is not a social work position.  That’s really 
maybe for the ongoing cases, but our job is to… my job is to go in and find out what 
is going on. 
 
 Helen agrees: 
 
A lot of people take this [investigation] as a social-worky job, and it’s not really a 
social work job, ‘cause you’re not going to be able to fix every family… A lot of 
things I learned in my social work back[field], I don’t… I can’t use ‘em in some of 
the situations I’m in, ‘cause some of the families are not going to let you be Miss 
Social Work. 
 
 Doing social work, in Helen’s mind, means not only focusing on the future, but 
having tangible effect on it, improving the lives of the families she works with. But since 
many of the parents resist being changed and in some cases would rather lose their 
parental rights than be changed, she is forced to do what she can to create short-term 
benefit, close the case, and hope for the best. 
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 The identification Helen feels with the accused perpetrators in abuse cases, which we 
remarked upon in the previous chapter, exerts a strong effect on her conception of 
preponderance: 
 
I never…I don’t know too many definitions. But I just try to explain that, you know, 
that it has to be something that you can prove that happened, or that you can say for 
sure that it happened, you know. For instance… um… somebody said, “Well, the 
referral said that they had marks six months ago.” “Well, can you definitely say they 
had six marks? Did you see ‘em? Is there a picture that has exact date six months 
ago? How can…?” And I always ask ‘em, “Well, how can you prove they had?” 
 
Helen goes on to stress that, because of the potential impact on a person’s life of 
being labeled an abuser of children, she feels she must be certain the label is correct 
before applying it: 
 
 I just believe… I’m one that I want to be able to see it. You know, ‘cause what I feel 
like is that, there are people out there that do things to kids, and there’s people that 
just get caught up in saying that they did, you know, with situations, that they did it, 
and I… you know, we mess with people’s livelihoods, you know. Especially when it 
comes to teachers, it comes to… all… everybody, you know…If you have a bad rap 
from CPS, then you won’t be working in too many places. So I just…. I always 
believe… I look at the kid and I also look at the… person I’m dealing with and 
realize, you know, I have another human being’s… not only do I have a kid’s hand 
in my life, I have a perpetrator’s hand in my life. So I have to be able to prove that 
they actually did this, because if they didn’t, then I’m messing with their livelihood, 
you know. 
 
Helen says the evidence must “prove… for sure” that an allegation happened in order 
for her to make an RTB finding. A belief that an alleged perpetrator was slightly more 
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likely than not to have committed abuse or neglect would seem, by this characterization, 
to be insufficient justification for a finding that might cost him or her a job. If this were 
the way Helen actually decided cases, she would, in effect, be increasing the burden of 
proof for validation, making preponderance more like “beyond a reasonable doubt,” 
thereby affording more protection to alleged perpetrators than to alleged victims. This 
would so noticeably flout what Helen acknowledges is her fundamental obligation, to 
protect child victims, that I suspect she does not apply the preponderance standard in the 
way she says she does. I think her compassion sends bias in all directions at once, and 
she ends up showing the same sort of back-door even-handedness that a mother with lots 
of children, all favorites, would show.  
Another misleading aspect of Helen’s take on preponderance is the implication that 
once she has made her determination in a case, that’s the end of it. She speaks as though 
supervision, risk review, the designated perpetrator’s right of appeal, and the 
ombudsman’s office did not exist. She knows they do exist, of course, and she knows 
that no one can lose a job as a result of a decision she makes by herself. But for Helen, 
being a great deal more intuitive than analytic, her own belief really is the court of last 
resort in determining the truth of an allegation. Her supervisor could make her change a 
finding, or a Program Administrator could overturn her at an ARIF hearing, but unless it 
could be pointed out to her that she had overlooked important evidence, her own 
understanding of the case would not be changed as a result. Helen strives toward a state 
of certitude in each of her cases; when she feels she has attained it, the case, for all 
practical purposes, is closed. 
Other investigators express themselves similarly. Jennifer, a Program Director, says, 
“The way I think about it, and it seems to work for me, is… um… “Am I sure? Am I 
sure that this happened?” And Teresa, a relatively new investigator, says: 
 
Preponderance of evidence is when one takes what ABCDE collaterals tell you and 
ABCDE evidence tells you, and you base it on all of that coming together to say 
pretty sure… that you think that's what's happening. And, um… that's how I do it. 
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And I do pay attention to my gut now. I… you know, when I was in my twenties, I 
didn't. I was always so… doubtful.   “Am I making the right decision?” And, now, if 
I just pay attention to what I feel like I need to do… and I'm not saying I'm always 
right because nobody’s always right and I certainly am not. But if I take my gut and 
couple that with what I have… in my witnesses and what I have that I can see, 
literally see with my eyes…  A lot of times I'll bounce it off other people? You 
know, I discuss it with other people… we’re encouraged to do that. My supervisor is 
always available. I'll call her on the phone and say, "You know, am I looking at this 
right?" And then, you know, she'll say, "Well yeah, that's exactly right."  Or, "No. 
No, no, no, no. You're way off base."  And that helps me a lot, too.  But I… 
preponderance is when you take everything that you have, regardless of where you're 
getting it, and you come up with, “I'm pretty sure that I'm doing the right thing.” Or,  
“I'm pretty sure that this is correct.” 
 
 Like Helen, Teresa describes preponderance in terms of subjective belief, an inner 
state of near-certainty arrived at after assiduous evidence collection, discussion with 
colleagues, and private deliberation. She emphasizes that preponderance is something 
she comes to feel after she performs all the requisite investigative tasks.  
 Earlier in this chapter we heard Louise’s story about the smooth, professional-
looking man who killed his daughter in front of his wife’s family. Louise refers to this 
case when she describes the state of belief she feels she must have in order to reach a 
final decision: 
 
When I do close a case, and when I sign my name off on it, I’m, you know, just that 
much sure.  I don’t want to have to second-guess my tho… And I think with that 
case I shared with you about that; that really was like the icing on the cake, you 
know, just to make sure. And I’ll dig and dig and dig until I am convinced. 
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 Louise says, in fact, that she can’t think of any case she ever had that she wasn’t sure 
about at the time she closed it, and she has worked a great many. 
 Other investigators focus less upon the belief formation aspect of preponderance than 
on the rhetorical aspects, the task of persuading others that a given judgment is correct. 
Though these investigators may feel as sure of their conclusions as Helen, Teresa, and 
Jennifer do, they believe that what constitutes preponderance is not up to them, but to the 
decision makers above them in the hierarchy. Satisfying them is what creates 
preponderance. Wanda says, “I won’t use the actual term that we use, but ‘cover my 
butt.’ That’s the big thing that we’re always saying. What questions should you have 
asked? What did you miss?” As she evaluates her case, she says, instead of asking 
herself, as Jennifer does, “Am I sure?” she asks instead, “”What do I need to have that’s 
going to make my… my ruling stand? How do I convince them of what I believe is the 
biggest thing.” 
 Gretchen, another experienced investigator, phrases it somewhat differently, but also 
sees preponderance as less a matter of believing than showing: 
 
What I think of preponderance is that… would any… what would another… 
reasonable adult think? You know? If I were to put… get… you know, give this 
situation to ten people, my idea of preponderance would be that six of them would 
a… would agree: “Yeah, that does…”  
 
 Pauline, too, sees the proof as being a public, rather than a private entity. 
Preponderance is a function of how one’s conclusion fares in the world or, more 
particularly, in the mind of an impartial reader: 
 
I think that, um…preponderance is simply that a reasonable person would look at all 
the documentation evidence that you have and come to the same conclusion, which 
is… it’s… that conclusion being it’s more likely than not that that this happened.  
Not that it’s earth shattering, or you know, the ground will move when you get there, 
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but that just a reasonable person, a person without a bias, would sit down and read 
your case and say, “Something happened.” 
 
 For investigators like Wanda, Gretchen, and Pauline, preponderance is not a matter 
of inward-looking deliberation, even if aided by consultation with others. It is the 
outcome of a social process, like the result of an election or the verdict in a trial. The 
investigator may put strong evidence and strong argument into the process, but what 
comes out at the end depends just as much or more on political conditions, the personal 
biases of others in the chain, and simple luck.  
 We see, then, that the concept of preponderance takes on a number of different 
interpretations as it is applied to real cases. It does seem, in the minds of investigator, to 
be an answer to the question, “How much evidence do I need?” That question, though, is 
always subordinate to the question, “Enough evidence to do what?” The answer to that is 
nowhere in the definition of preponderance, whatever methods are used to explain it, but 
is in the notions investigators and their superiors already have of what constitutes a good 
investigation, what its aims should be, and to whom or what it is fundamentally 
obligated. In practice, preponderance is either irrelevant or is adopted as the new name 
for a preexisting investigative goal – attaining certainty, persuading others, collecting 
evidence, protecting children.  
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CHAPTER VI 
THE GENRE OF CUSTODY 
 
I asked 14 of the 20 participants in this study to react to two case scenarios. The 
scenarios were written by Jackson and Nuttall (1996) for a study on various personal, 
professional, and case factors that influence judgments made by clinical social workers, 
pediatricians, psychiatrists, and psychologists about sexual abuse allegations. The 
researchers asked their participants to rate each of 16 scenarios as to how likely it was 
that abuse had occurred, given the facts described. A six-point scale was used, as is 
shown in Table 8. 
 
TABLE 8 
Jackson and Nuttall’s Six-point Questionnaire Scale 
1 
Very 
confident it 
did not occur 
2 
Fairly confident 
it did not occur 
3 
Slightly 
confident it did 
not occur 
4 
Slightly 
confident it did 
occur 
5 
Fairly confident 
it did occur 
6 
Very 
confident it 
did occur 
 
Each scenario was constructed to display a different combination of 15 two-level 
case factors, as is shown in Table 9. 
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TABLE 9 
Factors in Jackson and Nuttall’s Case Scenarios 
Factor Level 1 Level  2    
Alleged Victim   
A. Gender Male  Female 
B. Age 3 to 8 years 13 to 16 years 
C. Race Minority White 
D. Behavioral changes Yes No 
E. Affect about event No affect Affect 
Alleged perpetrator   
F. Socioeconomic status Professional Nonprofessional 
G. Relationship to alleged victim Familial Nonfamilial 
H. Ages 16 to 25 years 26+ years 
I. Race Minority White 
J. History of violence Yes No 
K. History of substance abuse Yes No 
Alleged Victim’s Caretaker(s)   
L. History of childhood sexual abuse Yes No 
M. History of psychiatric illness Yes No 
Family   
N. Prior contact with protective service agencies Yes No 
O. Child custody-visitation issues Yes No 
 
 
 The mean score for all respondents on all cases was 4.03, with a fairly high standard 
deviation of .61. The respondents were generally more inclined to believe abuse had 
occurred, but there was significant disagreement among them on each scenario. Jackson 
and Nuttall found that some of the variance was accounted for by age, gender, work 
experience, personal history of physical or sexual abuse, and whether one had raised 
children, among other factors. Case factors that tended to make an allegation more 
believable than not were the alleged perpetrator being white, being a family member, 
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being nonprofessional, or having a history of substance abuse. The likelihood of an 
allegation being judged credible was also increased if the alleged victim was a member 
of a minority, was a child rather than an adolescent, showed negative affect or change in 
behavior after the alleged incident, or had previous CPS history. 
 The two scenarios I chose to use in this study were the ones closest to the 3.5 mean 
on the credibility scale. The Linda F. scenario was slightly above null at 3.77, and the 
Harry O. scenario was slightly below it at 3.38. 
Linda F., a 3-year-old Caucasian girl, was brought to the emergency room of a large 
city hospital by her father who requested a sexual abuse evaluation. He said he was 
concerned because of a bright red rash that covered Linda's vaginal and anal areas. 
An additional source of worry for Mr. F. was that Linda had been more cranky than 
usual, waking up in the middle of the night crying. According to Mr. F., when he 
asked Linda about the rash, she became visibly upset and said 'Bobby pinches me." 
Mr. F. told the interviewer he was afraid that Linda was being sexually abused by 
Bob, Linda's baby-sitters' 27-year-old son. 
Mr. and Mrs. F. were separated shortly after Linda's birth. They were divorced a 
year ago at which time Mrs. F. was given full custody of her daughter. Two months 
ago, Mr. F. brought suit for full custody, claiming that he could be a better parent to 
Linda now that he was remarried. He declared he could  provide a more stable 
environment than his ex-wife who is a single parent and has a history of psychiatric 
illness. 
Currently, Mr. F. has visitation rights every weekend. Mrs. F. works 3 days a 
week, leaving Linda with an elderly, retired black couple, Mr. and Mrs. W., who 
baby-sit in their own home for a number of neighborhood children. Bob, the W.'s 
27-year-old son who is an engineer, has been living with the W.s since he was 
discharged from an alcohol rehab program about 6 months ago. According to Mrs. 
F., he has had no responsibility for Linda or the other children. 
Linda is a verbal child who was cooperative during her interview. Her preference 
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was to play with the dollhouse and have teatime "like I do with my mommy." When 
asked about Bob, she said that they play together and that sometimes he pinches her. 
When asked where Bob pinches her, she became anxious, shrugging and touching 
herself all over. Asked if she liked Bob, Linda nodded and said "yes.' Asked if Bob 
ever hurts her on her bum Linda said "no," continuing to play with her toys. 
Mr. and Mrs. W. and Bob said they were outraged at Mr. F.'s accusations. Mrs. 
F. expressed complete trust in the W.s and Bob. They all contended that the charges 
were motivated by Mr. F.'s wish to gain custody of Linda. 
 
Harry O., a 13-year-old Caucasian male, was brought to the emergency room of a 
large general hospital by his mother, Mrs. H., and his black stepfather, Dr. H.  
According to Dr. and Mrs. H., Harry had told them that Tom, his stepfather's son by 
a previous marriage, had sexually molested him.  Dr. and Mrs. H. said they were 
shocked by Harry's accusations as they "seemed to come out of the blue." 
According to Harry, his stepbrother Tom, a 25-year-old black psychologist who 
had recently finished his graduate studies, had taken him to the movies to see a 
horror film. When the lights went out, Harry reported, Tom unzipped Harry's fly and 
fondled his genitals.  Agitated and angry, Harry recalled that the attempts he made 
to push Tom's hand away were to no avail.  He said he was too embarrassed to call 
out for help. 
Dr. and Mrs. H. are an interracial couple who have been married for less than a 
year.  Dr. H.'s first wife died early in their marriage.  Mrs. H., when she was 
divorced from her first husband, Mr. O., 3 years ago, was given full custody of their 
only son, Harry.  Dr. H., a black physicist, is on the faculty of a prestigious 
university and has two boys by his first wife, who also was black. 
According to Mrs. H., since her marriage to Dr. H., Mr. 0. has filed numerous 
care and protection complaints against Dr. H.  He has also brought suit against Mrs. 
H. to gain full custody of Harry. 
When confronted with Harry's allegations, Tom H. denied them, saying they 
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were fabrications of an unhappy kid in an effort to discredit Dr. H.'s family. An 
honor student throughout his life, Tom has the reputation of being a fine 
psychologist and a "great guy."  He has no history of violence or of substance 
abuse. 
 
 The Linda scenario has Level 1 characteristics in categories B, I, K, and O, and 
Level 2 of all others. The Harry scenario displays Level 1 characteristics in categories A, 
E, F, H, I, and O. As I asked the 14 participants to respond to these scenarios, I did so in 
as neutral a way as possible, saying merely, “Tell me what you were thinking as you 
read through that,” or “What is your reaction?”  
 I asked the participants to read and react to the Linda scenario first. Their initial 
responses fell into four categories.  
• Melissa, the new investigator with the SIDS case, had an immediate and strong 
belief that Linda had been abused. “Um… well, she’s definitely showing… um… 
unusual and bizarre behavior. I mean, she… something has happened to her. I 
believe that someone has, um… I th… believe that there’s some type of abuse 
going on there.” 
• Helen and Yvonne, two experienced investigators, focused first on the child’s 
rash and the likelihood of its having been caused by something other than abuse. 
“I would want the doctor,” said Yvonne, “to tell me what he thought first… 
um… about the rash. Um… just from my experience with little girls two to three, 
it’s not uncommon for them to get rashes in that area.” She went on to say that 
she knew of cases in which bubble bath had been found to be the cause of 
vaginal irritation. And Helen said, “My initial reaction, looking at it… was 
probably that it was some type of… some type of health thing, that maybe she 
was just not cleaning herself the right way.” 
• Three investigators (Arnold, Leo, and Louise), all experienced, made no initial 
evaluative observations of any kind, but instead began immediately to describe 
what steps they would take to investigate the case. 
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• Eight participants, including three investigators (Elsa, Teresa, and Wanda), two 
supervisors (Carmen and Sarah), a Program Director (Jennifer), a policy maker 
(Pauline), and a CPS attorney (Nancy) seized first upon the fact that a custody 
fight was going of between the child’s parents. Nancy’s way of noticing this was 
typical: 
 
Well, see, of course I can't look at this without…Of course, my first 
thought…is that… um… the dad's trying to use this as a … in a custody… in 
a custody issue. Um… in that he's just trying to come up with something, 
‘cause he doesn't like the mom's, you know, situation, leaving the child with 
a…. you know, with somebody, and he wants to… he wants the kid. 
 
 If we were to compare the full contents of the participants’ reactions to one another, 
differences would be less pronounced. Participants who remarked first on the custody 
battle aspect of the case, or the probable innocuousness of the rash, went on to say how 
they would investigate the case. The three who started off by laying out a plan of 
investigation later observed, as Leo did, that the father “certainly has his own motivation 
here.” And they were as much aware as the eight participants who remarked on the 
custody battle first that allegations brought by one parent in a custody dispute against the 
other are seldom validated.  
 Of the four Level 1 factors that Jackson and Nuttall loaded into the Linda scenario – 
the child being younger than 9, the alleged perpetrator being a of a minority, the alleged 
perpetrator having a history of substance abuse, and the existence of a custody dispute – 
the latter was by far the most salient for these participants. One reason is that such cases 
are common for CPS. Yvonne, in fact, says, “If we had no custody cases I wouldn’t have 
a job.” Gretchen estimates that fully half the cases worked in her unit originate from 
custody battles. And Melissa, at the time I interviewed her, said every case she worked 
over the preceding summer had had that character.  
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 A second reason for the salience of the custody factor is that cases having it tend to 
be highly frustrating for investigators. The allegations are often exaggerated and have to 
do with events that happened long ago, if they are not completely fabricated. The 
children have frequently been coached on what to tell the investigators. And the 
complaining parent, through his or her attorney, often tries to pressure the investigator 
not only to validate, but to conclude the investigation in time for the next court date. As 
Yvonne said, “So many of ‘em are just baloney that… they, they get frustrating and… 
cause we’re in this job to help people, and it gets frustrating that we’re wasting our time 
on this.” Elsa, an investigator with a year’s experience, asked whether she had worked 
any cases where custody was an issue, replied: 
 
It’s a nightmare. It has become… a… They’re use… They are using CPS… as a 
court system. Because most of the time, or…or what I’ve come across, in the cases 
that I’ve been dealing with, is there’s…  You know, they’ve already had, you know, 
the decree’s been done. The visitation’s set up. There’s noth… The kids don’t say 
anything. The kids are in the middle. They love both their parents. Most of the time 
[…] It’s always about, you know, they came home with a bruise. Or they came home 
and said, “Daddy’s new girlfriend,” or “Mommy’s new boyfriend,” or new husband 
or new stepfather…  And these kids are absolutely torn apart. It… To me, that is the 
most… That is a very, very extreme form of emotional abuse to me. ‘Cause you’re 
pitting these children against two people that they love. And oh, we’ve got some 
good ones. And the time that’s expended on those, just to come to the conclusion that 
it’s nothing more than custody battles… I could have worked a lot of other cases.   
 
 Sarah describes a case the workers in her unit, including Elsa, have been dealing 
with for many months: 
 
We have a case right now that’s just an ugly, ugly, ugly custody battle.  And the kids 
are six and eleven. And what this mother is putting these kids through…She shuns 
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the kids if they say they like staying with their dad, and she won’t talk to them for 
days on end.  And you have just a… just a constant sort of thing, but yet she’s trying 
to say that dad’s… you know, of course, he’s the bad guy, so she’s always talking 
bad about… dad, and… and the… It’s just very… She has the kids. We ended up, 
just cause I wanted to put an end to it once and for all. The kids supposedly said that 
stepbrother hits ‘em, then when they’re there visiting. So I said, “You know what?  
Let’s do a videotape.” That way it’s an unbiased person doing the interview.  She 
can’t say that we led the kids, all that. Well, she tells the kids on the way over there – 
‘course we find this out after the kids are at dad’s house, we go interview them over 
there – she tells the kids, “Just remember, this is on videotape, and I’ll get to watch 
it?  So if you don’t tell them what I told you to tell them, I’ll know.” So the kids are 
terrified, so they’re in there saying all this stuff about when they’re at dad’s house all 
the things that happens to them, supposedly. So when the worker went out to the 
hou… dad’s house to talk to them, and talked to them away from the dad, they just 
broke down and bawled about it… I mean, they’re so afraid of her, that she’s going 
to… dislike them.  It’s just awful. 
 
 Nancy, the CPS attorney reports a similar case: 
 
Because I've been involved, personally, as an attorney, in cases where there was 
really bad stuff going on and where people you know, I had one case where a father 
was taking this little girl to a sexual abuse exam every single time she came back 
from her mother because he was accusing the mother's boyfriend of doing 
something, and this girl had something like thirteen sexual abuse exams in six 
months or something. So we ended up basically finding that the father was being 
abusive to the child.    
 
 Because “custody cases,” or cases in which the initiating allegation was made as a 
move in a custody dispute, are so common, so disagreeable to work, and tend to be so 
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much alike in their origins, developments, and outcomes, they constitute for CPS staff a 
more distinctive genre than any other potential grouping of cases based on shared 
victim, perpetrator, allegation, or reporter characteristics. Aristotle in the Poetics said 
any particular “mode of imitation” could be assigned a type according to its medium, its 
objects of representation, and its style. Custody cases have no distinctive medium or 
style, but do have distinctive objects in Aristotle’s sense – actions that are performed by 
either good people or bad people, “the diversities of human character being nearly 
always derivative from this primary distinction” (Aristotle, Poetics, II, trans. 1941). As 
simplistic as this may seem, it is indeed the multifarious badness of the complaining 
parents in custody cases – their hatred, jealousy, and lust for retribution, their brutal 
indifference to truth and to the effects of their actions on their own children – that 
defines the genre. That one factor supplies instantly the motives, actions, and endings of 
the custody case story.  
 The danger, of course, in custody cases being so thoroughly typical is that 
distinguishing a particular case from the type becomes difficult. As Bruner (1991) has 
pointed out, genres are not only conventional templates for the depiction of life events, 
they are Kantian “forms of intuition” that condition experience and constitute a basis for 
knowledge. Genre is not deduced from plot, in other words. It precedes and gives shape 
to plot. Before a new custody case can acquire any specific content whatsoever, its 
membership in the genre determines, or has strong potential to determine what can, or 
must, happen in the end. Several participants were keenly aware of this danger. Gretchen 
says: 
 
It’s amazing the amount of malicious… reports that we get.  And then, and… it 
just…and it’s really… it affects… workers because… you’ll look at the reporter 
page and see it’s the other parent and right away you’re like… “All right, oop, rule 
out case.  Custody battle.” ‘Cause we do get enough of those that … where that is the 
situation that you get very, very jaded… about anything… that’s supported by 
another parent.   And you don’t do a thorough investigation.   
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Nancy, the CPS attorney, agrees: 
 
Your tendency is to almost, you know, discount it immediately when you have a 
parent who's calling about another one in the middle of a custody dispute. And I 
would say probably, truthfully, more times than not, there isn't anything to it. But on 
the other hand, a lot of times there is something to it. And it can be a horrible 
situation for the parent who's trying to protect their child because they’re ignored 
because it is a custody dispute. 
 
 Barbara, the State Risk Director, began to find, somewhat paradoxically, that it was 
the more experienced investigators who were most likely to fall into the trap of deciding 
a case in advance simply because the intake made it seem to be a routine custody case: 
 
I’ve found in supervising… uh… I told you that at one time I had… uh… 90% of my 
caseworkers staff were very, very tenured. And something I found with working with 
them I thought was really interesting was that… they would swing the other way a 
lot of times. They’d get those, and I would… I would review the intake and assign it, 
stage progress it to investigation and assign it, and many times if it was not a real 
clear… if it was still kind of borderline, the allegations, they would come back in, 
and they would argue with me that they really didn’t need to investigate that. Almost 
always, if there were overtones of a custody dispute, they would be right back in my 
office to say, “You know what this is…” Um… And so I found, often times that… 
that they would… I guess what I’m saying is, it was because that they’re tenured and 
where they’d been and what they’d seen, they would try to use that to say, “This is 
going to be another one of those.  We don’t need to look at this.” Irregard…  Sort of 
disregarding maybe other critical issues that… that were there. And wanting me to… 
wanting to persuade me that this was one less case that, that, that I would have to 
assign to them, um… because it fit in some category. 
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 Wanda, herself an experienced investigator, had one of the rare custody cases that 
broke out of its conventions: 
 
I had one that was a bad sexual abuse case, and it read custody. It read big-time 
custody battle, but turned, you know, that it was... There was some sexual abuse, and 
some pretty sick stuff going on with this kid. So I know that one was a really strong 
RTB for me. We actually removed the kid. We… we got in on custody and took 
mom's custody away from her, you know, 'cause it was her turn to get visitation.   
I:  Was... was dad.... it was mom that... 
It was mom and boyfriend doing the sexual abuse, so we took her custody. 
I:  Oh, I see, so dad was the one who... 
Dad was the one who called it in, and he was... the same day he called it in was 
the same day he was supposed to give the child back to mom.   
I:  Oh, that is kind of a suspicious thing... 
So we were like, you know... It totally read... totally read custody battle. 
 
Wanda’s observes that the case initially read as custody case in the same way that 
someone might remark that a novel, in its opening, chapter, read as science fiction, but 
then, as it went on, became social satire. She goes on: 
 
And then she turns out that that day she's about to go back to mom, and she starts 
freaking out and starts saying this stuff, you know. Just so happens she didn't want to 
talk about it before then, and then when she finds out she has to go home... The 
details and the information she gave -- no way. No way a child would know that. 
I:  How old was that kid? 
Five?  And the information she gave was just ... was pretty good. I know criminal 
was very impressed. Yeah, criminal was very impressed by the information she gave.  
There was no way she was making it up.  So...   
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I:  But that’s kind of un... 
That’s... that’s very, very rare. 
I:  Very, very rare. 
Very.   
I:  But I guess, though, once something like that happens, then that sort of makes 
you aware that that’s always a possibility, I suppose. 
Oh, yeah, definitely, definitely. 
 
Pauline, the policy maker who has been an investigator and supervisor, remembers a 
similar instance: 
 
When um… I was a caseworker in Dallas we had a horrible, horrible child death. 
Um… it was a two-year-old little tod… toddler, who had… He ended up dying 
because his mama’s boyfriend or whatever grabbed him by the ankles and threw him 
over a four-poster bed, and one of the posts hit him in the abdomen, and he… he died 
a very, very long, long painful death. And we’d had fifteen reports on this family.  
And mom and dad were going through a custody fight. And that was  in every… that 
statement was in the… analysis of ev… of fifteen investigations. 
I:  Which made them all think it’s bullshit. 
Yes. Yes. So… 
I:  So you made a point of telling that story in training just because so many 
people… 
Don’t chalk it up as bullshit just because there’s a custody dispute going on.  You 
know, the custody dispute may have something…  It… It’s a piece of information, 
but…I don’t… you can’t hang on to it s… in an effort to prove… that it’s a bogus 
report. Or… I mean, you can’t do much with it, is what I’m saying, Robert. The fact 
that there’s a custody dispute going on is just one of those: “Okay, just put it over 
there, and just keep going through the case” kind of thing. What… What I found in 
this… this horrible child death case was that… um… was that that was the end of the 
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investigation. When they learned there was a custody dispute going on, that’s when 
our guard went down and  we said, “Oh, it’s just these allegations going back and 
forth.” And we ended up with a dead kid. 
 
 In Chapter IV I described how Helen, an investigator with eight years’ experience, 
adopted a more systematic approach to investigations after the death of a child who had 
been the subject of an earlier allegation that she had not been able to validate. Though 
that case did not have a custody aspect, Helen has nonetheless taken to heart the general 
lesson it provided about the necessity of looking beneath the surface: 
 
A lot of us – and I do it sometimes, but I try not to do it – well, you get to be like, 
“Oh, this is just a custody battle. Why do we have to even…?” But I try to take it for 
what… it’s worth… what… Cause it could be something legitimate, so I’ve gotten 
beyond the point where I say, “Okay, it’s just another custody… battle.” What, you 
know, they want to use us to gain custody, but a lot of ‘em are… some of ‘em are not 
like that. Some of them are legitimate. 
 
As with Carmen and her apparently specious sexual abuse allegation, we see in these 
comments a disciplining of the narrative mode of understanding, a resistance to seeing 
the story in a mass of evidence too soon. Helen, Pauline, Wanda, and Barbara cannot but 
be aware of the likelihood that a given custody case will unfold the same way that cases 
of that kind usually do. Yet they are able to set that awareness aside, to de-genrify the 
case for themselves and investigate, in a kind of sincere pretense, as though this case had 
none but its own story to tell.  
 
The Harry O. scenario also has a custody dispute factor, but somewhat unexpectedly, 
none of the 14 participants I asked to comment on it mentioned that issue first as they 
gave their reactions. That may be partly because I always presented the Linda scenario 
first and asked specifically about custody cases as part of the discussion of it; the 
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participants may have wanted to avoid raising the subject again. Also, though, the 
custody aspect in the Harry scenario is made less important than it was in the Linda case 
for several reasons. First, it is the alleged victim who makes the report, not a divorced 
parent. Second, Harry is 13, not three; even if he is fabricating this allegation, it is more 
likely to be for motives of his own than his father’s. Third, issues of race and class are 
more prominent than they were in the Linda scenario. 
The first thing three of the participants said about the Harry scenario is how much 
trouble they were having understanding it. “Very confusing,” said Carmen. “A little 
confusing,” said Louise. “I’m getting confused;” said Pauline, “I‘m going to need a 
genogram to figure out who everyone is.” This is interesting because to me the Harry 
scenario does not present greater reading difficulty than the first one. It’s shorter by 
some 90 words. It has five characters in it, whereas the Linda scenario has six. Perhaps 
the absence of a single salient typifying aspect, like custody, prevents the scenario from 
seeming coherent. It not being readily apparent to these three participants what kind of 
story this is, they have difficulty mapping it in their minds. In the Linda scenario the 
custody dispute, even if it was rejected as a determining factor later, served initially as a 
point around which the case facts could be ordered and made comprehensible.  
 After expressing her confusion, Louise, who is African-American, said, “I just 
noticed the way they keep bringing up race here. Um… And I really don’t see the 
significance in that… Abuse and neglect is not prejudiced. It’s unbiased, you know.” 
She seems to resent the fact that in both of these two presumably fictional scenarios the 
race of the alleged perpetrators is offered as though it were relevant evidence in 
determining whether the allegation is true or not. Elsa, who is white, also remarked on 
the prominence of racial identification in the Harry scenario. Both appear to be reacting 
to race as an aspect of the scenario’s suĵet, rather than of its fabula, and are momentarily 
forestalled, Louise for a second time, from seeing the case as a case. 
For most of the participants, even those, like Louise, who were distracted at first, 
Harry’s age, and the fact that he had made an outcry, was the most prominent feature of 
the case. In addition to Louise, Arnold, Pauline, Jennifer, Carmen, Leo, Melissa, Elsa, 
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Yvonne, and Teresa all said that Harry’s story would be the starting point of their 
investigation. Melissa and Teresa expressed immediate skepticism of it. Both found it 
unlikely that a 13-year-old boy would be “too embarrassed” to protest or get up and walk 
away when the stepbrother started to fondle him. Though the others were more cautious 
in evaluating Harry’s claim, they all thought a skillful and thorough interview with him 
would either produce additional details and background information that would set up 
the investigation or would reveal that the boy was lying. 
By Texas law, younger children who are alleged to have been the victim of physical 
abuse or sexual abuse must be videotaped or audiotaped when they are interviewed. 
Children older than 12 may instead have a written statement taken from them by a police 
officer. As Carmen describes it, the interviewing officer 
 
would look at... um... the criminal, more detailed in a sense of... um... the incident. 
You know: “Where did he touch you? How did he touch you? With what did he 
touch you? Did he say anything?” Yes, we want that information. [It’s] also that we 
want. “Well, how long have you known this guy? Have you... When did you go to 
the movie? What move did you see?” Things like that. Also, what the kid was 
wearing. Maybe he was wearing, “Oh, this is what I was wearing.” “Oh, those are 
pull up shorts. Where's the zipper?” Things like that. I mean you've got to look at 
everything. And... and as stupid and minute as it looks in the referral, those can 
easily help you to determine if this is a “rule out” case, and this is a kid who maybe 
doesn't like the AP for some reason. Or maybe the AP said, "No I'm not going to take 
you to a movie. I have work to do. " And the kid got pissed off. "Well, I'll show you.  
He did this, this, this and this." It's hard, it's very hard. But, again, you try to get as 
much detail so you can make the best determination  on the case and also the medical 
documentation, and history checks...   
 
Should Harry stick by his story and give additional information, the investigator 
would then be in a good position to interview the alleged perpetrator and test his version 
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of events: 
 
"Did you ever take this kid to the movie? You did?"  And then have the... the worker 
look it up and see if there was a mo... a movie was playing, it was that movie. It was 
night time. Does somebody remember seeing the child? I mean, you have to... 
Little... the small things like that could break the case. "Oh, no that movie hasn't 
played here. That movie's over." Well, are you sure? Was there another cinema?  
Um... you know... "I never took this child to the movies." I mean little things like 
that that you could...  that a... um... novice worker could miss, your senior worker 
probably catch. Something as little as, "Hey, what movie did you see? Tell me about 
the movie." Cause the child could talk about a strict... a different movie, and then the 
AP say, "Oh yeah, we saw a comedy. It was hilarious. The lights were bright..."  You 
know, and the kid’s talking about, “It was Godzilla, and it was dark, and I was 
scared, and... and I got so scared that I was all over... you... all over the AP, cause I 
didn’t know... I was scared, I was trying to get under him.”  I mean, those are things 
that you have to look at, because those can help you determine your decision in a 
case. 
 
Once those interviews were done, says Jennifer, the Program Director, there would 
still be lots of investigation left to do: 
 
I would look at the history of these two, see if they’ve been conflect… conflictual in 
the past.  Look at the relationship between the parents? And see if there’s any reason 
for one to try to make the other one look bad? Um…  You know, you’d really have 
to talk to friends, relatives, and neighbors… and…and get a picture of what this 
family’s like. Um… cause we don’t know if there’s a criminal…in the family. If 
there’s been visits to the house by the police for domestic violence.  If… if… let’s 
see… if this Harry has a criminal history, he’s got any previous or CV… CPS 
history. Um… There’s a lot of things you could look to provide you clues. 
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 For Jennifer and Carmen the scenario has found a genre after all, that of the big case. 
Big cases take lots of work, lots of supervision, and are almost certain to involve 
regional and state level higher-ups, law enforcement, prosecutors, and defense attorneys, 
especially if the outcome tends toward “reason-to-believe.” Big cases are the ones most 
likely to get on the news and to have negative career impact.  
 This classification of the narrative is enhanced by another factor of the scenario, the 
family’s socioeconomic status. Sarah put it most forcefully: 
 
I think that when we get cases like this where the family involved is… more 
educated than they… the average client that we have, I think that what comes up for 
us is that it’s going to be more difficult, because they have more resources available 
to them, and they have more at stake to lose… You know, standing in the 
community, maybe a job, a good job, those kinds of things. So I think that when we 
get these kinds of cases, which we do get them, um… that’s our first thing is that we 
think, “Okay…”  Not that we aren’t thorough, but I think that we’re even more 
meticulous, because these are the kinds of folks, if we end up validating, they are 
going to come back… sometimes and, like I said, get a lawyer, do whatever, to try to 
dis…discount what we’ve done. 
 
 Sarah contrasts the way these educated families react to CPS involvement in their 
lives to the way working class families do: 
 
The average client that we get has more access to… and their lives are more public, 
because of… um… they have to get public assistance… Ch… chances are there’s 
more violence… not more, but more that’s reported.  So their… personal lives are 
more public, so they don’t have um… maybe as much… say… (What’s the word I’m 
looking for?) They don’t feel as embarrassed?  Or shamed… by having something 
external come into their lives and say, “You need to do this…,” you know. Their 
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lives being an open book is… they’re kind of used to that. Because the fact that often 
times they’re seeking some kind of services, be it food stamps, DHS [Department of 
Human Services]… you know, WIC, MHMR [Mental Health Mental Retardation] 
services, whatever. They’ve been a part of that external assistance…. 
I:  Being scrutinized and having people come into their houses and ask ‘em a 
bunch of questions is… not a new thing. 
 No.  I’m always amazed at the fact that when we knock on the door they never 
ask for an ID. And they’re al… almost always willing to let us in. Because that’s…. 
they’re kind of used to that. Me, who’s, you know, never even had the police at my 
house…  I’m […] “Who are you?  No, you’re not coming in.” Because I know.  I… I 
don’t have to let you in. Whereas they kind of tend to think that… they have to let us in. 
 
 Nancy, the attorney, also made early mention of the class issue: 
 
Well, I think - and this is interesting- having the fact that their wealthy, and 
prestigious and educated, makes it much more difficult. Which it shouldn't really 
but, um, you know, it makes you feel like you have to be much more cautious and 
careful.  
 
Wanda, an investigator of three years’ experience, reacted to the scenario’s inclusion 
of the family’s socioeconomic status much the same way Louise did to its inclusion of 
race. Her first words about the scenario were: 
 
I don’t want to know what they do. I don’t want to know that he’s this prominent 
psychiatrist, you know, ‘cause it’s like, “Okay, let me throw out my credentials at 
you, and that makes me not capable of doing this.” That’s annoying. 
 
Earlier in this chapter we heard Wanda’s story about having to endure a humiliating 
cross-examination in a custody trial. The attorney challenged the findings she’d made in 
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her investigation on the grounds that she was young and had had little life experience. 
He attempted to discredit her by showing that she lacked standing as a judge of houses, 
as an investigator, and as a credible person. That any assertion should be valued or 
devalued on the basis of “credentials” remains a sore subject for Wanda. Race, too, she 
sees somewhat in the same light. Wanda is white, and she says alleged perpetrators 
sometimes try to discredit her because of that: 
 
I had a family... he... he...  the, um... It was an interracial couple, white wife, black 
husband.  And then the kids were mixed. Their grandchildren were mixed with 
Hispanic and white. So he [the alleged perpetrator, the grandfather] decides that the 
only reason I’m doing all this, you know, beside the fact that he left this huge print 
on his child‘s... in his grandson’s face, from hitting him upside with a shoe... Um… 
I’m not concerned with that. I’m not concerned with the child’s safety. The only 
reason I got involved is ‘cause it’s an interracial family, and I’m racist. So, you 
know, it’s just an easy card to play.   
 
 “… I’m the wrong person to play that with,” Wanda says. She recounts a phone call 
she had with the grandfather during the investigation: 
 
I told that him I was in an interracial relationship, and I have family members who 
are interracial, so that made him even more mad, that, “Okay, well wait, I can’t play 
this card.  This isn’t working.”  So that made him even more frustrated with me.  
And he ended up just hanging up the phone.   
 
The genre the Harry scenario has the potential to become a member of, for Wanda, is 
the here-they-go-trying-to-put-me-down-again kind of case. Like the big case genre, it 
isn’t one that tends toward a certain outcome, as the custody cases do. Rather, it 
postulates a familiar kind of obstacle, one that will call upon her to adopt a certain 
emotional stance. Like all genres, it is, as Bruner says, a way of perceiving and 
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organizing a set of narrative elements that renders them comprehensible and 
psychologically manageable.  
Pennington and Hastie (1988, 1993a, 1993b) have shown that the fitting of elements 
into a story pattern is how jurors comprehend evidence in a trial. The responses of the 
participants to the Jackson and Nuttall scenarios show that the story framework upon 
which the evidence is fitted can acquire a particular structure at a very early point, as 
soon as it is decided what kind of story this will turn out to be. The assignment of a story 
to a genre reduces the anxiety of not knowing, provides an initial point of orientation, 
and sets a provisional course of action. Membership in a genre, as I remarked earlier 
about investigation stories generally, gives character and potential understandability to 
the gaps within them. In both March’s (1994, 1997) rule-based and Klein’s (1998) 
recognition-primed decision theories, recognizing a decision situation as being of a 
certain type is a necessary preliminary to the application of an appropriate protocol. That 
is precisely what these participants seem to be doing as they quickly classify cases by 
their most cognitively or emotionally salient features. 
It should be emphasized, however, that classification by genre is by no means a final 
act. A story’s genre can be changed or ignored, and we have seen conscientious 
investigators do just that, having learned to distrust their intellectual comfort and the 
ways in which they satisfy their desire to know. 
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CHAPTER VII 
“I’VE GOT TO SURVIVE IT SOME WAY”: 
FRIEDA ON THE CUSP 
 
 Of the decision-making styles of all the persons I interviewed for this study, Frieda’s 
seemed to me to have the widest range along the cognitive continuum. It covered both 
sides of the midpoint and could at times seem strongly intuitive, at others strongly 
analytical. This may be partly, though certainly not entirely, explained by her job 
situation. She has been in CPS for many years and is now one of two regional Risk 
Directors. The main function of these Program Director level positions is to review cases 
involving children under the age of five or who have been the subject of multiple 
allegations within the past year. The assumption is that even though thorough 
investigations have already been conducted, a significant risk of abuse or neglect could 
have been overlooked. An expert, looking over the entire history of the child’s CPS 
involvement with a dispassionate eye, might spot what others had not. The task structure 
of this work is clearly analytical, but Frieda had only been doing it a short time. 
Newness to an activity may of itself entail an intuitive mode of processing, since one has 
not as yet had time to acquire the detailed knowledge of structure upon which analysis 
(in the sense of breaking down into constituent parts) depends. Frieda’s unusual 
versatility may be partly attributable to that. 
 When I interviewed her, Frieda gave an immediate impression of being highly 
detailed-oriented and systematic in her approach to her job. She recited for me, without 
pause, the names of the ten counties whose cases she reviews. When she first began to 
describe her child death review responsibilities, she did so in terms of the form that she 
had to complete for each case. Unable to find one to show me, she listed from memory, 
again without pause, its various components: “... child vulnerability, home environment, 
caretaker capability, quality of care, social environment...” She said when she was 
investigator she went through each case “methodically,” and said it was dismaying to her 
that heavy caseloads kept most investigators from delving into previous CPS 
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involvement with a particular child as thoroughly as they ought to. 
 Frieda is also dismayed by what she sees as categorical inconsistencies in the 
application of the abuse and neglect definitions to different cases. She described two 
drowning cases with similar circumstances that reached different outcomes. In the first, a 
mother was bathing two of her children, one four and the other about a year old.  
 
And... things were out of the ordinary there. They were building a house. The father 
comes in. They were in a rush. The contractor’s there. They have to decide on the 
window height, because he needs to go purchase the windows, blah, blah. so he 
leaves, she comes out., she takes a look at that. She makes whatever comments and 
the little boy comes to the door screaming that the baby’s dead... 
 
 Four years after this tragedy the couple applied for a daycare center license, but were 
denied because of the validated neglect against them, of which they had not been 
properly notified. They requested an administrative review. Frieda found that the death 
had been ruled accidental by the Medical Examiner four years before, but she consulted 
with a CPS attorney and they decided not to change the finding of “reason-to-believe,” 
despite their recognition that there had been no intent to injure the child and that the 
family had been “devastated by the accident.” “Clearly,” says Frieda, “they left the child 
in the precarious position.”  
 By the same standard, the “reason-to-believe” finding in another case, which seemed 
to Frieda to turn on the same issue, should have been upheld as well. In it, a child 
wandered out of the house, fell into the swimming pool, and drowned. The child’s father 
knew the latch on the back door was broken and the door could easily be pushed open. 
He got busy in the kitchen, though, and didn’t notice the child go out. Frieda says, “I had 
my page of thinking,” comparing this case to the other, but she could not see a 
fundamental difference. (Using pencil and paper to think through a dilemma is yet 
another sign of Frieda’s systematic approach.) The attorney, however, found a legal 
distinction in that the mother in the first case had placed the child in the bathtub, but the 
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father in the second had not placed his child in the pool. Though he knew about the 
faulty latch, the awareness he should have had regarding the dangerousness of the 
situation was not equal to what the mother in the first case should have had. Frieda finds 
this distinction abstract and unconvincing. “It still gets into the supervision issue,” she 
says, and she struggles on occasion when “trying to figure out how this one is different 
from this one.” This is not the struggle we saw Louise, Sarah, and Melissa engaged in, as 
they endeavored to fit the facts of their cases into a coherent story framework. Frieda has 
instead analyzed her two cases into their constituent parts, discarding much of the 
particularizing narrative detail, and found that they have in common the essential 
situation of a parent recklessly ignoring a risk that he or she knew existed, resulting in a 
child’s death. That the category expert Frieda respects as such, the attorney, says the two 
cases in fact fall into separate categories by virtue of elements Frieda sees as inessential, 
makes her doubt her own categorizing ability. 
 Frieda sees the inability of investigators to so distill their cases as a significant 
barrier to accurate decision making, but also as a natural result of personal engagement 
with the people in the case. She describes one in which a family visited a lake and, as 
they were leaving, sent a two-year-old back to the water’s edge to fetch a toy they’d left 
behind – “a little shovel,” Frieda remembers. The child got into the lake and drowned. 
The local unit had not confirmed neglect against the mother, but Frieda, as with the other 
two drowning cases she described, felt it had to be categorized as “reason-to-believe.” 
 
I think child deaths are hard for staff to work because, you know, we might just go 
out and slam a “reason-to-believe” on a family with good cause or lack of 
supervision, and, you know, there’s been no child death or whatever. But then, when 
a child death occurs, then, I mean it grapples at everybody’s… uh… heart, because 
you’re having to be… deal with people in a crisis situation. You’re heightened in the 
way your response to them, as far as, you’re hyper-vigilant with the family. You’re, 
you know, trying to control all the emotional things that are going on to try to get the 
information that you need, and sometimes those investigations, because you feel so 
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badly for the family in their trauma and their tragedy that sometimes, I think you… 
you don’t want to say anything else that’s going to upset them. 
 
 The investigators’ immersion in the ghastly story of the case, with all it attendant 
emotions, forestalls proper categorization. She does not blame the investigators for this 
failing, but sees it as justification for her own level and style of review. 
 With so much evidence of Frieda’s systematic orientation, I was quite surprised 
when, about halfway through the interview, she left off describing her social work 
education to tell the following story: 
 
… I was a supervisor for about six or seven years, and we read… I want to say 
thousands of cases. But you read, like for example, as a supervisor once I had a case, 
and as you work with your workers, you know who does what, what they skim over, 
what they do a good job at, what they don’t like to do, what they skip, kind of thing. 
And I had taken a box of cases home to read or whatever, and I lay down on the bed. 
I thought, “Oh, this’ll be great.   I’ll just lay here and read this.” And I… I had just 
laid down, I was reading this case, and I don’t know what about that case it was, 
but… Well, I do know kind of what it was, but I was reading along or whatever, you 
know, blah, blah, blah., blah, and I sat up. You know, it was kind of dramatic, 
because… I…you sit up and you read that…  “Did I read that or what?”  And I 
thought, “He didn’t see this kid.  That’s… There’s no way… he didn’t see this kid.”  
You know, it was like, he said all this blah, blah, blah… I know he didn’t see this kid 
from what this says. I just know…. 
I:  And how did you know?  You said just a minute ago you do know what it 
was. What was it? 
I think it was the way it was written, the ambiguity it was written with, the… all 
of the other… looking back on it, probably… He had more factual detail in it, and 
almost like the reading of it, it almost caused you to question whether he really saw 
this kid or if he was just a good storyteller. 
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I:  I see. 
So, I picked up the phone, and I called the family, and I said, “I’m… apologize. 
This is late, but I’m reading this case and I have to know some information.” I said, 
“Did my caseworker, da da da, did he interview this child?” And they said no. You 
know?  And I thought, “Whoa!” You know?  And I said, “Well, did they interview 
the other one?” and he said yes. I said, “Well, I’d like to come out tomorrow or 
whenever, and talk to you all.” And so when I went out to the house and talked to 
them and what have you, I got the other child on the phone, who was out of town 
somewhere and talked to him to verify if he had seen this worker, and sure enough, 
he hadn’t, you know? So I mean maybe that came from… I mean I certainly didn’t 
set out to read his case, thinking he hadn’t seen that kid, but when I read that it was 
kind of like a stark kind of reaction. I mean, I sat up… 
I:  Like the hair standing up… 
Yeah, it was like “What…” you know.  And sure en… and sure enough…  And 
then… Well, I don’t know if that plays into the intuitive, or if you’ve just read so 
much of their work you know what weaknesses you’ve been trying to work with, or 
what strengths you’re trying to build on. But… you know, of course there was 
personnel action in regard to that, so you had several issues… 
 
 This is as striking an intuition story as was offered by any participant in this study. 
Those who prided themselves on their intuitions would have been delighted to have this 
one’s out-of-nowhereness, its specificity, its sudden, visceral coming, and its 
unambiguous verification as regular features of their own. Frieda explains it, of course, 
in a mundane way as based in a thorough familiarity with the dishonest investigator’s 
writing. Even so, she is unable to say very precisely what the cue had been. She says, “I 
think it was the way it was written, the ambiguity it was written with…” though 
somehow at the same time it had “more factual detail” in it than seemed right. Frieda is 
trying to be analytical about her intuition, but the intuition resists. 
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 Frieda follows with a second example of her intuitive prowess. She made a 
presentation to a junior high school about CPS, and, when it was over the school’s law 
enforcement officer showed her a letter one of the children in the class she’d presented 
to had written describing sexual abuse perpetrated against her. Frieda says she knew 
immediately which child it had been: “She sat there the whole time with her hair, you 
know, she had her hair down, or she was just very distracted…” For Frieda this 
somewhat more ordinary instance of intuition is most meaningful as a sign that 
experience does train one’s perceptions, that over time one becomes “attuned.”  
 The clearest example of the way Frieda combines intuition and analysis in her work 
is the way she reads the cases she reviews. CPS policy, as I described in Chapter I, tries 
to set limits to the decisional power of any one person, especially the investigator. The 
more important the decision, the more decision makers are required to participate and 
the higher up the hierarchy it must go. There is a paradox in this, however, that 
supervisors and administrators commonly remark upon. Their ability to make good 
decisions depends on the quality of the information they get from the investigators. In 
the great majority of cases, even supervisors never see or hear the victims, perpetrators, 
or witnesses in a case. Everything they know about it comes to them through the 
investigators. They are, as several participants put it, the “eyes and ears” of the agency. 
Supervisors have the advantage of being able to question the investigators directly.  
Pauline, a former supervisor, describes a kind of Socratic process of detailed prompting 
through which she develops a full case story. “What did you see?”  she would ask. 
“What do you think about what you saw?” Sarah, a current supervisor, reports doing the 
same thing: “I mean I have certain questions that I ask as we go… when they call me or 
come in and staff.” The purpose is not only to assist and correct the caseworkers, but to 
mentor them and help them reach their own conclusions (Salus, 1997). Further up the 
ladder, though, that option disappears. They decide from the written record only. Victor, 
the ombudsman, says he has the option of talking to the investigators who have produced 
the documentation he reviews, but seldom does so. “If you haven't done it, then you 
haven't done it. You don't get ‘do-overs’ in this... this business. Once a case is closed, it's 
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closed.” He seems to mean by this that he is reluctant to allow CPS an opportunity to 
answer evidence and challenges to evidence that the appellant does not have. It does not 
seem unfair, however, to speculate that Victor is also reluctant to allow additions to the 
body of evidence at this stage, which would likely hamper, rather than make easier, the 
task of conceptualizing the case, finding the essence of the case that permits it to be 
judged as fitting or not fitting the relevant statutory definition of abuse or neglect. 
 Reading a case at the review level, then, would seem naturally to call for an 
abstracting, distilling reading. When I asked Frieda, though, whether she thought having 
only the case record to go by as she made her judgments was an advantage or a 
disadvantage, she protested my assumption that the documentation cut her off from 
important features of the case: 
 
Well, I think when you read those cases, I think you pick up on what the caseworker 
is seeing, if there’s any documenta… if it’s at… halfway decent, you know.  You can 
pick up on what they’re seeing and what they’re thinking.  Um… The pictures, of 
course, always help, you know, as you’re weaving it… 
 
 As Frieda goes on she refers to a case she’d told me about earlier in the interview, 
one of her child death reviews, in which a child’s head had been crushed after he fell off 
a piece of farm machinery on which he’d been allowed to ride: 
 
Yeah, I think you get the flavor and you get the… you… some of them, you know, 
are better than others, but you can… Like the one where the child was killed on the 
four-wheeler.  You know, I mean, it was kind of factual or whatever, but you pretty 
well placed yourself out there on that ranch.  You could almost see them coming 
down the road, you know, how far away it was from the house, um, what the father 
had said when he went in, um, and it’s kind of like, um… I think, if they… because 
the way that they write or whatever, they’re trying to capture what they saw, you 
know, the subjective kind of things might be…    
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 There is an apparent paradox here. We have seen, in the drowning cases, how, by 
way of analyzing them and distilling them to a judicable essence, Frieda pares away the 
same particularities she is claiming here to realize so fully. I can only suppose that 
Frieda’s first reading of the case is a naïve one. She sees the sights, hears the sounds, and 
engages the characters of the case as though her sole responsibility was to be an active 
and appreciative reader. Only by taking such a stance, suspending, for the moment, 
awareness of her decision-making role, can she comprehend the range and depth of what 
happened, and that vivid, felt comprehension of what happened is the only responsible 
point from which the abstracting work of the analysis can proceed. The naïve reading, in 
other words, is a necessary preliminary to analysis. Only through it can Frieda bring all 
the elements of the case to light, including the feelings, motives, and experiences of the 
persons involved, from which she can choose, later, those that are essential, that form the 
stark, spare lines of her judgment. 
 Persons whose decision-making styles are firmly analytic speak often of the 
judgment errors so prevalent in the tenements at the other end of the continuum. And the 
intuitionists complain, in a much less organized way, of the aridity, narrowness, 
literalness, and blindness to consequence of judgments made in the tidy little ranch 
houses at the other end, of what we may, for want of a better term, call judgment 
stereotypes. Their nature is captured in stories such as “Billy Budd,” where the dutiful 
Captain Vere finds no way out of executing the endearing title character, despite his and 
the other officers’ knowledge of the story that makes such an outcome absurdly unjust. 
Protest against judgment stereotypes is heard in the homily from Second Corinthians, 
“For the letter killeth, but the spirit giveth life,” and in the rebuke an understanding 
father delivers to a morally outraged son in N. Richard Nash‘s play, The Rainmaker: 
"Noah, you're so full of what's right you can't see what's good."  
 The movement of Frieda’s reading from intuitive to analytic recapitulates the 
experience of the investigator as he or she worked the case. Suspension of judgment is 
necessary during the evidence collection phase, in order to avoid confirmation bias and, 
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even if unconsciously, investigating in one direction only instead of working outward 
from the center evenly. And judgment, when the time for that comes, must ruthlessly 
exclude associations that would make too much of some pieces of evidence and too little 
of others. The stages of Frieda’s reading recapitulate, too, the movement of her career, 
from being an investigator and conservatorship worker to, now, being a full-time case 
analyst. 
 Frieda has happy memories of being a young social worker. She liked being “out 
there where the action was,” and working with the police, who were “always a lot of 
fun.” “And we did have fun,” she says. She also, however has frustrating memories of 
being unable, despite great effort, to make a difference in her clients’ lives: 
 
… My first go-around with the agency I was pretty much rose-colored. I had… 
There was a psychologist friend that said, “Oh, there comes the rose-colored social 
worker.” A rose-eyed glass, or whatever. Um… back then I thought everybody loved 
their children and wanted to take care of them, do what was right, you know, but, 
um… Back then, I thought that… um… children could change, that I could almost 
will them to change, um, because I was so interested in them and I wanted to help 
them, and we were going to get whatever, and they would be okay. And I… I 
committed to a little boy on my caseload… um… who was autistic. And for him to 
get this special school training that he needed, I had to haul him over there every 
afternoon to catch his bus home.  I forget how he got there, but the school system 
couldn’t get him from point A to B. And so every day at two o’clock I had to be like 
the parent going and picking him up and getting him over to that next leg of his trip. 
But it was that important to me that I wanted that child to have that chance, because I 
guess I thought it was going to make the difference. Which, in the end, it did not 
make the difference, but when I was doing it, you know, I felt like, you know, that it 
was really critical. And I think it, you know… I guess I was always so… bound and 
determined to have things work out right, you know?   
 
190 
 One can imagine the pain of having one’s hopes “to have things work out” be 
continually dashed. That unrelenting disappointment, along with crushing caseloads and 
low salaries, is what drives many young caseworkers out of the profession.  In 2001, the 
turnover rate among CPS caseworkers in Texas was 27.9% (Texas Department of 
Protective and Regulatory Services, 2001). Some of those who move up the ladder in 
CPS do so partly in order to escape the emotional wear and tear of fieldwork. Pauline, 
now a policy maker, formerly a trainer and supervisor, describes an event that told her it 
was time to leave the field: 
 
…I was in East Dallas, and it was late on a Friday afternoon. It was hot, hot, hot, hot.  
And I… and I went to do an investigation, and I’m sitting there listening to this 
mom, and it was just awful. And I knew… Robert, I knew, it was like, “This is bad 
for this kid.  I’m going to have to do a removal.” And… and I did.  And I worked ‘til 
real late that night. And I remember just being physically exhausted? And 
emotionally exhausted because it was a situation where I think that this mom… 
emotionally was attached to this kid? But couldn’t do it. And so taking kids away 
from their parents is…is hard work. And then, when I started it I was tired anyway, 
so I knew. Anyway, I got home, and my son was probably only two or three at the 
time. And… uh… he was still up. He was waiting to see me, and I… I walked in, 
you know, and I was [just all,] so I put down my bag, and I’m kissing on him and I 
open up my briefcase, and all these roaches come crawling out of it. They crawled in 
when I was in her home. And they crawled on my little boy. And  you know, it 
was… it was a v… it was a visual of, “I need to stop this shit… because I’m bringing 
it home. I’m bringing it home and I need to get out of the… out of the… like the war 
zone.”  Yeah. 
I:  When you say bringing it home, it sounds like you mean not just the roaches, 
but all of it.   
All of it. I think… That’s what it symbolized for me, Robert, when I watched it 
happing, happen, was that, it’s not just that I’m bringing roaches home to my baby, 
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but that all of this… all of this… all this shit that I… I’m exposed to, I’m bringing 
that home, too. And I didn’t want to do it any more.   
 
 In subtle ways, Frieda shows that contact with abused and neglected children and 
their families still exacts an emotional cost, even at the distance of case review. When I 
asked her whether she thought reading about so many child deaths would get her down 
over time, she replied: 
 
Um… well… It probably… um… it might, I guess, it… ‘cause you’re having more 
of a big dose of it. What I’ve been kind of interested in trying to do – and I don’t 
know how to put it together – would be to have a map of our region and somehow 
plat the.. the child deaths by areas by… by locale, kinds of deaths that they were, 
like, you know, these farm implement things, you know? Or like, like the drownings, 
or like the neglectful sup[ervision], then trying to figure out if you had more deaths 
coming out of one PD area than another.   
 
 Frieda seems to dodge the question by almost immediately changing the subject to 
her plans to make a map of the child deaths, in hopes of showing clusters by region and 
by type. But I think the change of subject was not random, and she answered my 
question more fully and directly than I first supposed. Frieda is saying yes, it will get me 
down, it does get me down, but I have the ability to look at these cases schematically, 
with their suffering and their potential to cause more suffering stripped away. She can 
mentally reduce these episodes to pins on a map, with no other than statistical 
significance. What Frieda cannot do is take permanent refuge in the abstract, however. 
Her natural curiosity about what happened, her sense of justice, and, above all, her 
commitment to the clients, prevents her from disdaining the intuitive approach 
altogether, even with its attendant costs. She has to go back in every time she pulls up a 
new case. 
 Frieda goes on: 
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I kind of feel like I… um… on these child deaths… I guess the thing that I’ve 
noticed about reading these cases is that they are… um… after you’ve spent all this 
time in them, it’s like you feel like you really know these families, you know? And 
you… it’s been surprising to me that you can recall… But, you… I mean, I’ve 
suffered through these cases because they’ve been so long and tedious and you spend 
days on some of them, you know, and it’s like, “Gross!” I… you know, it’s like… 
you want out of this quagmire that… um… Then, by the time I finish one of them – 
of course, like I said, I haven’t got the hang of it yet… I’m still, like Ida told me – 
she’s our other lead PD down here … She said, “You know, you’re putting a lot 
more detail in them than what they were before,” you know.  And I said, “Well 
maybe it’s ‘cause I… don’t know where to cut it off.”   But I’ve got to survive it 
some way. 
 
 Those final words, “I’ve got to survive it some way,” seem to indicate that Frieda 
sees her attention to detail and her copious writing (her “pages of thinking”), the tools 
and methods of her analysis, as coping mechanisms. They allow her to immerse herself 
in so many instances of what Janice Angstrom in Rabbit, Run thinks of as “the worst 
thing that has ever happened” (Updike, 1960, p, 227) without being emotionally 
overwhelmed by them. Analysis relieves the stress of imaginative association with the 
people and events of the case. 
 One might assume that someone occupying a middle position on the cognitive 
continuum would do so through the exercise of a Stoic moderation, that such a person’s 
psychological maturity and self-possession allow her to select cognitive tools for 
different tasks with the sureness and aplomb of a professional golfer picking the right 
club for a tricky approach to the green. In Frieda’s case, however, the middle position is 
not so much an easy versatility as a battleground where one style gives way to another 
out of compulsion, doubt, and anxiety. A ragged, fitful, and unconscious dialectic, rather 
than a conscious orchestration, Frieda’s mixture of intuition and analysis is hardly 
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something one could recommend or teach to others. It is, however, like the range of 
styles across CPS decision making generally, a necessary ingredient of whatever justice 
it produces. 
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CHAPTER VIII 
CONCLUSION 
 
 In this study I have examined the use of analytic and intuitive judgment by 20 
persons engaged in making decisions in child abuse and neglect investigations. My 
findings support those of other studies in which personal histories and values were seen 
to play a significant role in CPS decision making, especially at the investigator level 
(Craft and Bettin, 1991; Craft, Epley, and Clarkson, 1980; Drury-Hudson, 1999; 
McGovern, 1991; Munro, 1996, 1999; O’Donohue and Fanetti, 1996; Rossi, Schuerman, 
and Budde, 1999; Shapira and Benbenishty, 1993). Analysis of the participants' case 
narratives revealed that experiences and personal ethics affect the way they represent 
cases to themselves, which in turn affects the judgments they make about them. I do not, 
however, draw the same conclusion from this finding that some others have drawn, that 
intuitive judgment is too unreliable a tool for the important work of decision making in 
CPS and should, whenever possible, be contained, if not replaced, with decision making 
by groups or actuarial models like the IRA. I conclude this because it has also been my 
finding that the experiences and ethics of CPS employees are indispensable elements of 
their identities as investigators, as administrators, as ombudsmen and attorneys. Personal 
values are not only what bring them to these demanding jobs in the first place and allow 
them to endure their daily emotional depredations, they are sources of innovation, 
insight, and justice as much as they are sources of error. They serve as correctives to the 
values and absence of value of a system that routinely moves too quickly, pays more 
attention to process than outcome, and to the general than the particular. Instead of 
trying to minimize the effects of personal value on decision making across the board, 
trainers, supervisors, and policy makers should instead try to minimize its undesirable 
effects, while preserving, or even enhancing, its benefits. The training of new 
investigators should, first, acknowledge the large role that intuitive thinking plays in 
CPS decision making and, second, develop ways to help decision makers discipline 
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intuition, to use Pauline’s phrase once more, and to create conditions that foster the 
optimal functioning of it.  
 As McGowan (Gambrill and McGowan, 1994) has said, no matter how useful 
actuarial risk assessment instruments become, or how much we come to rely on them, 
intuition can never be calibrated out. It is exercised in the administration of the 
instruments themselves, in entering a score, for instance, to indicate whether a caretaker 
lacks empathy for a child. Barring the development of some sort of automatic people-
and-environment scanning device to do such scoring, data will go into the linear model 
through the intuition of human beings. There will always be exceptional cases, as well, 
with factors the current linear model has not been built to recognize, and worker 
judgment will always be necessary. Furthermore, as England has pointed out (1994), no 
risk assessment, however arrived at, by itself indicates what should happen next. 
Decisions must still be made about removal, placement, services, and prosecution. 
 Intuition plays an even deeper role in casework than that, however. Iser, in his theory 
of reading comprehension (1971, 1974), sees a literary text as being constituted by a 
large number of individual views, the full series of which displays the literary object one 
representative aspect at a time. The connections between these views are filled in not by 
the text itself, but by the reader, through the “free play of meaning-projection” (Iser, 
1971, p. 12). This is not usually a conscious process; we can infer its existence by the 
different interpretations different readers impose on a text, as well as different meanings 
we glean from the same text in different readings. Moreover, the meaning making that 
supplies the linkages among a text’s views is an inescapably personal one, which draws 
not only upon the reader’s cultural knowledge, but upon his or her individual 
experiences and emotions as well. Reading, by this account, is a constant interplay 
between expectation and recollection, self and not-self, self-assertion and passivity. By 
extension, we may say that this is very similar to the process of meaning making in an 
investigation. The evidence in an abuse case is obviously not authored in the same sense 
that the views of a literary text are. Yet, as I have argued in Chapter IV, it is an 
unavoidable assumption on the part of investigators that credible case evidence reflects 
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the univocal, knowable, external truth of what really happened. The evidence therefore 
may be considered as intended, organized, and made available to comprehension by that 
truth. So the case may be read in the same way that a literary text is read, and the gaps 
between its bits of testimonial, documentary, physical, and demonstrative evidence are 
filled in the way that Iser describes. In fact, we may say that the initially disparate and 
incoherent pieces of evidence become a “case” only as they are connected to one another 
in the activity of narrative meaning making. Intuition, and the narrative mode of thought, 
are constitutive of every case conceived as a case, and cannot be removed without 
forfeiting any understanding of it whatever. 
 Iser also makes the point (1978) that the difference between critics and ordinary 
readers is that critics have to defend the way they fill the gaps in a particular text and 
show why their manner of doing so is appropriate for it. This implies that the process of 
meaningful gap-filling during reading, which usually occurs unconsciously, can not only 
be brought into conscious, but can, at least to some degree, be controlled, as when one 
interprets a text according to the principles of a broader theory of meaning (a Freudian 
reading of Jo’s Boys, for example). It also implies that one critic may defend his or her 
meaning making successfully, and persuade others of its value, while another may not. 
Individual acts interpretation, in other words, can vary in quality. Thagard’s explanation 
criteria (1989) – coverage, coherence, uniqueness, and goodness-of-fit – would no doubt 
be useful in determining such quality, as would Hirsh’s (1967) notion of 
correspondence, which proceeds from the assumption that the form and meaning of a 
text reflect one another. “Internal evidence by itself might possibly indicate that one 
hypothesis makes functional [i. e., is able to use as evidence] more elements of the mute 
text than a rival hypothesis” (Hirsch, 1967, p. 190). 
 Investigators are like Iser’s critics in that they, too, must be able to explain and 
defend the connections they make among the bits of evidence in their investigations. 
They must make conscious the normally unconscious process of narrative inference that 
Pennington and Hastie (1993b) discovered mock jurors using in their efforts to construct 
an explanatory narrative of the evidence presented in a trial. In addition, investigators 
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must police their inferences and reject those that are fallacious, as some of Pennington 
and Hastie’s participants, and, presumably, people in general, do not. They must go a 
step beyond that, however, and reject, at least tentatively, inferences that achieve only 
coherence and do not advance the case toward correspondence with the truth of what 
happened, or, with respect to risk assessment, the truth of what kind of family this really 
is. Correspondence is achieved when an intuitive, inferential, or narrative connection can 
hold up under further investigation, when it can be tested, when it passes the scrutiny of 
decision makers further up the hierarchy. We have seen how Carmen, in telling her story 
about the teenage girl who accused her stepfather of sexual abuse, hesitated to make the 
inferences that would have made the story, and the case itself, successful. The necessary 
inferences would have passed all coherence tests, but Carmen flunked them anyway 
because, as the alleged victim never recanted her “beautiful” outcry, and her accusation, 
though discredited, was never proven false, they did not have for her the imprimatur of 
real truth. Similarly, Gretchen could not fully believe her intuition that the parents sitting 
in the dark were up to no good until she had kept the case open long enough to prove it, 
and Frieda had to validate her intuition that the documentation she read was fabricated 
by going out to interview the family it was supposedly about. The narrative coherence 
intuition can generate is desirable in and of itself, but its highest function is to point the 
way toward a correspondence between the narrative and reality, which correspondence 
seems to feel honestly earned only as it’s been gone out and gotten, hammered out on the 
anvil of checking, rechecking, measuring, arguing, watching, and asking. 
 The gaps in a literary text that Iser describes are roughly similar to a gap in 
consciousness identified by Searle (2001). For Searle, only irrational actions follow 
directly upon impulses. “The operation of rationality presupposes that there is a gap 
between the set of intentional states on the basis of which I make my decision, and the 
actual making of the decision” (Searle, 2001, p. 13). To the extent that this gap is filled 
automatically – by habit, by indifference, by convention, by the overwhelming strength 
of the intentional state – the resulting decision is deprived not only of rationality, but of 
freedom. It follows, then, that rationality, both in action and interpretation, consists in 
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allowing, recognizing, and making good use of the gap that could or should follow upon 
the perceived offering of an action or belief. When we are constructing stories to account 
for a given set of people, circumstances, and events, or among the memories we have or 
our own lives, we are free to choose which elements to connect to one another, as well as 
what the nature and degree of each connection should be. Of the great many connection 
arrays that are possible, some are salient almost immediately. They create a story that is 
like others one has heard, that satisfies an emotional need, or that answers very well the 
question that has brought one to seek a narrative explanation in the first place. 
Acceptance of any of these stories, however, and the individual connections that make 
them possible, does not happen immediately upon noticing their appeal, when the 
process of narrative meaning making, in its large and small movements, is made rational. 
 To view intuitive processes as forms of rationality would strike many as paradoxical, 
if not reductive and misleading. Bruner, however, though he contrasts the narrative and 
paradigmatic and says they are “irreducible” to one another (1986, p. 11), he sees both as 
modes of thought. Both are aimed at discovering relationships among variables, general 
on the one hand, specific on the other, including cause and effect. Both are in the 
business of explaining things. It is not necessary to see them as secretly being one 
another to accept that the intuitive and the systematic draw from the same cognitive 
toolbox, to use the analogy of Gigerenzer et al. (1999) and have the aim of making the 
lived world comprehensible. 
 Fisher (1987) makes an explicit connection between narrative and rationality, as well 
as between rationality and ethics. He contends that narrative rationality is a kind of logic, 
by which communication is evaluated. Its major principles are probability and fidelity. 
Probability comprises coherence of structure, coherence of material, which is measured 
by comparison with other stories, and coherence of character, which a story has when its 
characters consistently represent of a stable set of values. Fidelity, the truth of a story, 
has to do with what Fisher calls the logic of good reasons. This logic consists of 
elements that provide cause for an audience to accept the advice offered in any 
communication that can be called rhetorical, which he takes all narrative to be. These 
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elements include a showing that the facts put forward are really facts, and that no facts 
have been left out of consideration, that the arguments offered are not only relevant, but 
address the real issue at hand. Though Fisher claims that his version of narrative 
rationality is descriptive, rather than normative, it does permit distinction between good 
stories and bad stories, between those that are truthful and those that are not.  
 Similarly, Robinson and Hawpe (1986) see narrative thinking as a way of 
deliberating causes, different from scientific thinking mainly in its focus upon particular, 
rather than general causes, and its tolerance of multiple, simultaneously possible 
explanations, not in having radically different aims or methods. As in science, some 
explanations are better than others in that they stand up to testing. Stories, say Robinson 
and Hawpe, are in a constant process of revision, acquiring ever-greater adequacy 
through a process of inquiring, identifying, and selecting information. The temporary 
end of the process is a new story, “context-bound, concrete, and testable through 
ordinary interpersonal checking” (Robinson and Hawpe, 1986, p. 114). 
 If narrative, and intuition generally, did not operate as a form of rationality naturally, 
it would certainly acquire that character as it became shaped and acquired domain 
specificity though application within an institution. Furthering the rationalization of 
cultural and psychological processes is a primary function of bureaucracy, according to 
Weber, along with the cultivation of the “personality type of the professional expert” 
(Gerth and Mills, 1946, p. 240). Bureaucracy would therefore deem it essential to foster 
the rationalization of the meaning and decision making of its own members. It does so 
through a process of what Berger and Luckmann (1967) call secondary socialization, 
which is the internalization of an institution’s values, aims, and procedures. The 
inculcation of a specialized vocabulary and the habituation to a set of routinized tasks 
lead to the assumption of roles within the institution. A role, for Berger and Luckmann, 
is not merely a matter of performance, but requires initiation into “the various cognitive 
and even affective layers of the body of knowledge that is directly and indirectly 
appropriate” to it (1967, p. 77). Secondary socialization, where it is effective, structures 
both conduct and interpretation. 
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 Several researchers who have found the quality of intuitive judgment and lacking 
have made recommendations as to how the interpretations can be structured to bring 
about a higher level of reliability and accuracy. Hogarth (2001), who defines intuition as 
unconscious learning within a particular knowledge domain, contends that such learning 
will be optimized when decision makers learn to: 
• Impose circuit breakers, or psychological mechanisms that interrupt automatic 
reaction and meaning making; 
• Prevent emotion from being determinative in judgment, but use it instead as data; 
• Use narrative thinking to rearrange elements of a problem and explore 
connections; 
• Accept the fact that choices frequently put different desired outcomes in conflict 
with one another and therefore involve tradeoffs; and 
• Internalize the scientific method: observe, form hypotheses, test, revise 
hypotheses, retest, generalize. 
 Gambrill (1997) has made similar recommendations with regard to training in CPS. 
She, too, believes that promulgation of a more rigorously empirical approach to 
casework, which she terms evidence-based practice, would allow agencies to field 
caseworkers who are properly skeptical and who would be on guard against sources of 
error in the evidence, in the environment, and in themselves. In addition, Gambrill 
would have staff trained on the different sources of fallibility, in order to combat 
overconfidence. And, like Drury-Hudson (1999), she believes that greater knowledge of 
social work theory and of current research would help depersonalize and debias 
investigative judgments in the field.  
 Munro (1999) has suggested that, given the failures to which intuitive judgment is 
prone, CPS decision making should supplement it whenever possible with analytic tools, 
and learn to treat intuitions as hypotheses that need testing. She has also argued, 
however, that the main thing that administrators could do to improve decision making 
would be simply to allow more time for it (1996). There should be more time to 
investigate, more time to staff cases with supervisors and others, and more time simply 
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to think about the evidence. The pressure to close cases quickly predisposes caseworkers 
to avoidable error. 
 Most of the participants in this study would agree. Barbara, the State Risk Director, 
says: 
The errors that I see them making, sometimes I have to say, you know maybe if they 
had... instead of 25 investigations, new investigations every month, and they had 
something that was more workable, they wouldn't be making some of these mistakes.  
 Carmen, who supervises, tells of a conversation she had with her boss, a Program 
Director: 
 
And one of the... the comments she had in there is I need to learn how to balance 
time and the closure of cases. And she says it's very difficult and this is just not for 
you. It's something I tell everybo... every one of my supervisors because it’s... it is 
that difficult. Um... and I had her, I said, "Well, explain to me exactly time and 
closing cases. It's my job to get these cases closed, but at the same time it's... it’s my 
job to make sure that the cases are completed to their utmost, that.... there's all the 
investigations completed -- home visits, collateral calls -- yet you're on my back to 
close these cases. So I'm on their back to every up and do… So yeah, I might blink 
an eye at one less home visit. I might blink another eye at one less collateral because 
you're on my butt to close these cases." So she says y... there's a balance you have to 
find for yourself where -- and this is where your judgment comes in and your 
decision-making comes in, where it's really, really, really scary. 
 
 Carmen’s implication is that in the day-to-day operation of an investigative unit her 
judgments have less to do with what the evidence shows in a given case and whether the 
children involved are at risk of harm, than with the maintenance of good numbers on the 
delinquency list while at the same time avoiding closing any of the wrong cases too 
early. She is certainly aware, as Hogarth would have her be, of the conflicting goods in 
the decisions she must make, and the tradeoffs each option entails. And, as we saw in her 
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narrative in Chapter IV, she has a highly developed system of circuit breakers that 
prevent automatic judgments. It pains her, though, that, because of caseload pressure, 
management goals should claim a larger share of these skills and sensitivities than her 
investigators or her families do. 
 The dilemma is phrased most pointedly, perhaps, by Melissa, a relatively new 
investigator: 
 
Every day I get a case, and there’s just not a …  this is not a 40 hour a week job. And 
I don’t, I don’t think it’s fair, to be required to make a fair assessment, a crucial 
assessment within 30 days. It’s not fair to the families and it’s not fair to the 
children.  I think that, you know, I mean, this is…  I really feel like it… I have a 
really important job, and um, 10 years down the road, you know, I, I don’t w… I 
would hate to see one of my kids in HEB [a local grocery store chain] and him say, 
“You know, you really messed up my life, because that never happened to me.” You 
know, and… I, I just feel like, you know, I’m walking a plank, and I’ve got to make 
a decision really quick, ‘cause I’m close to the end, and, you know, then I’m 
gonna… I can’t take vacation. You know? So then, you know, you start making 
decisions based on what you got, and not based on what’s going on. 
 
 Short deadlines are, in general, one of the elements of a decision task that make it 
more suitable for an intuitive approach. Melissa, as intuition-oriented as she is, would 
not be likely to claim that if she had more time she could be more systematic. Her idea 
seems to be, rather, that with more time to work a case she could visit the family more 
often and learn more about them. Her intuitive understanding of the case would deepen 
and acquire detail, so that eventually what she “had” would come to correspond with the 
truth of what was “going on.” What would in effect be happening, though, with the 
greater number of visits, over a longer period of time and under varying circumstances, 
is that Melissa would be increasing her sample size and testing hypotheses, thereby 
making her judgments more valid. Her intuitiveness, in other words, would, whether she 
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willed it or not, become systematic. 
 Nurius, Kemp, and Gibson (1990) have argued that sound reasoning can only take 
place in an environment that supports it through supervision, consultation, staff training, 
appropriate work organization, and agency culture. The rule of thumb proposed by 
Deming (Barnes and Van Wormer, n. d.), that 85% of an organization’s problems are the 
result of systems and management failures, and only 15% are attributable to the failures 
of individual employees, could well be applicable here.  
 There is an inescapable paradox here, however, as pointed out by Berger and 
Luckmann (1967): “Individuals perform discrete institutionalized actions within the 
context of their biography” (p. 65, italics mine). Though secondary socialization causes 
people to act in certain ways, it never reduces their sense of doing so out of coherent and 
stable selves. Institutions modify, but cannot fully appropriate an identity that must be 
experienced as continuous both with what one was before coming to the institution and 
with what one is outside it, in one’s other identifications. Moreover, the pre-institutional 
or extra-institutional aspects of identity can set limits and conditions to the institutional 
aspects in order to increase compatibility and reduce conflict. In terms of March’s rule-
based decision theory (1994, 1997), the identity one applies to a situation is composed of 
meaning associations related to an organizational role, though not only those. Meaning 
associations from the whole of one’s life become incorporated into the institutional 
identity, as the investigator identities of different participants in this study have become 
inextricably bound up with their being African-American, being a single mother, or 
being a young woman.  
 Another factor that limits the ability of an institution to reproduce its aims fully and 
without complication in its members is the fact that the various practices it cultivates and 
employs foster identity elements of their own. As Wenger has put it (1998), “The 
landscape of practice is not congruent with the reified structures of institutional 
affiliations, divisions, and boundaries.” Identification as an investigator, a manager, an 
attorney, an expert judge of cases, is not the same as identification as a CPS employee. 
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Conflict can occur between the practice and employee identifications just as it can 
between those identifications and other others based on culture, class, race, or gender.  
It is quite false, then, to say, as Hummel does (1987), that as one becomes socialized into 
a bureaucracy, organizational identity completely replaces autonomous personality and 
individual conscience is extracted and distributed across the organizational hierarchy. As 
we have seen, personality and conscience are fully active in the way CPS staff members 
make decisions about cases. They are persons with not just one, but many 
identifications, both personal and professional. They manifest them into one another and 
manifest into each of them a personal notion of the good. As the philosophers Taylor 
(1989) and MacIntyre (1981) have argued, selfhood and morality are tightly woven 
together. For MacIntyre, the unity of a person’s life is that of a narrative quest. In all our 
practices and all our identifications, we look for a “conception of the good which will 
enable us to order other goods” (p. 204). The virtues are dispositions – toward 
truthfulness, moderation, courage, and compassion – that benefit the practices in which 
we are engaged, that help us overcome the “harms, dangers, temptations, and 
distractions which we encounter,” and permit us to continue to gain knowledge of 
ourselves and of the good. 
 The stories we have heard from these 20 persons engaged in the practice of 
investigating and deliberating allegations of child abuse are from the narrative of their 
lives. Ostensibly work stories and case narratives, they are as representative of their 
personal and communal quest for the good as any story they could tell about themselves. 
And the virtues they express, both despite of and because of their grounding in the 
personal and ethical, carry out the mission of child protective services in a way that 
technique by itself could never do. Technique has no true usefulness that does not derive 
from a sense of the good held by the person or persons that apply it. 
 I am aware that the use I am making here of terms like truth, person, and identity will 
strike some readers as quaint. Czarniawska (1997), for example, rejects the notion of a 
narrative rationality, advanced by Fisher (1987), Robinson and Hawpe (1986), and 
others, with its varying criteria for designating what is good and bad in a story and its 
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assumption of an arbitrating external reality. She embraces instead what she 
characterizes as a pragmatic view of narrative that focuses on the way narrative 
functions socially. A given story achieves or fails to achieve the immediate social 
purpose it had in being told. Neither the story nor the storyteller has any sort of 
ontological status outside this social context. Identities and stories have life only in the 
process of their creation or re-creation in particular situations of interchange. Beneath 
the situation there is nothing. This constructionist position goes beyond Kant in claiming 
that the reality behind appearances, the world story’s fabula, as it were, is not only 
unknowable, but nonexistent. Similar is Davies and Harré (1991) concept of positioning, 
which they offer in contradistinction to what they take to be the overly reified notion of 
role. The theory defines such identity categories as race and gender as positions one 
takes in conversations, not as continuous, stable, and determinative conditions. 
Narratives, by this view, presumably, would be seen as a medium for positioning, 
certainly not as manifestations of truth, identity, or anything external to them. My only 
answer to this critique is to point out that I have been looking throughout this 
dissertation at the subjective reality of the participants. From that perspective, truth, in 
the sense of correspondence between language and an outer reality, and identity, in the 
sense of a discrete, coherent, if conditioned self, may indeed be illusions. Acceptance of 
them, however, even ironic and provisional acceptance (Rorty, 1989), seems to be 
indispensable for the kind of ethic -- in perception, thought, and conduct – that is 
necessary for justice. A sense of the truth, and one’s integrity as a self, being at stake 
both motivate and make worthwhile the sacrifice of peace and comfort that justice 
requires. 
 Justice, in the simple sense of according all persons their due is, as Hampshire has 
argued (2000), not a product of harmony and reconciliation between opposing interests 
or principles. It emerges, rather, from the conflict between them, as long as there is 
fairness in hearing of both sides and the final compromise is one “where the tension 
between contrary forces and impulses, pulling against each other, is perceptible and 
vivid, and both forces and impulses have been kept at full strength” (Hampshire, 2000, 
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p. 32). This state of unresolved tension is never comfortable to the person or the 
institution that maintains it. At the tumultuous, ever-tenuous center one feels less in the 
presence of justice, and less the author of it, than one does at more extreme positions on 
either side, applying system to every decision task, no matter what its characteristics, or 
basking in a belief that one’s intuition unfailingly affords direct and complete knowledge 
of the world. That center, however, is where CPS and institutions like it carry out their 
missions. 
 
“My Head on the Chopping Block”: An Epilogue 
 
 After reading the first complete draft of this dissertation, the Chair of my committee, 
Dr. Carolyn Clark, said she wondered if some participants might feel their identities 
were insufficiently concealed. I have, after all, identified them by their real job titles 
their general locations. Others in the agency who read the dissertation might be able to 
guess who they were. Dr. Clark is also a strong believer in the collaborative nature of 
qualitative research and considered it not only fair, but “essential” that the participants 
have a chance to comment on my use of their contributions. 
 Between January 2002, when I finished my interviews, and February 2003 when I 
submitted the draft, four of the 20 participants – Arnold, Frieda, Yvonne, and Louise – 
had left state employment. I was able to send a message to Frieda through one of the 
other participants who had been friends with her – if she got the message, she chose not 
to answer – but I had no way of contacting the other three. So to the 16 participants to 
whom I still had access, I sent an email: 
 
My dissertation is just about done, at last, but before it's set in stone I wanted to give 
you and the other participants a chance to see what use I made of your interviews. 
The attached section contains all the material related to you, (You're "_____"), and 
the conclusions chapter, too, but if you'd like to see the whole thing, you certainly 
can. 
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I'd like to know if you are okay with the degree to which I've concealed your 
identity and if you think I've represented you fairly. I'd also be interested in your 
reactions to the thing as a whole. I know this is rather a lengthy bit, but just scan 
through the parts that aren't too dull, and get back to me, if you can, by, say March 
15. 
 
 I got few responses to the email. The section I sent was over a 100 pages, and I 
expect most felt they had no time to read it. Jennifer, in fact, wrote back to say that 
explicitly and asked for the page numbers of sections dealing with her. Once I provided 
them, her only comments were that I’d gotten her job title wrong and that she didn’t like 
seeing all her “ums” and “ahs” reproduced. That was also Nancy’s complaint. I assured 
them both that complete transcription was a usual feature of this kind of research and 
that, if it was any consolation, no one else came off any better. When I submit portions 
of the dissertation for publication I’ll probably delete those “ums” and “ahs.” Since I 
never make use of them in my analysis, they only serve to distract the reader and 
embarrass the participant. 
 Victor, the ombudsman, wrote the following: 
 
I have two comments. There is a distinction between the assessment of risk and the 
determination of whether or not abuse or neglect has occurred in a given situation. I 
was involved in the development of risk assessment tools beginning when I worked 
in Hawaii in 1983 and fully appreciate the role intuition must play in investigation 
and risk assessment, even in leading a worker to decisions about reunification or 
termination. However, the designation of someone as a perpetrator is at least a 
quasilegal process, and as such requires documentation to support that determination 
at the required level of proof. Risk assessment can be much more intuitive, but to act 
on the assessment beyond the investigation it too must be documented in a manner 
sufficient to convince others. 
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 I began in CPS in 1971 in Oregon, and have worked in Hawaii and Texas from 
investigations all the way through specializing in resolving difficult permanency 
cases. An error, or more accurately an oversight or bias, in the investigation can 
undermine CPS's ability to gain permanency for a child many years later. The short 
answer is CPS cannot effectively protect children or workers based on "because I 
feel it in my gut." 
 Second, every CPS worker that I know who has served very long has a horror 
story or two about things they should have noticed and acted on, but didn't. I suppose 
its a sort of quality control.  In the situation Sarah reports with the 18 month old with 
a spiral fracture of the femur; spiral fractures are generally caused by twisting. Spiral 
fractures are rarely accidental in non-ambulatory children. An 18 month old is 
probably ambulatory and the possibility the child trapped his or her foot while still in 
motion is a possible cause of the injury. 
 
 Victor appears to think I’m “soft” on intuition. He’s quite right, of course, when he 
says a finding based solely on someone’s gut feeling will not be persuasive to others, 
will not be sustained, and will therefore do nothing to protect a child at risk. I hope I 
haven’t written anything that suggests I believe otherwise. I am struck, though, by his 
comment about the “horror stories,” where investigators felt they missed cues, and a 
child was seriously injured or killed as a result. His suggestion that such events serve as 
“quality control,” presumably by making investigators become more systematic in their 
methods, is a bit chilling. At least one participant in this study though, Helen, describes 
her “horror story” having a definite “quality control” effect on her investigations. Victor 
seems to be implying, however, that were investigators exercising proper “quality 
control” all along, the “horror stories” wouldn’t happen. But even the strongest 
proponents of systematic decision making in CPS casework would not claim that linear 
models and other analytic tools can ever be foolproof. The realistic goal of such 
instruments is to reduce error to a minimum, not to wipe it out completely. There will 
always be cases of children suffering terrible harm in situations that displayed no 
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identified risk factors beforehand. So “horror stories” will always be with us. But in his 
comments Victor is once again displaying a faith in system expressive of his role as an 
expert analyst. As I have argued earlier in this chapter, it is conflict, not conciliation or 
compromise, between those at opposite ends of the cognitive continuum that produces 
justice. So we should see Victor’s resolute championing of system as compensating for 
the equally resolute faith in “gut feeling” at the other end of the continuum. 
 The only other substantive response I got was from Carmen. I have thought of 
Carmen as my “number one informant” on this project. She was among the first persons 
I interviewed, and it was in analyzing her narrative about the young woman who 
persuasively, but probably falsely, accused her stepfather of sexual abuse that I first 
discovered my major themes. Also I had a great liking for her as a person. Her 
enthusiasm, intelligence, skill, and commitment to children were all far above the 
ordinary, and I thought I had done well by her in the dissertation. I was stunned, then, 
when she sent me the following: 
 
I had a difficult time getting through the paper.  After reading the sections that I was 
a part of, Carmen's scenarios are conveyed as "failures" every time.  Carmen comes 
across as a supervisor who is unsure and makes poor decisions, and therefore her 
investigations are closed because of her poor abilities and lack of confidence.  I also 
felt towards the end that Carmen's outlook of closing a case was more for covering 
her ass then protecting the children.  I sincerely hope that people who read this do 
not put me together with Carmen.  I have worked very hard and feel that I have 
accomplished a great deal.  I would hate to think that my colleagues see this 
dissertation and feel like I have a lack of respect for their positions and their 
credentials.  I'm sure that you felt my energy during this process and know truly how 
much I love my job and do it for the children.  This energy and love for my job was 
not conveyed anywhere in Carmen's sections. I feel like I was portrayed in a poor 
light and maybe those who read this dissertation will wonder why the agency still 
employs me.   I did not read the whole paper and maybe my outlook is incorrect and 
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maybe Carmen is appropriately pictured in other sections, but I was a little disturbed 
with the sections that I did read.  I hope that you can understand where I am coming 
from and please do not allow my name to be associated with Carmen.  I understand 
that your paper is research and subjective.  I do wish you well with the final draft. 
  
 In something of a panic, I replied: 
 
It makes me think I must have done a really bad job of writing for you go get the 
impression you've gotten. To portray you as someone who makes poor decisions was 
the last thing I ever intended. I think you do what you do wonderfully well, and I 
hoped that had come across. Your narrative about the sexual abuse case is really the 
dissertation's centerpiece and, to me, demonstrates, more than any other of the other 
data, my main point that conscientious [people] in CPS, like you, have their basic 
understanding of case facts guided by a high standard of personal ethics and a 
devotion to the truth. I'm guessing that the bits you didn't like were earlier on when I 
was talking about the intuitiveness of people in the field versus the systematic 
thinking of administrators.  
Let me assure you that, first, nowhere in the dissertation or anywhere else will 
your real name be associated with Carmen's. Second I am ready to remove or change 
any part of the thing that you think puts you in a bad light. I really mean that. 
 What I would like to do is call you or see you in person again so that you can 
show me the parts you don't like. I promise not to get defensive.  
 What do you think about that? 
 
 Carmen answered: 
 
I am sorry if I made you feel if you did a bad job or if I came across defensive.  I did 
not read the whole paper and am certain that you did well.  I was just concerned with 
my narrative.  I did realize that my section was a major focus and I guess that's why I 
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was so scared when reading it.  I would like to talk to you and get a better 
understanding for the points in the paper which might help me to understand my own 
sections.  I am not angry with the paper, I was just taken back and a little scared that 
Carmen was unsure of her beliefs and decisions therefore making her case 
dispositions invalid.  You have put a lot of work into your dissertation and I do not 
feel that it needs to be changed.   You have researched points and analyzed methods 
that I am not aware of making it difficult for me to connect with.  I would like to talk 
and wouldn't mind a phone call or a meeting.   
 You know, in this position I worry and stress a great deal and always wonder if I 
am making the right decisions. It feels like every day I put my head on the chopping 
block for everybody to take a swing.  This leads to always worrying about what other 
people think of me and how I do my job.  I guess that's why I was worried with my 
sections.  Look forward to talking with you.   
 
 I visited Carmen about ten days later in her office. She was very cordial. After a bit 
of mutual catching up she repeated that she wasn’t asking for any changes to the 
dissertation, but was worried that she came across as indecisive and carping. It would 
damage her professionally, she feared, if anyone connected her to the “Carmen” of the 
study. I then tried to show how the parts of the dissertation pertaining to her functioned 
in the whole. I described the conflict between those at opposite ends of Hammond’s 
cognitive continuum and how I had quoted her to characterize the thinking of those who 
were more intuitive. Contrary to my expectations, though, this wasn’t the part about 
which Carmen was most concerned. It was the analysis of her narrative about the sexual 
abuse allegation that she felt put her in a bad light. I explained Pennington and Hastie’s 
story model of decision making and its description of the process as a nearly automatic 
one. Once a story incorporating the evidence is felt to have sufficient coverage, 
coherence, uniqueness, and goodness-of-fit, according to the theory, one accepts it as 
true. What Carmen displayed in they way she told the story was a willingness not to 
accept a story as true, despite having those characteristics, when it conflicted with an 
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internalized standard of truth. That standard required higher degrees of coverage, 
coherence, uniqueness, and goodness-of-fit than the evidence could offer, and, as it was 
not met, Carmen found herself unable to accept the available story as adequate. She 
rejected the emotional and intellectual comfort that acceptance of it would have brought 
in favor of a discomfort and lack of resolution that served her obligation to truth. My use 
of the word “failure” that Carmen lamented in her first email was my characterization 
not of the investigation, but of what seemed to be Carmen’s belief about it.  And what 
she was afraid might look like wishy-washiness to others was, to me, the hallmark of her 
scrupulousness and integrity as a decision maker. 
 Once I’d explained the overall structure of the dissertation and how her own pieces 
fit into it, Carmen said she felt better. She said she accepted that I had not meant to 
criticize her or her decision making. She wished me luck, and asked me to send her a 
copy of the final document.  
 I felt a strong sense of gratitude and relief as I left Carmen’s building. Over the 
preceding week, I’d had some anxious moments wondering what I would do if she 
hadn’t accepted my reassurances and demanded instead that all reference to her 
interviews be removed. As central as her data was to the dissertation, taking it all out 
would have been surgery the project might not have been able to survive. Relieved as I 
was, however, I also felt a kind of hollowness. It seemed to me that, though Carmen’s 
worst fears had subsided, she probably still wished she’d never agreed to be interviewed. 
The possibility that someone could read her sections the same way she had, form a bad 
opinion of her, guess who she was, and deny her promotion, were perhaps reduced, but 
still existed. But even if that never happened, she still felt exposed and betrayed, not 
necessarily because anything I wrote about her was unfair, but simply because she had 
given to someone else, without quite realizing that she was doing so, the right to 
represent her, to expose her, and to make of her an object of scrutiny. The fact that her 
real name isn’t used was almost beside the point. She is Carmen, and in the dissertation 
things are said about her, which may cause other things to be thought about her, whether 
they figure out her identity or not, over which she has no control. During the interviews 
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she probably felt quite differently. Though she was responding to my questions, her 
interests, experiences, and opinions were what guided and filled up the conversation. In 
the dissertation the opposite is the case. However prominent a place I give her words, 
and however well I interpret them, it’s altogether my little universe, and I am, quite 
literally, free to make of her whatever I please. Nothing I could have said to her in that 
last conversation would have fully removed that feeling she had of being done up and 
put on display. Her willingness to accept my reassurances, I think, expressed a great deal 
more kindness than peace of mind. I have taken another look at everything having to do 
with Carmen in the dissertation and did find one paragraph where I was careless in 
attributing to her an attitude she had not expressed. I’ve amended that and left the rest 
unchanged. 
 My hope, when I completed the dissertation, was that if any of the participants who 
read it were displeased with what I wrote about them, they could nonetheless accept that 
studies of human judgment are necessarily studies of human fallibility, and that whatever 
decision-making weaknesses I pointed out did not in any way reflect upon their industry, 
their dedication to abused and neglected children, or their overall worth as CPS 
employees. I wanted for all the participants, and the administrators who gave me 
permission to recruit them, to believe my research had done justice to the gifts of time, 
thoughtfulness, and candor they made to it. Given Carmen’s reaction, though, and given 
how flattering I thought I’d been to her, it seems likely that others may have felt as she 
did, but were too disgusted, too busy, or too indifferent to write back. If that were so, it 
raised the question of what had I accomplished that could make up for the distress and 
bother I’d caused people.  
 I don’t think my findings – about conflict across the continuum, the ethical and 
rational aspects of intuition – would be seen as dramatic or innovative enough, in and of 
themselves, to mollify any participants who believed their courtesy had poorly rewarded. 
The awful word “interesting” was the only one used by both of those who commented 
upon the findings at all. Very few people, in CPS or anywhere else, feel the need for a 
new theory to explain what they do every day. And as much spread out over the 
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cognitive continuum as the 20 participants were, it was my impression that they were 
overwhelmingly more “sensing” than “intuitive,” in the Myers-Briggs sense, focused, as 
they tended to be, on concrete facts and procedures, and not on over-arching abstractions 
about them. So only a concrete change in agency practice that resulted from the findings 
would have the power to redeem what might otherwise seem a bad bargain. 
 I believe my findings do support the recommendations I have made that intuition be 
recognized as not only a necessary, but beneficial component of CPS decision making 
and that its managers and trainers should aim at helping decision makers discipline their 
intuition and at creating a decision-making environment that optimizes it, rather than 
ignoring or actively trying to eliminate it. Creating such an environment would, it seems 
to me now, be doing nothing more, and nothing less, than enabling Carmen and others 
like her in the organization to realize their full potential as decision makers and to feel 
more secure in the exercise of their judgment. That would mean, as argued above, 
finding ways to give her and her workers more time to investigate and deliberate. It 
would also mean giving her training in some of the research I reviewed above and in 
Chapter II. Knowing the sources of error and bias, as well as techniques for countering 
them, can make intuitive decision making much more accurate and balanced. It would 
mean allowing for more “reminding,” to use Carmen’s word, back and forth across the 
continuum. Since one’s choice of decision-making method has much to do with the 
structure of the task at hand, dealing routinely with only one kind of task could lead to 
loss of flexibility and a kind of judgmental dogmatism. Carmen and her investigators 
should on occasion be involved in the kinds of desk reviews that the ombudsman’s 
office and the risk directors do. Ombudsmen and risk directors should go out into the 
field and work cases a week or two a year. Finally, it would mean acknowledging and 
exploring the ethical character of case construction and of judgment disagreements. 
Failing to recognize that conflict in CPS decision making often arises from differing 
notions of the good allows opponents to attribute their differences to lack of 
understanding, compassion, or industriousness on the part of their opponents.  
 Though the creation of a more intuition-conscious culture in the agency might not 
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make Carmen’s daily decisions easier to make, and though the consequences of error 
would still be terrible, she could come to feel less vulnerable and anxious. To permit 
myself one last bit of interpretation of her words, I believe my treatment of her in this 
dissertation only exacerbated, and did not create, her sense of having her head on the 
chopping block. That comes, at least in part, from the knowledge that she must use her 
intuitive judgment every day and be responsible for the consequences, without that 
judgment having been trained, guided, authorized, or even officially recognized to exist. 
Policy and decision-making tools, if not policy makers and tool designers themselves, 
make room for judgment only by implication and by the leaving of gaps. Carmen’s 
working life would be much improved, and my debt to her reduced, if this research could 
cause the role her judgment plays to become acknowledged more explicitly, and her 
capacity as a decision maker to be more nourished, supported, and honored than it is 
now. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
Subjective Aspects of Judgment and  
Decision-Making In Child Protective Services 
Consent Form 
 
I understand that I am being asked to participate in a research study on judgment and 
decision-making in Child Protective Services (CPS) casework.  The study is being 
conducted by Robert Daniel and will be the subject of his Ph.D. dissertation at Texas 
A&M University.  I understand that I am to be one of 15 to 25 CPS caseworkers, 
supervisors, and administrators who will be interviewed one or more times, for a total of 
no more than two hours each, between May 1, 2001 and December 31, 2001.  I 
understand these interviews will be tape recorded, transcribed verbatim, and analyzed.  
Since verbatim transcripts are critical to the methodology, I understand that a refusal to 
be tape-recorded will be taken as a refusal to participate in the study.   
 
I understand that I may choose where my interview(s) will take place. 
 
I understand that Mr. Daniel has received permission from Regional Director Susan 
Thomson for my interviews to be conducted during working hours. 
 
I understand that I will be asked questions about CPS cases I have worked on and 
decisions I have made or helped to make regarding them, but I will not give names or 
other information that could identify clients. 
 
I understand that I may refuse to participate in this study without any job 
consequences whatever.  If I agree to be interviewed, I may refuse to answer any 
question or discuss any particular subject that makes me feel uncomfortable.   I may later 
withdraw consent that I have previously given, also without job consequences.  I 
understand that if I do that, Mr. Daniel will erase the tape recording of our interview, 
delete the transcript from his computer files, and destroy any hard copies he has printed.  
I understand, too, that if I say something in the interview I later wish I had not said, I can 
have Mr. Daniel erase it, in my presence, from the tape.  If he has already made a 
transcript, the portion of it I want to withdraw will be deleted from it, and all hard copies 
containing that segment will be destroyed. 
 
I understand that my participation in this study will be held confidential.  No one but 
Mr. Daniel and the five members of his Advisory Committee will have access to the tape 
recordings and the transcripts made from them.  In Mr. Daniel’s working documents, in 
his dissertation, and in any subsequent publication of the study, my real name will not be 
used.  The names of any persons I discuss during the interview, both clients and CPS 
staff, will also be changed.  My job title will be given, however, and anything I say 
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during the interview(s) may be reproduced word for word.  
 
I understand that Mr. Daniel will keep the tapes of my interview(s) indefinitely, 
stored securely in his home.  I may, however, ask him to destroy the tape at any time.   
 
I understand that I am to receive no payment of any kind for my participation in this 
study, or gain any job benefit. 
 
I understand that my participation in the study will not affect my CPS employment 
in any way. 
 
I understand that if I have questions about this study I may contact the Chairperson 
of Mr. Daniel’s Advisory Committee, Dr. Adrianne Bonham, whose address, phone 
number, and E-Mail appear below. 
 
I understand that this research study has been reviewed and approved by the 
Institutional Review Board – Human Subjects in Research, Texas A&M University.  For 
research-related problems or questions regarding subjects’ rights, I can contact the 
Institutional Review Board through Dr. Richard E. Miller, IRB Coordinator, Office of 
Vice President for Research and Associate Provost for Graduate Studies at (979) 845-
8585.   
 
I have read and understand the explanation provided to me.  I have had all my 
questions answered to my satisfaction, and I voluntarily agree to participate in the study. 
 
I have been given a copy of this consent form. 
 
________________________________    _______________ 
Signature of participant        Date 
 
________________________________    _______________ 
Signature of principal investigator       Date 
 
Principal investigator: 
Robert Daniel 
1202 Castle Hill 
Austin, TX 78703 
(512) 478-7815 
rdaniel3@aol.com 
 
Chairperson of Mr. Daniel’s Advisory Committee: 
Dr. Adrianne Bonham 
(979) 845-5497 
bonham@acs.tamu.edu 
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